State-owned (SO) multinational enterprises (MNEs) from emerging economies face two contradictory effects on their foreign operations due to their linkage with their home-country governments. Although home governments provide SO MNEs with resources, the affiliation also exposes SO MNEs to the legitimacy challenges in the host countries. Given this theoretical debate, we propose that home government support may facilitate SO MNEs’ post-entry operations in the host markets. Furthermore, because the legitimacy pressures directed at SO MNEs may be contingent on the interstate relations between the host and home governments facilitated by China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the BRI cooperative relations may shift the effect of home government support. Using survey and archival data, we find that home government support has a positive impact on the foreign performance of SO subsidiaries. This effect is weaker in countries that are cooperating with the BRI than in those that are not. Moreover, institutional distance weakens the negative interactive effect between BRI cooperation and home government support on the performance of SO MNEs’ foreign subsidiaries. These findings extend the institutional perspective by highlighting an alternative source of legitimacy for MNEs with distinctive attributes and in various host conditions.
While research and development (R&D) investment has been procyclical in the post-war period, recent literature suggests that
the optimal path for R&D is countercyclical, and that the economy would be better off by subsidizing R&D in recessions. The
objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare effects of distortions in the intertemporal allocation of R&D resources
and to compare diverse policy interventions so as to improve social welfare. To this end, we introduce a calibrated dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model with Schumpeterian endogenous growth that is capable of explaining the observed procyclicality
of R&D. Our results show that the cost of business cycles is lower in the decentralized economy with procyclical R&D than
in the efficient allocation with countercyclical R&D. This is because the suboptimal propagation of shocks in the decentralized
equilibrium offsets some of the existing steady-state distortions. In this second-best context, countercyclical R&D subsidies have no positive effect on welfare. In contrast, fiscal policies aimed at restoring
the optimal steady-state produce large welfare gains. 相似文献
We report on an experiment conducted to evaluate the effects of varying the way in which market information is presented to
participants in laboratory Cournot duopolies. We find that the most standard variations, which are the use of a profit table
or a profit calculator, yield indistinguishable performance. However, the addition of a best-response option to the profit
calculator tends to increase aggregate output to the Cournot level and decrease the incidence of tacit collusion. 相似文献