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141.
Conchita Garcés Ayerbe Carmen Galve Górriz 《International Advances in Economic Research》2003,9(2):123-132
This study presents theoretical arguments and evidence that attempt to show the contribution of economic mechanisms typical
of a business for resolving problems of environmental protection. Firstly, a brief synopsis is given of the classic solutions
that environmental economics proposes for correcting environmental externalities. Next, the benefit of expanding these two
mechanisms is discussed so that they include those intermediate mechanisms for which it is not possible to clearly establish
if they are developed within the domain of the market or the business. The study's focus resides in the fact that the explicit
expansion of the range of solutions proposed from a macroeconomic point of view establishes a connecting point between environmental
economics and business economics, an area in which academic attention to environmental matters has been significantly less.
The present work forms part of research project SEC2002-00835, financed by MCYT-FEDER. 相似文献
142.
Olga Shvetsova 《Constitutional Political Economy》2005,16(2):125-141
William Riker ((1964) Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little Brown) stressed the problem of the contested nature of federal institutions and argued that federations existed
amidst the ongoing challenge to their rules, that federal institutions were being continuously endogenously produced in the
interaction of political parties rather than serving as self-enforceable constraints on the political process. As parties
changed, so did federalism, and eventually the balance was bound to shift to either one or the other extreme as far as the
degree of centralization was concerned. An alternative approach to essentially the same problem of federal instability was
to conceptualize the underlying game differently, as a game of coordination, so that institutions would be accepted as constraints
and would therefore be self-enforceable because they allow the players to avoid the chaos and successfully converge to an
outcome with payoffs exceeding their reservation values (Hardin, 1989, Ordeshook, 1992). The third proposed solution, consociationalism,
emphasizes the elite effort to overcome the conflictual nature of the institutional choice (Lijphart, 1977). Here, as in the
coordination argument, the hope is that one could create incentives for politicians to view the existing rules as advantageous
and to avoid redistribution by means of the institutional revision. Yet, just like the coordination argument, it is based
on an implicit assumption that politicians are more easily motivated to act “cooperatively” than are their constituencies.
The missing step in the literature is the mechanism by which this more or less “cooperative” behavior of elected politicians
could be sustainable in the environment of popular accountability. An essential component in building the theory of institutional
design is to show the possibility in a democracy of elected politicians cooperating on institutional matters even when each
of their constituencies would prefer to adjust the constitutional terms to its own advantage. Elite “cooperativeness” must
be sustainable even in the presence of outside challengers promising to stay closer to the constituent preferences. Here,
I present a model of mass-elite equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy, which demonstrates the possibility to motivate the
incumbents to sustain the institutional stability while at the same time protecting them from electoral defeat. I also discuss
the difficulties and limitations that such a solution faces, in particular, in plural societies.
JEL classification: H77, D02
In working on this paper, I have benefited from the discussions with Mikhail Filippov, Peter Ordeshook, Charles Kromkowski,
Carol Mershon, and from the comments of the participants of the conference on ‘‘Micro-Foundations of Federal Institutional
Stability’’ at the MicroIncentives Research Center at Duke University, Durham, NC, April 30–May 1, 2004, and of the Lansing
Lee proseminar at the University of Virginia. The responsibility for the many remaining flaws is solely mine. 相似文献
143.
Alex Possajennikov 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):921-928
Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff
depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth.
Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University
of Mannheim is acknowledged.
RID="*"
ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de) 相似文献
144.
Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts
subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU)
model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in
fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts
are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in
better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets.
Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian
National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges
the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055.
Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan 相似文献
145.
In the mid-nineties FIFA decided to increase from two to three the number of points assigned to the winning team of a soccer
match played under traditional round-robin national leagues. Since a game of soccer can be regarded as a contest, FIFA's measure
provides an interesting case-study for analysing how a change in the system of rewards (from a zero to a non-zero sum rule)
may affect the contestants' equilibrium behaviour. In this paper we try to assess, both theoretically and empirically, whether
FIFA's new point rule has changed soccer towards a more offensive game, in which teams adopt more risky strategies. In particular,
we evaluate the “na?ve hypothesis” according to which the measure would induce every team to play always more offensively,
and we explore the extent to which the change in teams' behaviour may be affected by quality differentials between teams.
Our most important hypothesis is that when the asymmetry between opposing teams is large enough, an increase in the reward
for victory induces the weaker team to play more defensively, rather than the opposite. By looking at a subset of matches
held in the Portuguese first division league, which approximate the conditions of our model, we find support for this hypothesis.
First version received: July 1999/Final version received: May 2001 相似文献
146.
Kwang-Hyun Chung Rudolph A. Jacob Ya B. Tang 《International Advances in Economic Research》2003,9(2):152-162
This study examines motivation and stock market reactions of firms announcing earnings in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) after
filing with the Security Exchange Commission (SEC). Most firms announce earnings in the WSJ before SEC filing. Firms that
reverse this sequence are voluntarily delaying public earnings announcements. The authors find that these firms are not only
poor financial performers but also engage in earnings managements. They are delaying their WSJ announcements to postpone announcing
bad news. The authors find significant stock price reactions to both the SEC filing and the WSJ announcement. The price reaction
to earnings is incomplete at the SEC filings. The market continues reacting to firms' subsequent WSJ announcements as if the
SEC filing fails to communicate earnings information to some investors. 相似文献
147.
Jenifer Piesse Igor Filatotchev Yung-Chih Lien 《International Review of Economics》2007,54(1):176-193
This paper examines the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics on performance in publicly traded Taiwanese
firms that are controlled by founding families. Results show that when shares are owned by institutional investors, particularly
foreign financial institutions, firms perform better. However, where families are the major shareholders, this is not the
case. In addition, boards that are independent of the financial interests of the founding family have a positive impact on
performance, whether measured by accounting ratios, operating performance or the stock market. (JEL: P52, G32) 相似文献
148.
We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally
complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented
as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry
properties of the structure 相似文献
149.
Nigar Hashimzade 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):907-912
Summary. In this paper I analyze the general equilibrium in a random Walrasian economy. Dependence among agents is introduced in the
form of dependency neighborhoods. Under the uncertainty, an agent may fail to survive due to a meager endowment in a particular
state (direct effect), as well as due to unfavorable equilibrium price system at which the value of the endowment falls short
of the minimum needed for survival (indirect terms-of-trade effect). To illustrate the main result I compute the stochastic
limit of equilibrium price and probability of survival of an agent in a large Cobb-Douglas economy.
Received June 7, 2001; revised version: January 7, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar and Thomas DiCiccio for helpful discussion and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions. 相似文献
150.
Andrea Saayman 《International Advances in Economic Research》2007,13(2):183-199
This article indicates how different measures of the real exchange rate, i.e., the exchange rate adapted for cost inflation,
price inflation and labour costs, influence the equilibrium view and misalignment of the South African rand/US dollar exchange
rate. The approach followed is based on the behavioural equilibrium exchange rate approach by Clark and MacDonald (1998), where the exchange rate is influenced by a number of fundamental and transitory factors. The real equilibrium exchange
is estimated by using a single equation regression and a number of key explanatory variables. To determine the long-run relationship
a Vector Error Correction Mechanism is used. 相似文献