Regulating Banks through Market Discipline: A Survey of the Issues

Abstract.  The interest in the application of market discipline to regulate the financial industry has boomed recently due to the proposed New Capital Accord. This paper reviews the potential role market discipline can play in financial regulation. We start with a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation and with a brief history of the current regulatory mechanisms. Next, a definition of market discipline as a regulatory mechanism is advanced. We evaluate the disciplining power various market participants have. Finally, we argue that more external risk management disclosure is a condition sine qua non in order to enable market discipline as a regulatory mechanism. In this respect, the Basle Committee has taken the right approach.     

A comparison of monetary family policy in the European Community

In a number of constitutions, in article 16.3 of the International Bill of Human Rights and in article 23.1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights it is laid down that the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. The following exposition aims to explain the monetary family policy and the extent of monetary transfers for the protection of families in the member countries of the European Community (EC).     

A theory of global strategic alliances: The case of the global auto industry

The theory articulated in this paper suggests that the desire to reduce demand and competitive uncertainty are two separate, important motives for alliance formation. Taking this as a starting point, we predict the configuration of horizontal alliances that we might expect to observe within an industry when firms experience these uncertainties to different degrees. An empirical test of this theory using data from the global auto industry yields results consistent with the view (1) that alliances are a device for reducing both the uncertainties that arise from unpredictable demand conditions and those that arise from competitive interdependence, and (2) that variation of demand uncertainty and competitive uncertainty across firms explains differentials in both the intensity and structure of their horizontal alliance activity.     

The baby boom, the baby bust, and the housing market A second look

I re-examine Mankiw-Weil's (MW) claim that house prices will fall 47% by 2007. MW argue that the arrival of the Baby Boom generation at adulthood drove up prices during the 1970s. When the beginnings of the Baby Bust generation matured in the 1980s, prices softened. When this generation arrives in earnest, prices will collapse. I make three points: (1) The regression upon which MW hang their prediction has an implausible -8.1% trend, which drives their prediction. (2) Demand directly influences the rental price; the asset price (MW's variable) is influenced by demand only indirectly. I re-run MW's regression, replacing the asset price with the rental price, and their prediction disappears. (3) Relying on data presented by MW, I show that housing consumption rose during the 1970s, after adjusting for income growth. Just when MW say the asset price of housing was rising, consumers behaved as if the price were falling. Consumers were right: The rental price fell by approximately 20% during the 1970s.     

DETERMINANTS OF GOODWILL AMORTIZATION PERIOD

This study investigates whether economic consequences have an effect on the length of the period over which goodwill is amortized. It finds that there is a significant relationship between the size of the firm and the length of the amortization period. It also finds, when the only firms included in the sample are those reporting debt covenant restrictions dependent in part on goodwill accounting, evidence that the length of the amortization period for goodwill is related to the firm's leverage.     

Estimating the effectiveness of extension information systems using farm trials and subjective probabilities

A method of combining survey data and Dairy Herd Improvement Association (DHIA) records to achieve low cost farm trials is presented. Farm trials and surveys of current practices and production responses are useful to identify yield gaps between expectations predicted from experimental findings and actual field results. Different management schemes can be ranked using subjective probabilities and stochastic dominance to enhance successful implementation of research findings and to increase the feedback between researchers, extension workers, and producers. A survey of current masitis control practices and expected milk yield response is the example. Combining survey results with DHIA records allowed estimating the relationship between somatic cell counts (SCC) and milk yield. Eliciting beliefs about the relationship between SCC and milk yield showed that producers agreed with predictions from the statistical model. Subjective probabilities about SCC and mastitis control practices showed that our sample of experts and producers consistently ranked the different practices but extension agents had no consensus about the the most or least effective ones.     

Dividend reinvestment plans: An empirical analysis

This study examines the effect of initiating discount and no discount dividend reinvestment plans on shareholder wealth. The results show a negative response to DRP announcements, which is significantly smaller than that found in studies of new equity offerings. These results are consistent with the Scholes and Wolfson (1989) hypothesis that managers in need of equity capital use DRPs to mitigate the adverse stock price effects of new equity issue announcements. Furthermore, there is a significant difference in the price response of discount and no discount DRPs for industrial firms. This result is supportive of the signaling potential of discount DRPs. Supportive evidence is also found in the analysis of firm characteristics for industrial firms.     

TESTING FOR INTEGRATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT MARKETS

The degree of spatial market integration in European Community agricultural product markets is investigated. The methodology is based on co-integration analysis. A two-step testing procedure is applied to test the existence of the ‘Law of One Price’ which should be in force if these markets are truly integrated. The results show that market integration has not been achieved in a number of cases even when MCAs are subtracted from the price series used.