A Note on Minimax Mixture of Distributions Free Procedure for Inventory Model with Variable Lead Time

In recent papers, Moon and Choi (1998) and Hariga and Ben-Daya (1999)considered a continuous review inventory model with a mixture of backordersand lost sales in which the lead time, the order quantity, and the reorder pointare decision variables was studied. Moreover, they also develop a minimaxdistribution free procedure for the problem. While the demands of differentcustomers are not identical in the lead time, then we can't only use a singledistribution (such as Moon & Choi (1998) and Hariga & Ben-Daya (1999))to describe the demand of the lead time. Hence, we correct and extend the modelof Moon and Choi (1998) and Hariga and Ben-Daya (1999) by considering thelead time demand with the mixture of distributions. In addition, we also applythe minimax mixture of distributions free approach to the model by simultaneouslyoptimizing the order quantity, the reorder point, and the lead time to devise a practical procedure which can be used without specific information on demand distribution.     

Revealed preference and differentiable demand

Summary. We prove that, for finitely many demand observations, the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference tests not only the existence of a strictly concave, strictly monotone and continuous utility generator, but also one that generates an infinitely differentiable demand function. Our results extend those of previous related results (Matzkin and Richter, 1991; Chiappori and Rochet, 1987), yielding differentiable demand functions but without requiring differentiable utility functions.Received: 1 November 2001, Revised: 5 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, D12. Correspondence to: Kam-Chau WongThis is a much revised version of Lee and Wong (2001). We are grateful to the Referee for valuable suggestions. We also thank Professor Marcel K. Richter for his comments.     

A MARKET WITH FRICTIONS IN THE MATCHING PROCESS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*

We construct a laboratory market in which there is a friction in the matching between buyers and sellers. Sellers simultaneously post prices and then buyers simultaneously choose a seller. If more than one buyer chooses the same seller, the seller's single unit is randomly sold to one of them. Our results show a broad consistency with theoretical predictions, although price dispersion exists and is slow to decay. Prices also exceed the equilibrium level when there are only two sellers, and buyers' purchase probabilities are insufficiently responsive to price differences when there are two sellers.     

The First U.S. Food Stamp Program: An Example of Rent Seeking and Avoiding

Abstract . Rent seeking involves the wasteful expenses incurred to secure, acquire, or maintain a monopoly position. Rent avoiding involves the expenditures undertaken to avoid the imposition of rent-seeking costs. Each represents a social cost of Tullock rectangle loss in addition to the dead-weight or Harberger triangle loss that combined to form the Harberger-Tullock trapezoid social cost. The first Food Stamp Program in the United States came about through the rent-seeking and/or rent-avoiding efforts of farmers, grocers, bankers, and other economic agents and did not lead to the promotion of social welfare. The evidence of these self-interested efforts was gleaned from articles in the New York Times and government documents. The first Food Stamp Program also fits the economic theory of regulation developed by Stigler, Jordan, Peltzman and others, and it involved imposed costs on economic agents as the program evolved.     

Unionism and the public sector

It is incorrect and misleading to speak of unionization as a ‘human right’. The only human right is ‘self-ownership’, i.e. to pursue goals with one's own abilities but with no force or fraud against others. Government cannot dispense rights, only privileges and protections to some at the expense of others. A minimal degree of coercion exercised by government is unavoidable. But labor unions are not governments. Government has granted significant privileges to unions in the private sector, but such are not appropriate for public sector unions.     

Improving perishable product inventory management using goal programming

The multiple objectives of perishable product inventory management are examined in this paper. These objectives include: (1) satisfying demand by carrying sufficient inventories, (2) holding down inventory carrying costs, (3) keeping the amount of product spoilage (outdating) at an acceptable level, and (4) maintaining quality by using the product while it is still fresh, and (5) keeping the cost of rotation low. Some of the above objectives are in conflict. Thus, certain redistribution policies may help attain one or more of these objectives to a greater extent. Redistribution involves the transfer of the product from outlets where demand is low to outlets where demand is high. A goal programming model for solving redistribution problems is presented. An example is provided and sensitivity analysis is performed in order to determine when redistribution is advantageous. Applicability of the model is discussed.