Grensgebied van recht en onrecht: Belastingtarieven

Heine, Deutschland, Kaput XIIRede, uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van lector aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam, op dinsdag 15 oktober 1957. Verschenen bij Uitgeverij F.E.D., Roemer Visscherstraat 29, Amsterdam.     

I. Allgemeine Wirstchaftslehre

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Probabilities proportional to time-state prices

If probabilities and implicit prices of elementary state-contingent claims are proportional across states, any random income stream component is valued by discounting its expectation at the riskless rate. This lacking risk adjustment is explained by degeneracy in either market risk aversion or in randomness of aggregate consumption.     

Reductions in Real versus Tariff Barriers: The Impact on Industry Concentration

Economic integration has had ambiguous effects on industry concentration. The literature on the topic proposes various explanations for these empirical findings. This paper provides an additional theoretical argument. It shows that in a world of monopolistic competition, integration alone (modeled as a reduction of trade barriers) may exert opposing forces on industry concentration, depending on whether the barrier consists of real (frictional) or tariff costs. In particular, the Herfindahl index of industry concentration falls for a reduction in real costs, but rises for a reduction in tariff costs. The reason is that real barriers burn up resources, such that industry profitability is reduced, reducing entry, and resulting in fewer firms and a correspondingly higher concentration. Under a tariff barrier, the redistributed tariff revenue stabilizes industry profitability, resulting in more firms and a lower concentration.     

Demand-side Spillovers and Semi-collusion in the Mobile Communications Market

We analyze roaming policy in the market for mobile telecommunications. Firms undertake quality improving investments in network infrastructure in order to increase geographical coverage, capacity in a given area, or functionality. Prior to investments, roaming policy is determined. We show that under collusion at the investment stage, firms and a benevolent welfare maximizing regulators interests coincide, and no regulatory intervention is needed. When investments are undertaken non-cooperatively, firms and the regulators interests do not coincide. Contrary to what seems to be the regulators concern, firms would decide on a higher roaming quality than the regulator. The effects of allowing a virtual operator to enter are also examined. Furthermore, we discuss some implications for competition policy with regard to network infrastructure investment.     

Economies of scale in Norwegian electricity distribution: a quantile regression approach

In this article, we investigate scale economies in Norwegian electricity distribution companies using a quantile regression approach. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to apply this estimation technique when analysing scale economies. We estimate the cost elasticities of the two output components: network length and number of customers, to calculate returns to scale. Our results show large potential of scale economies, particularly for the smallest companies. We also find that returns to scale is increasing over time. These findings have important implications for policymakers when they are deciding the structure of the industry in the future.