Cascading contingent protection and vertical market structure

Cascading contingent protection may occur when protection of an upstream industry transfers injury to the downstream industry and increases the likelihood that this industry asks and receives protection. This paper examines cascading protection within a sequential petitioning model where the upstream industry acts as leader. The analysis identifies market structure and the vertical linkage between the upstream and the downstream industry as important determinants of the occurrence of cascading protection. It is shown that the circumstances which make cascading protection more likely to occur also make it more likely that this protection has serious negative welfare consequences.     

When Is Efficiency Separable from Distribution in the Provision of Club Goods?

Using the homogeneous of degree zero inverse congestion (“quality”) function employed most frequently in the literature, we characterise completely the families of utility functions which are then necessary and sufficient for break-even utilitarian welfare maximising provision of club goods with self-selection to be separable from distribution. Two types of separation—involving, alternatively (a) the price and quality; (b) the price, quality, facility size and total utilisation—are considered. When separation is possible, utility functions and optimal decisions take simple, intuitive forms. Our results extend the scope of separation results previously obtained only for pure public goods. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D62, H23, H40.     

In Search of the Fourth Way: A Commentary on the Books by Fred Argy and Mark Latham

This paper is a critique of the new books by Mark Latham and Fred Argy, the first of which in particular is said to herald the 'Third Way' in Australian politics. It considers the implications for new policies of economic power and the redefinition of economic welfare, and concludes that if this is the Third Way then we are in need of a Fourth Way.     

Workforce gender effects on firm performance and workers’ pay: evidence for the UK

Using linked workplace–worker data for the UK, a number of hypotheses are tested related to individual gender and the gender composition of the workforce. The proportion of female workers per establishment is strongly negatively associated with median workplace pay. There is some evidence that workplace performance (but not employment size or growth) is positively associated with the female–male workforce ratio. For workers, the female wage penalty (which is substantial) is strongly influenced by the female–male workforce ratio. In addition, commensurate with gender discrimination, those who manage female workers receive lower wages but professional workers in the same establishments do not.     

Too Much Monitoring, Not Enough Performance Pay

This paper endogenises the internal organisation of competitive firms in a simple general equilibrium framework. The options are monitored teams, unmonitored teams motivated by collective performance pay, and self-employment. The choice of incentive scheme depends on market price and also affects price through its influence on output. As more people opt for self employment, pecuniary externalities increase the pressure on the rest to follow suit and Pareto rankable multiple equilibria arise. The conditions for a competitive equilibrium to be constrained efficient are restrictive and everyone may gain from policies limiting monitoring and self employment and from the imposition of entry taxes.     

Precision in auditing standards: effects on auditor and director liability and the supply and demand for audit services

Theoretical research suggests that large auditors have more incentive to issue accurate reports compared to small auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Dye, 1993). Controlling for the client characteristics of large and small auditors, this paper shows that large auditors issue reports that are more accurate and more informative signals of financial distress. These findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction of a positive relationship between auditor size and auditor accuracy.     

Applying multiple regression analysis to the forecasting of grocery store sales: an application and critical appraisal

Multiple regression analysis is applied to an analysis of the trading performance of a chain of grocery stores in the north-east of England. The performance of stores outside the conurbations is shown to be related to characteristics of the OPCS ‘urban-areas’ in which the stores are located, and a way is presented of modelling the effect of competition from within and outside these centres.

A high degree of statistical explanation is achieved, and the methodology used is defended against criticisms that can be levelled at many of other multiple regression analyses of store performance. Caution is nevertheless advised against the application of the model to forecasting the performance of new stores, although a range of applications are suggested whereby the implications of changes in the trading circumstances of existing stores might be examined.     

A collective,undifferentiated accounting profession: an Australian study

A study of 386 potential and current members of the accounting profession in Australia and South‐East Asia provides evidence of the importance of three attributes – brand/reputation, international recognition of qualifications and career opportunities – in the decision to join a professional accounting body. While these attributes are important, logit regression models indicate that they are not discriminatory in the choice of professional body and suggest a perception of a collective, undifferentiated accounting profession. The marketing of brand/reputation and membership benefits may be a more efficient and effective strategy in attracting members and differentiating the profession if undertaken by a combined or coordinated professional body.     

Do acquirers disclose good news or withhold bad news when they finance their acquisitions using equity?

Companies that use their own stock to finance acquisitions have incentives to increase their market values prior to the acquisition. This study examines whether such companies mislead investors by issuing overly optimistic forecasts of future earnings (“deception by commission”) or by withholding bad news about future earnings (“deception by omission”). We compare the management forecasts of acquiring firms in a pre-acquisition period (days −90 to −30 before the acquisition announcement) and a post-acquisition period (days +30 to +90 after the acquisition is completed). We show that, when acquisitions are financed using stock, companies are not more likely to issue overly optimistic earnings forecasts during the pre-acquisition period compared with the post-acquisition period. However, these same acquirers are more likely to withhold impending bad news about future earnings. Consistent with litigation having an asymmetric effect on disclosure incentives, our findings suggest that deception by omission occurs more often than deception by commission.