Control and Out-of-Sample Validation of Dependent Risks

This article introduces a framework to determine and allocate capital reserves to multiple dependent business lines, with or without overall reserve level constraints. The proposed methodology emphasizes the role of the loss function in the validation criterion and its conditional interpretation. Univariate and multivariate examples are discussed in detail.     

Catastrophe Bonds and Reinsurance: The Competitive Effect of Information-Insensitive Triggers

We identify a new benefit of index or parametric triggers. Asymmetric information between reinsurers on an insurer's risk affects competition in the reinsurance market: reinsurers are subject to adverse selection, since only high-risk insurers may find it optimal to change reinsurers. The result is high reinsurance premiums and cross-subsidization of high-risk insurers by low-risk insurers. A contract with a parametric or index trigger (such as a catastrophe bond) is insensitive to information asymmetry and therefore alters the equilibrium in the reinsurance market. Provided that basis risk is not too high, the introduction of contracts with parametric or index triggers provides low-risk insurers with an alternative to reinsurance contracts, and therefore leads to less cross-subsidization in the reinsurance market.     

Wolf / Lindacher / Pfeiffer: AGB-Recht. Kommentar

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Orchestrating corporate social responsibility in the multinational enterprise

Research Summary: Multinational enterprises (MNEs) invest significant resources in corporate social responsibility (CSR), but their attempts to build a global “social brand” may clash with the execution of operational strategies at a subsidiary level. Using a game-theoretic model, this research addresses the complex interplay of different contingencies that shape the coordination and control challenges facing MNEs when they implement global CSR strategies, including brand spillovers, the risk of public scandals caused by irresponsible behavior, the size of the MNE network, as well as the roles played by nongovernmental organizations and altruistic managers. Challenging the view of CSR as insurance against lapses of responsible conduct, our model shows that investment in social brands helps avoid irresponsible practices across the MNE network, thereby inducing subsidiaries to “walk the talk.” Managerial Summary: Global social brands are increasingly valuable to multinational enterprises (MNEs), which makes the control and coordination of responsible behavior across their network of foreign subsidiaries a relevant managerial challenge. Indeed, lapses of responsible conduct at the subsidiary level often generate reputational damage at the multinational level. This research explores several mechanisms that help MNEs manage this coordination and control challenge. First, it shows under what conditions MNEs can leverage their investments in social brands to induce responsible practices across their global network. Second, it illustrates how MNEs can exploit collaborations with nongovernmental organizations to reduce the costs of coordinating and controlling their subsidiaries. Finally, it identifies conditions under which MNEs benefit from hiring altruistic managers to run their subsidiaries.     

An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity

This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.      

Knowledge flows through social networks in a cluster: Comparing university and industry links

Knowledge spillovers from a university to the local industry play an important role in high-technology clusters, but we know little about these spillovers. This paper examines empirically the extent of informal contacts between employees in firms and local university researchers in a wireless communications cluster. Furthermore, it analyses the features of an engineer who acquires knowledge from these informal contacts. The university–industry contacts are compared to results for informal contacts between employees in firms. The research shows that the interfirm informal contacts are more numerous than university informal contacts. Likewise, knowledge is more frequently acquired from engineers in other firms than through university–industry contacts. However, not all engineers in the cluster have informal contacts or acquire knowledge through these. Engineers who have participated in formal projects with university researchers and engineers who are educated at the local university have a higher likelihood of acquiring knowledge from informal contacts with university researchers.     

Keynes and Sraffa's 'Difficulties with J. H. Hollander'

The paper reports on Jacob H. Hollander's cooperation with John Maynard Keynes and Piero Sraffa in the preparation of the latter's edition of The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo. The report is based on archive material from various sources, including the unpublished papers of Edwin Cannan, Piero Sraffa, Jacob H. Hollander, John Maynard Keynes, and Jacob Viner, and the archive of the Royal Economic Society. The archive material consulted by us shows that, put mildly, Jacob H. Hollander did not promote Sraffa's editorial project: he held back material which he had received from Frank Ricardo and did not disclose to Sraffa that he owned several important letters which he had privately purchased. Moreover, Sraffa was refused access to Ricardiana even after he had traced them down in laborious detective work to be in Hollander's possession. Hollander's unwillingness to cooperate with Sraffa considerably delayed the publication of the Ricardo edition.     

Households' Preferences and Exchange Rate Overshooting

Abstract

This paper uses a ‘New-Open-Economy Macroeconomic’ model to study the effect of a shock to Households' preferences on exchange rate dynamics. The special features of the model are that Households' preferences exhibit a ‘catching-up with the Joneses’ effect and that international financial markets are imperfectly integrated. Results of numerical simulations of the model demonstrate that these features imply that, in an otherwise standard ‘New-Open-Economy Macroeconomic’ model, a shock to Households' preferences can give rise to an overshooting of the exchange rate.     

Migrants' Savings, Purchasing Power Parity, and the Optimal Duration of Migration

If some of the returns to migration accrue from returnmigration, the optimal duration of migration may be shorter thanthe feasible duration of migration. We develop a model that providesand highlights conditions under which return migration takesplace even though a reversal of the inter-country wage differentialdoes not occur. In particular, we consider the higher purchasingpower of savings (generated from work abroad) at home than abroadas a motive for return migration. Inter alia, our model producesa negative relationship between the optimal duration of migrationand the purchasing power differential and in some (but not all)cases, a negative relationship between the optimal duration ofmigration and the wage abroad. In addition, and contrary to ourprior anticipation, our utility maximization analysis suggeststhat East-West migration will tend to be temporary while inter-EuropeanCommunity (or intra-West European) migration will likely be permanent.