Reciprocal Supervision,Collusion and Organizational Design

We study the design of supervisory functions in an organization with one principal and two agents. Each agent can perform supervision activities regarding the other agent. We characterize the way the principal must structure incentive payments to avoid any collusive activity between agents. In particular, it is shown that better mutual information between agents may hurt the principal. The other main result is the possibility that it may be better to give up one supervisory function or to have a third party be the supervisor if possible. Finally, we show that such a dual supervisory structure raises the possibility that letting collusion happen may be the best policy.     

Two executives, one career

For six years, Cynthia Cunningham and Shelley Murray shared an executive job at Fleet Bank. One desk, one chair, one computer, one telephone, and one voice-mail account. To their clients and colleagues, they were effectively one person, though one person with the strengths and ideas of two, seamlessly handing projects back and forth. Although their department was dissolved after the bank merged with Bank of America, the two continue to consider themselves a package-they have one resume, and they are seeking their next opportunity together. Their choice to share a job was not only a quality-of-life decision but one intended to keep their careers on course: "Taking two separate part-time jobs would have thrown us completely off track" they write in this first-person account."We're both ambitious people, and neither of us wanted just a job. We wanted careers" In this article, the two highly motivated women reveal their determination to manage the demands of both family and career. Flextime,telecommuting, and compressed workweeks are just some of the options open to executives seeking greater work/ life balance, and the job share, as described by Cunningham and Murray, could well be the next solution for those wishing to avoid major trade-offs between their personal and professional lives. Cunningham and Murray describe in vivid detail how they structured their unusual arrangement, how they sold themselves to management, and the hurdles they faced along the way. Theirs is a win-win story, for the company and for them.     

Growth and improverishment in the middle of the nineteenth century

This paper applies the techniques for the development of ‘soft’ data to gain insight into the historical impacts of economic change on the structure and extent of poverty in the early stages of commercialization and industrialization. A typology of the structure of poverty is constructed for 1850 for 24 countries and the nine types which emerge are ranked partially by the probable extent of extreme poverty. The nature and ranking of the types are then used to develop hypotheses regarding the historical processes generating poverty. The paper focuses on the poorest stratum of society in countries of widely different levels of development. The study suggests that the phenomena generating poverty in 1850 were surprisingly similar to those operating in today's developing countries.     

Fiscal policy and economic growth: some evidence from China

Review of World Economics - China has experienced profound economic and social changes in recent decades. During this period, China’s fiscal policy framework has been substantially reformed....     

Labour Demand Adjustment: Does Foreign Ownership Matter?

This paper examines whether multinationals differ in their employment adjustment from domestic companies, using a panel of 5,544 Belgian firms observed between 1998 and 2005. More precisely, we estimate labour adjustment costs by worker and firm types. We propose a new flexible specification that takes into account the role of firm size in adjustment costs. Our results indicate that adjusting white‐collar employment is around half as costly for multinational firms (MNFs) as for domestic firms of the same size. The remaining differential in adjustment costs between MNFs and domestic firms might result, among other things, from multinationals' stronger bargaining power.     

Accumulative vs. Appreciative Expressions of Materialism: Revising Materialism in Light of Polish Simplifiers and New Materialism

Journal of Business Ethics - At a time when it is critically important to preserve natural resources and reduce the amount of man-made pollution, this article explores other potentials for...     

Organization‐Based Self‐Esteem,Psychological Contract Fulfillment,and Perceived Employment Opportunities: A Test of Self‐Regulatory Theory

This study addresses organization‐based self‐esteem (OBSE) development by examining the role of perceptions of employer psychological contract fulfillment, and the self‐regulatory processes by which OBSE evolves and produces its effects. Self‐regulatory theory helps reveal why psychological contract fulfillment relates to OBSE, how OBSE mediates its effects, and the ways in which OBSE might interact with perceived employment opportunities to affect job satisfaction, performance, and turnover intentions. The results show that OBSE is related to and mediates the relationships between relational contract fulfillment and employee job satisfaction and performance, but OBSE is not related to transactional contract fulfillment. Nor does OBSE mediate the relationships between transactional contract fulfillment and the dependent variables. Perceived employment opportunities moderate the relationships of OBSE with job satisfaction and turnover intentions. This study concludes with recommendations of ways managers can increase their sensitivity to the types of messages they communicate to employees. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.