An Analysis of Third Party Consumer Complaint Handling Mechanisms: The Hawaii Office of Consumer Protection

This paper presents a preliminary analysis of third party complaint handling mechanisms, based on data obtained from the Hawaii Office of Consumer Protection. Specifically, the study focuses on the types of complaints processed by the Agency, the factors which affect the redress received by consumers and the length of investigation time.     

Russian enterprises in mid-2010: Slow improvements in the context of a high degree of economic uncertainty

The results of a recent regular survey of opinions among enterprises of the real economy sector, which was conducted by the Laboratory for the Analysis and Forecasting of Microeconomic Processes of the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the RAS (IEF), are analyzed in this paper.     

Russian industries at the beginning of 2011: Current issues and investment climate

The results of a regular survey of companies in the real economic sector conducted by the laboratory of analysis and forecasting of microeconomical processes of the Institute of Economic Forecasting, Russian Academy of Sciences, are analyzed and commented.     

Erfolgreiche Sanierung in der Insolvenz aus Sicht des Schuldnerunternehmens

Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag stellt die M?glichkeiten eines geplanten und gesteuerten Einsatzes des Insolvenzverfahrens zur Sanierung Not leidender Unternehmen dar. Aufbauend auf den Erkenntnissen der Krisentheorie sowie einer ?konomischen Analyse des Insolvenzrechts eignen sich aus Sicht eines schuldnerischen Unternehmens vor allem das Insolvenzplanverfahren auf Basis eines Antrags wegen drohender Zahlungsunf?higkeit in Verbindung mit einem Antrag auf Eigenverwaltung zur Sanierung in der Insolvenz. Der Erfolg der gerichtlichen Sanierung h?ngt dabei ma?geblich von einem effizienten Vorgehen unter Beachtung des aus Sicht der Anteilseigner optimalen Insolvenzzeitpunkts, der Bewertung der Insolvenzeignung des zu sanierenden Unternehmens und der Entscheidung über die Verwertungsart ab.

---

Summary This paper addresses the options of systematically managed insolvency proceedings to reorganise nonperforming firms. Crisis theory and an economic analysis of insolvency law suggest an “Insolvenzplanverfahren” based on a motion because of imminent insolvency in conjunction with requesting a debtor in possession solution is the best option for an indebted company. The success of a juristictional reorganisation depends on the optimal time to file for insolvency, a preselection of companies based on the appropriateness for a juristictional reorganisation, and the decision on asset utilisation.

     

An empirical examination of IPO underpricing in the Chinese A-share market

Research in the literature shows that initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stocks are systematically priced at a discount to their subsequent initial trading price. The large underpricing magnitude in the Chinese IPO market has attracted much attention. We consider three hypotheses that may explain the IPO underpricing in China. These are the winner's curse hypothesis, the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis and the signaling hypothesis. Among these hypotheses, the winner's curse hypothesis has not been tested in the Chinese market. Using IPO data for online fixed-price offerings from November 1995 to December 1998, our results show that the winner's curse hypothesis is the main reason for the high IPO underpricing in China. The signaling hypothesis is not empirically supported in the Chinese market during the sample period.     

Determinants of export performance

Comparative advantage, government incentives and entrepreneurial dynamics as determinants of a country’s export performance are discussed in this article. The author’s particular attention is focussed on the present situation and future perspectives of the less developed countries.     

Problems now and in the past

In some places, voices are raised today which assert that development aid is not worth the noise that is being made about it, because the industrialised countries went through exactly the same phase of development by their own, unaided efforts and still had arrived where they are now. Any development aid, so it is said, will only paralyse the determination of LDCs to aid themselves. The author discusses this assertion in the following article.     

MORE ON WELFARE GAINS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FROM LIBERALIZING WORLD FOOD TRADE

The common presumption that food-importing developing countries would be harmed by a liberalization of world food trade is questioned in this paper. Both theory and new empirical modelling evidence suggest the possibility of the opposite conclusion. Even if just advanced industrial countries were to liberalize their food trade, the present empirical analysis (using a model of world food markets) suggests that economic welfare and net foreign exchange earnings from food trade could improve for the vast majority of developing countries. The extent to which that gain would be greater if developing countries also were to liberalize their policies affecting food markets is shown as well. The analysis helps to reconcile differences between previous results using partial-equilibrium models and those derived from computable general equilibrium models.     

PRODUCER COOPERATIVES,INPUT PRICING AND LAND ALLOCATION

This paper considers input pricing rules for a producer cooperative which supplies its members with two inputs: a publicly provided private input (water), and a local public input (road services). An Israeli Moshav which allocates land equally among producers is a good example. The cooperative uses a two-part pricing rule: a product-dependent uniform fee (head tax) and a user charge per unit of the private input. Discrimination of head tax among the producer groups is shown to dominate that of user charge in the short run. However, land reallocation among producers can result in a Pareto-superior pricing rule and the Henry George theorem emerges in the long run. Thus, allowing land leasing while maintaining equal rights to land increases producer welfare.