A modified logit model for time series with an application to the pricing behaviour of manufacturing firms in Australia

The modified logit model (Amemiya and Nold, 1975) is generalised to the case where the error term is autocorrelated. The asymptotic distribution (as n →∞ and T →∞) of a feasible GLS estimator of β is derived. Tests of linear restrictions on β and the significance of ρ are presented. The results of the applied work suggest that the factors which explain the pricing behaviour of manufacturing firms, as reported in the tendency survey conducted by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Westpac Banking Corporation, include historical inflation rates of up to 7 quarters and capacity utilisation. First version received: March 2001/Final version received: July 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  The first draft of this paper was written while the author was on study leave at the Department of Econometrics, University of Sydney, Australia.     

Approximate equilibria in microeconomic rational expectations models

For general equilibrium models in which prices transmit information among asymmetrically informed traders, strict rational expectations approximate equilibria are defined. A state-dependent price function is an ε-equilibrium if, when agents use their own information and that conveyed by prices, aggregate excess demand (in each state of the world) does not exceed ε. For any positive ε, existence requires only very mild assumptions—continuity and compact support. Moreover, there are revealing ε-equilibria for all smooth economies satisfying a dimensionality condition. In an open neighborhood of this case, existence of maximally revealing ε-equilibria holds.     

Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategy-proof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I prove three theorems. First, every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial. Second, this paper's strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow's rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-negative response, and citizens' sovereignty conditions for social welfare functions. Third, Arrow's general possibility theorem is proven in a new manner.     

Ombudsman schemes in the United Kingdom's financial sector: The insurance ombudsman,the banking ombudsman,and the building societies ombudsman

The problems facing consumers in pursuing complaints against suppliers through the courts are well known and have given rise to the development of alternative strategies. This paper considers the development and use of one such strategy — the ombudsman — in dealing with the complaints of consumers against insurers, banks and building societies. The decisions to create these schemes can be seen against a background of the radical changes in the financial markets during the 1980s. However, the practice of the different ombudsmen is also influenced by the history, rules, practices and commercial contexts of their respective industries. It is argued, for instance, that the ombudsmen have developed standards of fairness which enable them to step outside established law and practice. However, the extent to which each is willing to do this may depend on the history and legal context of the relationships which a particular sector has had with its customers.

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Ombudsmann-Regelungen im Finanzsektor Grobritanniens: Die Ombudspersonen für Versicherungen, für Banken und für Wohnbaugenossenschaften

Zusammenfassung Die Schwierigkeiten, die Konsumenten haben, wenn sie Beschwerden gegen Anbieter auf gerichtlichem Wege klären lassen wollen, sind gut bekannt und waren Anla\ für die Entwicklung alternativer Strategien. Der Beitrag behandelt eine dieser Alternativen — den Ombudsmann — bei der Behandlung von Verbraucherbeschwerden gegenüber Versicherern, Banken und Wohnbaugenossen-schaften. Die Entscheidungen, die zur Schaffung dieser Regelung geführt haben, sind vor allem vor dem Hintergrund der starken Veränderungen auf den Finanzmärkten in den 80er Jahren zu sehen. Dabei wird das praktische Vorgehen der Ombudspersonen von der Entstehungsgeschichte, von Gewohnheiten und Praktiken und vom wirtschaftlichen Zusammenhang ihrer jeweiligen Branche beeinflu\t. So haben die Ombudspersonen zum Beispiel Richtlinien für Fairne\ entwickelt, die ihnen auch Möglichkeiten au\erhalb der etablierten Bereiche des Rechts und der Praxis eröffnen. Allerdings hängt die Bereitschaft des einzelnen Ombudsmannes, solche Möglichkeiten zu ergreifen, von der Geschichte und dem rechtlichen Kontext der Beziehungen ab, die seine Branche mit ihren Kunden gehabt hat.

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The authors would like to thank VW-Stiftung which funded the project, of which an earlier version of this study formed a part: Southern Extension of the EC, Financial Services and Consumer Protection; as well as Magda D'Ingeo and Katrina Wilson, both of Brunel University.     

E-Finance: An Introduction

E-finance is defined as “The provision of financial services and markets using electronic communication and computation”. In this paper we outline research issues related to e-finance that we believe set the stage for further work in this field. Three areas are focused on. These are the use of electronic payments systems, the operations of financial services firms and the operation of financial markets. A number of research issues are raised. For example, is the widespread use of paper-based checks efficient? Will the financial services industry be fundamentally changed by the advent of the Internet? Why have there been such large differences in changes to market microstructure across different financial markets?     

A Closer Look at the Relation between GARCH and Stochastic Autoregressive Volatility

We show that, for three common SARV models, fitting a minimummean square linear filter is equivalent to fitting a GARCH model.This suggests that GARCH models may be useful for filtering,forecasting, and parameter estimation in stochastic volatilitysettings. To investigate, we use simulations to evaluate howthe three SARV models and their associated GARCH filters performunder controlled conditions and then we use daily currency andequity index returns to evaluate how the models perform in arisk management application. Although the GARCH models produceless precise forecasts than the SARV models in the simulations,it is not clear that the performance differences are large enoughto be economically meaningful. Consistent with this view, wefind that the GARCH and SARV models perform comparably in testsof conditional value-at-risk estimates using the actual data.     

The coexistence of transaction and relational marketing: Insights from the Chinese business context

Transaction and relational approaches to marketing have been promoted as alternative forms but recent evidence suggests that they may coexist. We explore this in the context of China. If firms operating in a highly relational society, such as China, exhibit transactional behavior, these two approaches must be compatible. We argue that Chinese values give rise to business practices consistent with both transactional and relational perspectives. These are summarized in six propositions for research. Theory building and managerial practice could benefit from thinking in terms of how elements from the two perspectives can be brought together rather than remain as alternatives.     

Risk and Market Segmentation in Financial Intermediaries' Returns

This study examines both the quantity and price of risk exposure for different segments of financial intermediaries. Overall, we find evidence of market segmentation in the U.S. financial services industry. Specifically, we find that securities firms, consistently over the sampling period 1974–1994, had the most market risk exposure with the lowest market risk premium. Banks' market risk fluctuated over the sampling period. Banks increased their market risk-taking after the shift in monetary target in October 1979 and the announcement of the risk-based capital requirements in July 1988. The banks' market risk became the highest and insignificantly different from securities firms'. The results are consistent with the moral hazard argument; that is, banks took on more risk to take advantage of government guarantees as their charter value declined. Banks were subject to relatively high interest rate risk premium. However, in response to increased interest rate volatility and decreased charter value after October 1979, banks (while they increased their market risk exposure) lowered their interest rate risk exposure to an insignificant level. The results suggest that the federal safety net may have been perceived by the market as covering only market risk but not interest rate risk. Overall, we find little evidence of interest rate risk exposure, suggesting the prevalence of hedging programs using interest rate derivatives. The interest rate risk premiums, unlike the risk exposure, differ across financial intermediaries.     

Credit risk transfer and contagion

Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk. Others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises. Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare. It can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises.