Motivation and Performance of Seasoned Offerings by Closed-End Funds

We examine the motivation and performance of closed‐end funds that engage in seasoned public or rights offerings. We find that closed‐end funds are more motivated to engage in seasoned offerings when their shares exhibit a relatively high premium (compared to their corresponding NAV) and have a high degree of liquidity. We also find a significant negative valuation effect on average in response to seasoned offerings by closed‐end funds. Our cross‐sectional analysis reveals that the valuation effect at the time of the seasoned offering is more unfavorable for funds that have relatively high expense ratios and are relatively large. Furthermore, we find that the closed‐end funds experience significant negative valuation effects over the three‐year period subsequent to the seasoned offering, implying poor post‐offering performance.     

The demand for minor league baseball

Conclusions Overall our model explains 80 percent of the variation in attendance at minor league baseball games for 27 teams over the 1973–77 seasons. This is a remarkable proportion of the variance to be explained by a pooled cross-section-time-series model with 86 observations. Demmert's model explained 58 percent of the variation in per capita attendance in major league baseball over the 1951–69 period and Noll's model explained 69 percent of the variation in absolute attendance at major league baseball games during 1970–71. The F-ratio indicates that our overall model is statistically significant.Our empirical estimation of the demand for minor league baseball attendance supports the general hypotheses one derives from the theory of consumer demand. As expected, the quantity demanded is negatively related to price; the elasticity of demand is less than one. Per capita income has little effect on attendance, but the quality and excitement of play seem to be important to fans. Surprisingly, winning has no effect on attendance. Promotional efforts appear to be effective in generating attendance, but paid advertising seems to be wholly ineffective.The authors received helpful comments on an earlier draft from Al Finegan, Robert Hays, Ira Horowitz, Larry Nelson and an anonymous referee. A less technical report on the subject of this article has been published inBusiness (January–February, 1980) by the same authors.     

Union Effects on Earnings Dispersion in Australia, 1986–1994

In Australia a large decline in union density has occurred since the mid-1970s. This paper examines the effect of the decline in union density on the dispersion of earnings in Australia between 1986 and 1994. Changes in union density are found to have increased earnings dispersion for male employees over this period, but do not appear to have had a strong effect on earnings dispersion for female employees. The main cause of changes in earnings dispersion for both male and female employees has been an increase in the dispersion of earnings of non-union employees.     

A comparison of ethical evaluations of business school faculty and students: A pilot study

This paper reports the results of a pilot study of differences in ethical evaluations between business faculty and students at a Southern university. Data were collected from 137 business students (46 freshmen and 67 seniors) and 34 business faculty members. Significant differences were found in 7 of the 30 situations between freshmen and faculty and four situations between seniors and faculty. When the combined means for each group were tested, there was no significant difference in the means at the 0.05 level of significance. A trend was revealed, however, in that the majority of the time faculty members were the most ethically oriented followed by seniors and then freshmen.Dr. Robert E. Stevens is Professor of Marketing at Northeast Louisiana University and is the author of 11 books and more than 80 articles. Dr. Stevens has served as a consultant to local, regional, and national firms for research projects, feasibility studies, and market planning, and has been a partner in a marketing research company.Dr. O. Jeff Harris is Professor of Management at Northeast Louisiana University. Prior to coming to Northeast, he taught at Louisiana State University, the University of Arkansas, and the University of Texas. Professor Harris has written three books and numerous articles and position papers. He is a consultant to many health care and processing organizations.Dr. Stan Williamson is an assistant professor of management at Northeast Louisiana University. He teaches strategy, human resource management, and management principles. Before this, he served as a senior executive for a regional health care system for 13 years and as a consultant in the health care field.     

Explaining variation in risk across insurance companies

The purpose of this study is to determine what firm-specific factors affect the risk of insurance companies. Traditional methods used to identify potential failures have been severely criticized. Thus, alternative approaches to risk assessment should be of interest to investors and managers of these companies. Models for measuring the impact of factors on risk are developed and empirically tested. The models employed explain a high proportion of variation in risk levels across companies. The sensitivity of insurance company risk to financial characteristics vary with the variable used as a proxy for risk and the type of insurance company assessed. Given the strong relationships between firm-specific characteristics and company risk, it appears that the risk of insurance companies can be effectively controlled with proper management.     

On Contracting Out: Some Labour Market Considerations

Fashion is the great governor of this world; it presides not only in matters of dress and amusement, but in law, physic, politics, religion, and all other things of the gravest kind.     

A multiple equilibrium model of indicative planning

This paper considers how indicative planning can improve outcomes in an imperfectly competitive economy. We adopt a model of multiple equilibria under imperfect competition based upon one presented by Diamond. We introduce exogenous uncertainty into this model and distinguish between the information provision and coordination roles of a planning agency.