The deterrent impact of police: An examination of a locally provided public service

This paper develops and empirically tests a model of crime deterrence in an urban area. There are two important departures from past efforts to study the impact of criminal sanctions. The first is that the provision of sanctions from the local public sector is modeled; this is accomplished by specifying the distributional goals of local government and by specifying the production of safety. The second departure is that actual crime and reported crime are differentiated theoretically and in the empirical work. An empirical test of the model, using a unique neighborhood data set, shows that police deter crime significantly; however, this deterrent impact cannot be demonstrated without the distinction between actual and reported crime.     

Accounting for optimism and pessimism in expected utility

We provide a preference foundation for decision under risk resulting in a model where probability weighting is linear as long as the corresponding probabilities are not extreme (i.e., 0 or 1). This way, most of the elegance and mathematical tractability of expected utility is maintained and also much of its normative foundation. Yet, the new model can accommodate the extreme sensitivity towards changes from 0 to almost impossible and from almost certain to 1 that has widely been documented in the experimental literature. The model can be viewed as “expected utility with the best and worst in mind” as suggested by Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (Chateauneuf, Alain, Eichberger, Jürgen, Grant, Simon, 2007. Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: NEO-Additive capacities. Journal of Economic Theory 137, 538–567) or, following our preference foundation, interpreted as “expected utility with consistent optimism and pessimism”.     

Shareholder Activism, "Voluntary" Restructuring, and Internal Labor Markets

We model an internal labor market in which employee behavior and compensation are affected by the firm's financial position and the threat of hostile takeover or other exercise of shareholder "voice." We show how good past performance can result in excessively generous promotion and pay decisions. While the threat of shareholder activism will remove this "slack," activists optimally face a positive cost barrier, which in turn varies across firms. The cost barrier is higher when cooperation or "helping" between employees is more important, and is lower when employees receive efficiency wages due to an inability to "pay" for their jobs. Since the importance of helping is associated with pay compression and "flat" pay ladders, such firms should also exhibit a greater degree of management entrenchment.     

One-step R-estimation in linear models with stable errors

Classical estimation techniques for linear models either are inconsistent, or perform rather poorly, under α$\alpha$-stable error densities; most of them are not even rate-optimal. In this paper, we propose an original one-step R-estimation method and investigate its asymptotic performances under stable densities. Contrary to traditional least squares, the proposed R-estimators remain root-n$n$ consistent (the optimal rate) under the whole family of stable distributions, irrespective of their asymmetry and tail index. While parametric stable-likelihood estimation, due to the absence of a closed form for stable densities, is quite cumbersome, our method allows us to construct estimators reaching the parametric efficiency bounds associated with any prescribed values (_α0,_b0)$({\alpha }_0,b_0)$ of the tail index α$\alpha$ and skewness parameter b$b$, while preserving root-n$n$ consistency under any (α,b)$(\alpha ,b)$ as well as under usual light-tailed densities. The method furthermore avoids all forms of multidimensional argmin computation. Simulations confirm its excellent finite-sample performances.     

Networks,Infrastructure and the New Task for Regulation. Werner Sichel and Donald L. Alexander,editors.

Review of Industrial Organization -     

THE VOLUNTARY PRESENTATION OF VALUE ADDED STATEMENTS IN AUSTRALIA: A POLITICAL COST PERSPECTIVE

This paper explores corporate management's incentive to voluntarily disclose Value Added Statements in their yearly financial reports. Adopting a political cost perspective, hypotheses relating Value Added Statement disclosure to labour intensity, corporate tax payments, rate of return, size and industry volatility are developed. Using a sample of Australian publicly listed companies, the results of our empirical testing support the hypotheses that the decision to voluntarily disclose Value Added Statements is related to a company's size (in terms of both market concentration and profitability), a proportional measure of tax payments and the industry to which it belongs. Labour intensity and rate of return were found to be unrelated to the voluntarily disclosure of Value Added Statements.