The Downside of Knowledge Spillovers: An Explanation for the Dispersion of High-tech Industries

Both theoretical work on knowledge spillovers and regional policy initiatives often assume that there exists a general and unanimous advantage for firms to cluster. But opposed to the benefit is the disadvantage of sharing knowledge with other (rival) firms. This paper highlights the “downside” associated with knowledge spillovers and presents a four-stage game of location choice where spillovers result from labour poaching and where the strategic interaction between firms may make them avoid co-location with spillovers. The model provides an explanation for the dispersion of German high-tech industries found in a companion paper.     

Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability

We study the evolution of preferences under perfect and almost perfect observability in symmetric 2-player games. We demonstrate that if nature can choose from a sufficiently general preference space, which includes preferences over outcomes that may depend on the opponent's preference-type, then, in most games, only discriminating preferences (treating different types of opponents differently in the same situation) can be evolutionary stable and some discriminating types are stable in a very strong sense in all games. We use these discriminating types to show that any symmetric outcome which gives players more than their minmax value in material payoffs (fitness) can be seen as equilibrium play of a player population with such strongly stable preferences.     

Does Work Always Pay in Germany?

Abstract. Income redistribution in Germany is the result of a combination of several redistribution instruments: there is a complex income tax law, different obligatory social insurances and supplementary benefits. This paper estimates income redistribution by quantile regression, using German EVS data. Two results are obtained: income after redistribution does not always increase in line with income before redistribution, i.e. for people with a low income before redistribution, it does not make sense to increase their efforts, since more work means less earnings. Further, an increasing redistribution rate for higher incomes is not always observable from the data.