Maximizing purchase decision factors other than price

Assessing and acquiring technology does not have to be chaotic, driven solely by price, clinical preference, and emotion. With the tools available, it can be distilled to a process of organized common sense, which results in maximum flexibility for the user and allows materiel managers to procure the best, most cost-effective equipment for the hospital.     

The balanced scorecard--measures that drive performance

Frustrated by the inadequacies of traditional performance measurement systems, some managers have abandoned financial measures like return on equity and earnings per share. "Make operational improvements and the numbers will follow," the argument goes. But managers do not want to choose between financial and operational measures. Executives want a balanced presentation of measures that allow them to view the company from several perspectives simultaneously. During a year-long research project with 12 companies at the leading edge of performance measurement, the authors developed a "balanced scorecard," a new performance measurement system that gives top managers a fast but comprehensive view of the business. The balanced scorecard includes financial measures that tell the results of actions already taken. And it complements those financial measures with three sets of operational measures having to do with customer satisfaction, internal processes, and the organization's ability to learn and improve--the activities that drive future financial performance. Managers can create a balanced scorecard by translating their company's strategy and mission statements into specific goals and measures. To create the part of the scorecard that focuses on the customer perspective, for example, executives at Electronic Circuits Inc. established general goals for customer performance: get standard products to market sooner, improve customers' time-to-market, become customers' supplier of choice through partnerships, and develop innovative products tailored to customer needs. Managers translated these elements of strategy into four specific goals and identified a measure for each.     

The case of the unpopular pay plan

Three years after launching the team-based Quality For All program, Top Chemical Company CEO Sam Verde was searching for a team-based compensation system that would reflect his company's new philosophy. With a committee gathered to discuss the issue, Verde confronts the fact that changing pay plans is an issue few people can agree on. "Very simply," explains vice president for compensation Gilbert Porterfield, "the plan is designed to give employees working on teams real incentives for constant improvement and overall excellence. The variable aspect of the system pays employees for the performance of their group." This doesn't sit well with the others. "It's going to punish teams like mine for the failings of others instead of rewarding us for the work we do and have already done," says packaging team representative Ruth Gibson. Another committee member feels that team-based anything is a "motivational happy land that doesn't square with how people really work." While Verde likes the proposed pay plan, he has doubts over whether his employees will accept the risk. Upper management has no problem basing 60% of its pay on TopChem's performance. But getting line employees to risk part of their salaries--even as little as 4%--on the ups and downs of the chemical industry may be more trouble than it's worth. Four experts on compensation reveal where Top Chemical went wrong in its plan and how Sam Verde might bring about change successfully.     

On modeling incentive systems which utilize pollution charges for pollution abatement

This paper examines a scheme of economic incentives for environmental protection, in which spatially differentiated pollution taxes are in use in compensating the pollution abatement costs. A simple mathematical model is described which determines an incentive system that encourages polluters to reduce the discharges to an acceptable level of ambient quality standards in a cost-effective manner. It is shown that the vector of pollution charges has to be proportional to the marginal abatement cost vector, but is smaller than the latter in magnitude. It is demonstrated that a necessary incentive effect may be achieved even if the total pollution charge is much lower (about three times) than the total abatement costs. It is also estimated how this charge incentive system reconciles conflicting criteria of cost-effectiveness and of equity. These conclusions are verified by numerical experiments with real data.