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71.
Kyu Sang Lee 《Experimental Economics》2005,8(2):171
This dissertation aims at elucidating the history of Vernon Smith’s experimental economics by focusing its attention upon the three themes of rationality, minds and machines that assumed significance at different (albeit overlapping) stages of the development of Smith’s experimental economics with the help of his published and unpublished papers.Chapter 1 is devoted to the scrutiny of the form of rationality incorporated into the portions of Smith’s laboratory experiments whose results have usually been taken as corroborations of his “Hayek Hypothesis.” By bringing into the foreground Smith’s definite position on demand theory and its concrete instantiations on many different occasions, we make the case that Smith has consistently imposed by means of the induced value theory certain narrowly defined preference structures that have definite implications for the form of rationality instantiated in the laboratory.The main narrative in Chapter 2 concerns Smith’s intellectual interchanges with behavioral scientists in the early 1960s, more specifically, his reactions to behavioral scientists’ attempts at cognitive modeling. We present several reasons for interpreting Smith’s initiation of the attempt at the maximization-based induced value theory as an endeavor to discipline subjects’ minds. We also provide in Chapter 2 a portrayal of Smith’s missed opportunities to get involved in the large-scale laboratory experimentation projects pursued in the 1950s in close connection with several branches of psychology.Chapter 3 consists of two parts. In Part 1, we describe the origin of mechanism design economics, and offer a detailed explanation of the analytical kinship between Smith’s “microeconomic system theory” and the standard conceptual framework utilized in mechanism design economics. Part 2 is devoted to describing the roles played by the computer in both Smith’s empirical research agenda and the theoretical, mechanism design research pursued by Stanley Reiter (one of Smith’s intellectual companions since the 1950s). Our historical narrative in Chapter 3 is intended to clarify that computer experience and computational theory drove the development of Reiter’ version of mechanism design economics, and that they also (partially) shaped some crucial events in the history of Smith’s version of experimental economics.JEL Classification: B21, B31, C90, C92, D02Prof. Philip E. Mirowski: Advisor 相似文献
72.
Passage of an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) overhaul bill in 1998 reflects the depth of American taxpayer frustration with the agency. We bring a constitutional, or rules of the game, perspective to tax enforcement. We examine political costs and benefits and agency discretion as reasons why tax enforcement by the government might deviate from the preferences of a representative citizen. We also examine prospects for reform. Lasting reform must alter the rules for deciding tax enforcement policy or the political pressures which yield excessive enforcement today will reemerge in the future. 相似文献
73.
Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma.
In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to
reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge
sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties.
We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also
punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease
the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly
lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation.
We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University
of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson,
Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful
comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available
from the authors. 相似文献
74.
In a 1994 paper, extending the well-known incremental surplus subsidy scheme of Sappington and Sibley, Schwermer presented a non-Bayesian incentive scheme for regulating a Cournot oligopoly industry. This note designs an oligopolistic incentive scheme for a hierarchical Stackelberg model in which firms choose outputs sequentially. 相似文献
75.
The paper attempts to identify the telecom-sector performance indicators, relevant economic variables, and institutional characteristics
of a country that effect the process of privatization of state-owned telecom enterprises. Using standard duration analysis
of a panel data, we demonstrate that the privatization incentives are not only shaped by the mobility of financial capital
in a country but are also influenced by the degree of competitiveness of private sector participation in policy-making process.
The empirical results also reveal the significant impact of productive efficiency in telecom service provision on its course
to privatization.
We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. We are solely responsible for all mistakes. 相似文献
76.
Charles C. Okeahalam 《International Review of Applied Economics》2007,21(5):669-685
Indicators of market power can be ambiguous because cost economies associated with scale and not market imperfections may influence results. This article illustrates that without direct measures of concentration, estimates of costs, scale economies and profitability can be used to identify market power in banking. Secondly, via this method, econometric estimates provide meaningful evidence of market power in the South African banking sector over the study sample period (1979–1998). A reasonable conclusion is that while industrial structure is important, careful consideration needs to be given to cost economies and profitability when assessing market power. In addition, there is a need to consider appropriate policy to reduce market power in banking in South Africa. 相似文献
77.
Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain
about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation
(CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical
nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental
evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components
that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private
good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a
probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the
winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in
the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion
of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness
of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect
on the winning bid.
相似文献
78.
Taxation of Mobile Factors as Insurance under Uncertainty 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Kangoh Lee 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2004,106(2):253-271
This paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors, i.e., capital, under uncertainty. The wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks. Since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction, and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed, taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages. In particular, the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages, thereby providing insurance. For this reason, jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump‐sum taxation is available. In addition, this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition, and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition. 相似文献
79.
Entry deterrence and innovation in durable-goods monopoly 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable-goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well. We show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good. The equilibrium is therefore determined not only by the incentive for intertemporal price discrimination in durable-goods monopoly, but also by the incumbent's concern for maintaining the technological leadership. We demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation. 相似文献
80.
Charles J. Corbett Frank J. C. Debets Luk N. Van Wassenhove 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1996,7(3):287-305
Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable. 相似文献