Tracking Can Be More Equitable Than Mixing

Parents and policy‐makers often wonder whether and how the choice of a tracked or mixed educational system affects the equality of opportunity. I answer this question by analyzing the influence of peers on future educational results. I define an equal opportunity policy as one that maximizes the average lifetime income of the worst‐off type of individuals in society (i.e., students from disadvantaged backgrounds). I find that tracking maximizes average lifetime income if the opportunity cost of college attendance is sufficiently high.     

Vanity and the love of system in Theory of Moral Sentiments

Abstract

Some recent writing on Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments has emphasised the importance of vanity as one of the most important human motivations. This reading leads to a new version of Das Adam Smith Problem, but this is unwarranted. Such a reading tends to conceal the significance that Smith gave to the love of system, which motivates the actions of the philosopher, the man of state, and above all the entrepreneur. This paper shows, by contrast, that by using this conception we can relate Theory of Moral Sentiments to Wealth of Nations, and reject the idea that these works are based upon contradictory assumptions.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology

We analyze the formation of public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology. Whereas policy coordination is not necessary for symmetric players, it matters for asymmetric players; however, this fails in the absence of transfers. By contrast, with a transfer scheme, asymmetry may be an asset for cooperation. We characterize various types and degrees of asymmetry and relate them to the stability of self‐enforcing agreements. Asymmetric distributions of autarky public good provision levels (also representing asymmetric interests in cooperation) that are positively skewed tend to be conducive to the stability of agreements. We show that under such conditions, even a coalition including all players can be stable. However, asymmetries that foster stability (instability) tend to be associated with low (high) gains from cooperation.     

The family gap and family friendly policies: the case of Norway

Norway has among the most generous family policies in the world. The most recent is the cash-for-care reform, which was implemented in 1998. We answer two main questions in this article: What is the level of the family gap in such a generous regime and how has it developed as a consequence of the latest reform? Results suggest that the family gap is rather modest in Norway compared to many other countries and we find no evidence of a worsening of the gap in recent years. A positive interpretation of these results is that the Norwegian labour market is fairly flexible, in the sense that it seems to be able to absorb even more generous family policies.     

Hedging Housing Risk in London

This paper investigates the benefits of allowing households to compensate the portfolio distortion due to their housing consumption through investments in housing price derivatives. Focusing on the London market, we show that a major loss from over-investment in housing is that households are forced to hold a very risky portfolio. However, the strong performance of the London housing market means that little is lost in terms of expected returns. Even households with limited wealth are better off owning their home rather than renting and investing in financial assets, as long as they are willing to face the financial risk involved. In this context, access to housing price derivatives would benefit most poor homeowners looking to limit their risk exposure. It would also benefit wealthier investors looking for the high returns provided by housing investments without the costs of direct ownership of properties. Comparisons with French, Swedish and U.S. data provide a broader perspective on our findings.     

The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy

This paper is organized as follows: first, we show that the reference to the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek’s thought. Second, we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek’s theses in this domain. Finally, we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek’s approach and propose means to solve them.

Patents,R&;D and lag effects: evidence from flexible methods for count panel data on manufacturing firms

This paper investigates the relationship between patents and research and development expenditures using new longitudinal patent data at the firm level for the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1982 to 1992. The paper also develops a new class of count panel data models based on series expansion of the distribution of individual effects. Estimation results from various distributed lag and dynamic multiplicative panel count data models show that the contemporaneous relationship between patenting and R&D expenditures continues to be strong, accounting for over 60% of the total R&D elasticity. The lag effects are higher than have previously been found for the 1970s data. We would like to thank Chris Bollinger, Bronwyn Hall and Paula Stephan for useful comments on the previous version of the paper. Earlier versions were presented at the 11th International Conference on Panel Data, Texas A&M University, the Midwest Econometrics Group Meeting, and the Annual Conference of the Southern Economic Association.     

The Right Choice at the Right Time: A Herding Experiment in Endogenous Time

Herding describes the phenomenon in decision-making where an economic agent disregards his own private information to follow the actions of his predecessors as in Banerjee (1992). With later decision-makers simply copying earlier decisions their private information cannot be inferred by other decision-makers and will be forever lost. There is some experimental evidence on simple sequential herding of this type in the literature, notably Anderson and Holt (1997). This paper differs by allowing subjects to delay their decision-making in order to benefit from observing others' actions as in more recent herding models such as Chamley and Gale (1994). The results in this paper suggest that subjects will indeed delay when their private information is not sufficiently strong. Despite this ability to wait, as predicted in the theoretical literature, cascades remained ubiquitous and more worrying still, reverse-cascades occurred in which incorrect decisions made by early decision-makers produced informational cascades on the wrong action. In an alternative design, informing subjects that they had made incorrect choices only made matters worse as subjects moved further away from rational behavior.