Modelling and Mapping Agricultural Output Values Using Farm Specific Details and Environmental Databases

Ongoing concerns regarding the economic losses associated with the CAP and the negative environmental impacts of present land use have led to calls for land use change and consequent efforts to identify areas which are, from both a financial and social perspective, most appropriate for such conversion. This paper develops and applies an output value modelling methodology in which site-specific biophysical factors are combined with farm level data in order to predict input usage and, subsequently, farm profit. The spatial analytic capabilities of a geographical information system (GIS) are used to combine the variety of data employed to permit analysis of a large study area (the entirety of Wales) and yield models of both the market and shadow value of output from the two principal agricultural sectors of the area: dairying and sheep farming. The GIS is then used to produce readily interpretable maps of these values across the study area. The resulting maps are highly compatible both with value maps of alternative land uses given in the recent literature and with approaches to policy formulation currently under development by a range of UK agencies. Such maps may be used to assist estimation of the extent and location of farming response to land use policy change.     

Bid-Ask Spreads,Information Asymmetry,and Abnormal Investor Sentiment: Evidence from Closed-End Funds

Using a sample of closed-end equity funds listed on the NYSE from 1994 to 1999, we investigate differences in spreads and adverse selection costs between the closed-end funds and a matched sample of common stocks. We find that spreads and adverse selection costs for the closed-end funds are significantly lower than those of control stocks. The results are consistent for the subperiods both before and after the minimum tick size change on NYSE on June 24, 1997. The differences of spreads and adverse selection costs cannot be attributed to the differences in the characteristics of the closed-end funds and the matched sample of common stocks. Lastly, we find that abnormal investor sentiment and adverse selection costs of closed-end funds are positively correlated over time.     

保险业要么锁定客户，要么收购

贝恩公司调查发现,仅有1／10的保险公司成功地实现连年持续地创造价值。许多公司最终表现欠佳的主要原因在于,他们严重误判自己提供客户所需产品／服务的能力。当高级主管被问及是否认为本公司提供最佳客户体验时,77％的高管自认为是,但仅有6％的客户认同。那么,究竟什么才是保险业实现最佳股东回报的关键呢?     

The effect of communication in incentive systems—an experimental study

In organizational theory, it is a widely accepted postulate that cooperation among subjects is enforceable. This assumption is essential for the evaluation of two frequently discussed incentive systems: team and tournament compensation. Whereas in team‐based pay systems cooperation is highly desired, cooperation in rank‐order tournaments—labeled as ‘collusion’—is regarded as one of the main drawbacks of relative performance evaluation. In this experimental study, two different communication technologies are introduced into both incentive environments. The results indicate that when only limited communication is permitted subjects tend to cheat on each other in the tournament rather than in the team setting. Interestingly, allowing subjects to exchange emails leads to a similarly stable cooperation in both incentive systems. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cybersecurity: Stakeholder incentives,externalities, and policy options

Information security breaches are increasingly motivated by fraudulent and criminal motives. Reducing their considerable costs has become a pressing issue. Although cybersecurity has strong public good characteristics, most information security decisions are made by individual stakeholders. Due to the interconnectedness of cyberspace, these decentralized decisions are afflicted with externalities that can result in sub-optimal security levels. Devising effective solutions to this problem is complicated by the global nature of cyberspace, the interdependence of stakeholders, as well as the diversity and heterogeneity of players. The paper develops a framework for studying the co-evolution of the markets for cybercrime and cybersecurity. It examines the incentives of stakeholders to provide for security and their implications for the ICT ecosystem. The findings show that market and non-market relations in the information infrastructure generate many security-enhancing incentives. However, pervasive externalities remain that can only be corrected by voluntary or government-led collective measures.     

Regulierung, Effizienz und das Anreizdilemma bei Investitionen in intelligente Netze

In this paper, we survey from a theoretical point of view to what extend cost-based and incentive-based regulatory regimes stimulate investments. For the purpose of this analysis, we furthermore differentiate by different efficiency measures, i.e. allocative efficiency, productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency and analyse to what extend each efficiency measure is stimulated by the regulatory regime. Eventually, we analyse to what extend regulatory incentives for network innovation in a smart grid context exist and to what extend different forms of regulation stimulate dynamic efficiency.