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111.
112.
Alex Possajennikov 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):921-928
Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff
depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth.
Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University
of Mannheim is acknowledged.
RID="*"
ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de) 相似文献
113.
Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts
subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU)
model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in
fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts
are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in
better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets.
Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian
National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges
the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055.
Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan 相似文献
114.
In the mid-nineties FIFA decided to increase from two to three the number of points assigned to the winning team of a soccer
match played under traditional round-robin national leagues. Since a game of soccer can be regarded as a contest, FIFA's measure
provides an interesting case-study for analysing how a change in the system of rewards (from a zero to a non-zero sum rule)
may affect the contestants' equilibrium behaviour. In this paper we try to assess, both theoretically and empirically, whether
FIFA's new point rule has changed soccer towards a more offensive game, in which teams adopt more risky strategies. In particular,
we evaluate the “na?ve hypothesis” according to which the measure would induce every team to play always more offensively,
and we explore the extent to which the change in teams' behaviour may be affected by quality differentials between teams.
Our most important hypothesis is that when the asymmetry between opposing teams is large enough, an increase in the reward
for victory induces the weaker team to play more defensively, rather than the opposite. By looking at a subset of matches
held in the Portuguese first division league, which approximate the conditions of our model, we find support for this hypothesis.
First version received: July 1999/Final version received: May 2001 相似文献
115.
Jenifer Piesse Igor Filatotchev Yung-Chih Lien 《International Review of Economics》2007,54(1):176-193
This paper examines the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics on performance in publicly traded Taiwanese
firms that are controlled by founding families. Results show that when shares are owned by institutional investors, particularly
foreign financial institutions, firms perform better. However, where families are the major shareholders, this is not the
case. In addition, boards that are independent of the financial interests of the founding family have a positive impact on
performance, whether measured by accounting ratios, operating performance or the stock market. (JEL: P52, G32) 相似文献
116.
We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally
complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented
as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry
properties of the structure 相似文献
117.
Nigar Hashimzade 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):907-912
Summary. In this paper I analyze the general equilibrium in a random Walrasian economy. Dependence among agents is introduced in the
form of dependency neighborhoods. Under the uncertainty, an agent may fail to survive due to a meager endowment in a particular
state (direct effect), as well as due to unfavorable equilibrium price system at which the value of the endowment falls short
of the minimum needed for survival (indirect terms-of-trade effect). To illustrate the main result I compute the stochastic
limit of equilibrium price and probability of survival of an agent in a large Cobb-Douglas economy.
Received June 7, 2001; revised version: January 7, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar and Thomas DiCiccio for helpful discussion and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions. 相似文献
118.
Synopsis It has been proposed that open thermodynamic systems will act to dissipate available energy gradients by self-organizing into
coherent structures that, with time, evolve and develop into nested hierarchies – panarchies – that adapt to internal and
external changes according to a characteristic adaptive cycle. This paper seeks to apply these ideas in the purely societal
realm by investigating the role of money in economic systems. Money represents the value embodied in goods; a value that is
separate from the exact nature of those goods. We suggest that money thereby liberates the ‘free value’ of economic desire
and that this free value has properties analogous to energy. The result is the self-organization of structures and systems
(‘econosystems’) that dissipate this ‘free value’. Econosystems act at different scales, and nested levels of econosystems
form a panarchy, having effects that can be observed. In particular, it appears that money facilitates the creation of relationships
between econosystem actors, increasing the connectedness of the econosystems that envelop those actors. We have identified
a phenomenon whereby freed social value (i.e. money) can aggregate, or pool, at a larger econosystem scale in structures such
as banks. These pools act as gradients that actors at the neighborhood scale can exploit for self-organization in the econosystem.
Thus, econosystem actors appear to be freed from thermodynamic constraints by using money as a means of self-organization.
However, because of these pools of aggregated social exergy, connectedness is increased at the larger scale of the econosystem.
The potential consequence of this dynamic is that money may act to push larger scale econosystems toward a state of heightened
vulnerability to collapse, while freeing smaller scale actors from apparent constraints. In this way, we propose that money
acts to skew information feedback loops between econosystem actors and larger scale structures such as economies and ecosystems.
相似文献
119.
Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain
about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation
(CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical
nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental
evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components
that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private
good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a
probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the
winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in
the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion
of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness
of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect
on the winning bid.
相似文献
120.