The empire strikes back: Adam Smith,John Stuart Mill,and the Robust Political Economy of empire

Recent scholarship regarding the idea of a U.S. Empire has raised serious questions as to the feasibility and desirability of imperial ambitions. This paper traces the debate over the net-benefit of empire back to the Classical economists. Adam Smith argued that the British Empire was a net cost while John Stuart Mill concluded the same empire was a net benefit. Contemporary arguments about a U.S. Empire map neatly to the divergent views of Smith and Mill. In addition to engaging in an exercise in history of thought, we use Smith’s political economy as a means of adjudicating between the different claims regarding the feasibility of empire. In doing so, we subject the claims of proponents of American Empire against the standard of robust political economy, which holds that intervention must generate desirable outcomes where less than ideal incentive and epistemic conditions hold. In doing so, we conclude that many of the claims made by proponents are fragile under less than ideal conditions.     

Topology of economic systems

An economic topology can have many uses to the academician, student and practitioner. Refining a topology of economic systems helps to bring together seemingly disparate characteristics and to point out potential long run trends. The progression of economic systems over time and also brief explanations of each system are given. We argue that most modem economic systems have some remnants of earlier forms, that is, most economies today are some mixture of what might be considered pure systems. Measurable characteristics to identify a particular system are developed that allows progress to or from a particular classification to be charted for individual countries.     

A Model of Competing Jurisdictions with Locally Polluting Environments and Mobile Populations

In this model we consider a federation consisting oftwo geographically separated Regional states withlocal taxing authority. The residents of thefederation are identical in preferences and haveexplicit tolerance to pollution. Pollution is local innature and is a by-product of production implying amore highly populated region would generate morepollution. Local authorities in the regions can andwill (in the interest of local residents) engage ingame theoretical taxation strategies. The model isused to illustrate that Nash Equilibrium can resultwherein the two regions have different levels ofenvironmental quality. The resulting Nash conditionsimply for instance that residents of the ``cleanregion' will subsidize those in the other region tostay in the more polluted environment (in order foreach to accomplish their preferred consumption andenvironmental quality pair).     

Not just guidelines: Pirate codes and the emergence of property rights in <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Invisible Hook</Emphasis>

Peter Leeson’s The Invisible Hook provides a readable and entertaining narrative of the hidden economics of the Golden Age of Piracy. This essay comments on one particular aspect of Leeson’s work: what we can learn from pirates about the emergence and evolution of property rights? I conclude that pirate codes had their origins in part in legally enforceable agreements and that pirates’ blend of individual and communal property rights bore some resemblance to the property rights of wandering tribal peoples.