Who's right for an international assignment?

Picking the wrong candidate for an international assignment can be costly for both the individual and his or her company. So more and more companies are turning to testing techniques like the Overseas Assignment Inventory that allows a company to compare a candidate against a profile of success based on a study of thousands of international managers.     

Functioning and reforms of small claims tribunals in New Zealand

This article examines some of the pending changes to the jurisdiction and functioning of Small Claims Tribunals in New Zealand. The Disputes Tribunals Act 1988 repeals the Small Claims Tribunals Act 1976. The new Disputes Tribunals will exercise a wider jurisdiction, both in monetary terms and with respect to the nature of cases which can be heard, than did the Small Claims Tribunals. In particular, the Disputes Tribunals will have wider powers in certain areas of tort. The author also examines certain procedural reforms, and the significance and possible consequences of these.

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Zusammenfassung In Neuseeland gibt seit etwa 12 Jahren spezielle Gerichte für kleinere Streitfälle. Eine vom Justizministerium durchgeführte Evaluationsstudie stärkte die Auffassung, diese Gerichte unter bestimmten rechtlichen und Verfahrensgesichtspunkten zu reformieren.Das 1976 verabschiedete Gesetz über Gerichte für kleinere Streitfälle wurde 1988 durch das Gesetz für Rechtsstreitigkeiten ersetzt. Dieses Gesetz führte zu einer Ausweitung insofern, als die Streitwertgrenze von 1,000 $ auf 3,000 $ angehoben wurde. Bei Einigkeit beider Parteien kann der Streitwert sogar bis 5,000 $ gehen. Bisher konnten die Gerichte nur zivilrechtliche Streitigkeiten entscheiden, andere Rechtswidrigkeiten waren beschränkt auf Schäden durch fahrlässigen Umgang mit Kraftfahrzeugen. Durch die neue Gesetzgebung wird der Rechtssprechungsspielraum beachtlich erweitert. Diese Ausweitung der gerichtlichen Kompetenzen erschien notwendig, um einder breiteren Öffentlichkeit Zugang zu solchen Schlichtungsverfahren zu eröffnen — eine angesichts der ständig steigenden Kosten der Rechtssprechung sinnvolle Forderung. Außerdem hat das neue Gesetz neue Verfahrensregelungen eingeführt. Beispielsweise sind die Gerichte nunmehr verpflichtet, ihre Urteilssprüche zu begründen. Außerdem sind die Klagemöglichkeiten näher definiert.Der Beitrag analysiert die möglichen Auswirkungen dieser Änderungen auf die Funktionsweise der Gerichte.

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Cynthia Hawes is Lecturer in Law, University of Canterbury, Christchurch 1, New Zealand, and Small Claims Tribunal Referee in Christchurch.Much of the text of this article was given as a paper at the annual conference of the Australasian Universities Law Schools Association, at the University of Sydney, August, 1988.     

The Board's missing link

If a dam springs several leaks, there are various ways to respond. One could assiduously plug the holes, for instance. Or one could correct the underlying weaknesses, a more sensible approach. When it comes to corporate governance, for too long we have relied on the first approach. But the causes of many governance problems lie well below the surface--specifically, in critical relationships that are not structured to support the players involved. In other words, the very foundation of the system is flawed. And unless we correct the structural problems, surface changes are unlikely to have a lasting impact. When shareholders, management, and the board of directors work together as a system, they provide a powerful set of checks and balances. But the relationship between shareholders and directors is fraught with weaknesses, undermining the entire system's equilibrium. As the authors explain, the exchange of information between these two players is poor. Directors, though elected by shareholders to serve as their agents, aren't individually accountable to the investors. And shareholders--for a variety of reasons--have failed to exert much influence over boards. In the end, directors are left with the Herculean task of faithfully representing shareholders whose preferences are unclear, and shareholders have little say about who represents them and few mechanisms through which to create change. The authors suggest several ways to improve the relationship between shareholders and directors: Increase board accountability by recording individual directors' votes on key corporate resolutions; separate the positions of chairman and CEO; reinvigorate shareholders; and give boards funding to pay for outside experts who can provide perspective on crucial issues.     

Putting leadership back into strategy

In recent decades an infusion of economics has lent the study of strategy much needed theory and empirical evidence. Strategy consultants, armed with frameworks and techniques, have stepped forward to help managers analyze their industries and position their companies for strategic advantage. Strategy has come to be seen as an analytical problem to be solved. But, says Montgomery, the Timken Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School, the benefits of this rigorous approach have attendant costs: Strategy has become a competitive game plan, separate from the company's larger sense of purpose. The CEO's unique role as arbiter and steward of strategy has been eclipsed. And an overemphasis on sustainable competitive advantage has obscured the importance of making strategy a dynamic tool for guiding the company's development over time. For any company, intelligent guidance requires a clear sense of purpose, of what makes the organization truly distinctive. Purpose, Montgomery says, serves as both a constraint on activity and a guide to behavior. Creativity and insight are key to forging a compelling organizational purpose; analysis alone will never suffice. As the CEO--properly a company's chief strategist--translates purpose into practice, he or she must remain open to the possibility that the purpose itself may need to change. Lou Gerstner did this in the 1990s, when he decided that IBM would evolve to focus on applying technology rather than on inventing it. So did Steve Jobs, when he rescued Apple from a poorly performing strategy and expanded the company into attractive new businesses. Watching over strategy day in and day out is the CEO's greatest opportunity to shape the firm as well as outwit the competition.     

Identification and estimation of Gaussian affine term structure models

This paper develops new results for identification and estimation of Gaussian affine term structure models. We establish that three popular canonical representations are unidentified, and demonstrate how unidentified regions can complicate numerical optimization. A separate contribution of the paper is the proposal of minimum-chi-square estimation as an alternative to MLE. We show that, although it is asymptotically equivalent to MLE, it can be much easier to compute. In some cases, MCSE allows researchers to recognize with certainty whether a given estimate represents a global maximum of the likelihood function and makes feasible the computation of small-sample standard errors.     

Oil prices and economic activity: evidence for G-7 economies based on a wavelet approach

This study examines the relationship between oil prices and economic activity in the G-7 economies during the period 1960M1–2014M07 using a wavelet approach. The results show significant differences in the relationship between these two variables depending on the frequencies. Furthermore, we find that oil price shocks affect economic activity at low frequencies (long run) in all G-7 countries, while the effect at high frequencies (short run) is limited to a few countries.     

The role of CEO relative standing in acquisition behavior and CEO pay

In this study, we develop and test a theory of CEO relative pay standing. Specifically, we propose that CEOs with negative relative pay standing status (underpaid relative to comparison CEOs) will engage in acquisition activity, as a self‐interested means of attempting to realign their pay with that of their peers. We further propose that, when CEOs with negative relative pay standing acquire, they will tend to finance those acquisitions more heavily with stock than cash, to mitigate the risk associated with those deals. Finally, we argue that acquisition activity will partially mediate the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent CEO compensation increases; however, that pay growth will come primarily in the form of long‐term incentive pay. Our results support our predictions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why Firms Engage in Corruption: A Top Management Perspective

This study builds upon the top management literature to predict and test antecedents to firms’ engagement in corruption. Building on a survey of 341 executives in India, we find that if executives have social ties with government officials, their firms are more likely to engage in corruption. Further, these executives are likely to rationalize engaging in corruption as a necessity for being competitive. The results collectively illustrate the role that executives’ social ties and perceptions have in shaping illegal actions of their respective firms.