The Dominant Firm Model Revisited

This paper extends the standard Forchheimer dominant firm model by making more explicit shifts in the fringe supply when the market price set the dominant firm deviate from its limit price. It demonstrated how, when a dominant firm engages in short-run profit maximization, the market price it sets in the long run will equal its limit price and that, in certain situations, increased production cost for fringe lead to an increase in the number of fringe firms in the long run.     

Supra-national regulation for supra-national telecommunications carriers?

The article reviews the extraordinary number of international ventures by major telecommunications organizations and explores problems for traditional national regulation that these global networks create. A theoretical model is defined that illustrates the adjustment process of different national policies to each other. The choice of various supra-national regulatory arrangements is shown to be affecting substantive policy. The article then discusses options for coordination and concludes that the concrete problems created by supra-national carriers do not justify the hidden cost of elaborate mechanisms of supra-national policy. Since such coordination has traditionally been used to prop up monopoly arrangements, a better approach for the foreseeable future is to encourage more national policy experimentation and focus less on international policy coordination.