CONSEQUENCES OF MINIMUM WAGE INDEXING

During the 1980s, the minimum wage fell relative to prices and average wages in the U.S. economy. If the minimum to average wage ratio had been constant at the level maintained through the 1970s, the minimum wage would have been $5.51 in 1993. If the 1993 minimum wage had increased to $5.51, payments to minimum wage workers would have increased by an estimated $20.3 billion, and the number of people earning that wage would have risen from 2.0 million to 14.7 million. Elasticity estimates generated from other studies indicate that employment would have fallen 240,000 (4.4%) among 16–19 year olds and 349,000 (3.0%) among 20–24 year olds. Wage payments to minimum wage workers would have substantially increased, but the effect on family income distribution would have been small. Many minimum wage workers are children living with parents or adults in a family with other earners. Consequently, 75% of minimum wage workers account for less than half of their family's income.     

ASSESSING THE VALUE OF ECONOMICS RESEARCH: THE CASE OF THE BIAS IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX

Economists provide sometimes contradictory information about economic systems that contribute to policy design. How does one value this type of knowledge? A political‐economic game is presented that allows for reinforcing and contradictory research messages. Policy makers are assumed to follow a Bayesian decision theory process and the model is tested with quantitative estimates of the value of research on the degree of bias in the Consumer Price Index. Most economists agree that a bias exists, but published estimates vary widely. A blue‐ribbon panel of economists recommended revisions to how the index is calculated, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics subsequently made revisions that differed from their original plans, but how much influence did the panel really have on the revisions? (JEL Z00)     

Avoiding Accounting Fixation: Determinants of Cognitive Adaptation to Differences in Accounting Method*

Much research over the last 30 years has provided evidence that individuals display accounting fixation; that is, their cognitive process does not appropriately adapt to cross‐sectional or temporal differences in an accounting method. This paper presents the results of a quasi‐experimental test of the hypothesis that cognitive adaptation to a change in accounting method is an ordinal interactive function of three person characteristics: relevant accounting knowledge, general problem‐solving ability, and intrinsic motivation to appropriately engage in the decision task. Based on a product‐pricing decision task in which participants are provided with product costs reported by two generally employed product‐costing methods (activity‐based costing [ABC] and volume‐based costing), the results show that the majority of participants did not change their cognitive behavior when there was a change in the costing method. Further, those participants who did adapt to the change in accounting method, and thus avoided accounting fixation, did so by debiasing costs reported by volume‐based costing but not by ABC. Finally, these adapters generally exhibited high values for all three of the person characteristics compared with those who did not adapt.     

STOP US BEFORE WE SPEND AGAIN: INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING

A distributive politics model establishes that the presence of exogenously enforceable spending limits reduces spending and that the effect of executive veto authority is contingent on whether spending is capped and whether the chief executive is a liberal or conservative. Surprisingly, when spending limits are in place, governments with conservative executives spend more than those with more liberal chief executives. Limits are welfare improving, as is the executive veto when it leads to the building of override coalitions. Using 32 years of US state budget data, this paper also establishes empirically that strict balanced budget rules constrain spending and also lead to less pronounced short-term responses to fluctuations in a state's economy. Party variables like divided government and party control of state legislatures tend to have little or no direct effect, with political institutions and economic indicators explaining much of the variation in state spending.     

Symposium on Public Policy Issues in Finance

The thesis of this symposium, organized by James Bicksler, was that while finance theory will surely inform practitioners, it seems appropriate to pay some attention to the opposite flow: practitioners can inform theory. Contributors include a distinguished group of practitioners with extensive backgrounds in economics, and economists with extensive public policy experience: Martin Feldstein, Robert Glauber, David Mullins, and Steven Wallman. Their topics range from privatizing social security, to managing market crashes, to the regulatory agency cost problem, to regulatory constraints in a technologically advanced world.     

Chaos and Nonlinear Dynamics: Application to Financial Markets

After the stock market crash of October 19, 1987, interest in nonlinear dynamics, especially deterministic chaotic dynamics, has increased in both the financial press and the academic literature. This has come about because the frequency of large moves in stock markets is greater than would be expected under a normal distribution. There are a number of possible explanations. A popular one is that the stock market is governed by chaotic dynamics. What exactly is chaos and how is it related to nonlinear dynamics? How does one detect chaos? Is there chaos in financial markets? Are there other explanations of the movements of financial prices other than chaos? The purpose of this paper is to explore these issues.     

Book Reviews

Technological Collaboration in Industry; strutegy, policy and internationalization in innovation
Corporate Venturing: Creating New Businesses within the Firm
Handbook of Innovation Management
Technology and enterprise in a historical perspective
Intellectual Property for Engineers
The Ernst & Young Business Plan Guide
crnagement as a New Technology
Mass Customization: The New Frontier in Business Competition     

Is it an offence to overcharge?

This paper considers whether a trader commits an offence when he makes a mistake and overcharges a customer. It examines the offences found in section 20 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 - as defined in section 21(1)(a) - and looks at the effect of a recent decision of the appeal courts.