The Relation Between Insider-Trading Restrictions and Executive Compensation

In this study I investigate the relation between firm‐level insider‐trading restrictions and executive compensation. Using a trading‐window proxy for the existence of such restrictions, I test predictions that insiders will demand compensation for these restrictions and that firms will need to increase incentives to restricted insiders. I find that firms that restrict insider trading pay a premium in total compensation relative to firms not restricting insider trading, after controlling for economic determinants of pay. Furthermore, these firms use more incentive‐based compensation and their insiders hold larger equity incentives relative to firms that do not restrict insider trading. These results hold after controlling for the endogenous decision to restrict insiders and are consistent with the notion that insider trading plays a role in rewarding and motivating executives.     

The Impact of TOM on Prices in the US Housing Market

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Search theory shows that real property prices and marketing durations are simultaneously determined and positively related. Yet, empirical studies...     

Entry and capital structure mimicking in concentrated markets: The role of incumbents’ financial disclosures

We examine whether the public availability of product market incumbents' financial disclosures leads to greater capital structure mimicking of incumbents by entrants. Exploiting a change in disclosure enforcement for German private firms in the mid-2000s, we find entrant-incumbent mimicking rises substantially in concentrated markets once incumbents' financial statements are publicly available. Additional tests exploring potential mechanisms are more consistent with interfirm learning underlying the effect than alternative channels. Our findings shed light on the effects of competitor financial statement disclosure on private firms’ initial financing decisions and highlight how capital structure dependencies among peer firms arise.     

Measuring the Socio‐Economic Legacies of Mega‐events: Concepts,Propositions and Indicators

Legacies have become a key rationale underpinning the bidding process for hosting mega‐events. These long‐term effects are deemed to hold benefits and costs, and measurement is important. However, there is limited theory or empirical evidence on legacy impacts. In this article, the literature on legacies of mega‐events is reviewed and event tourism isolated to develop an interdisciplinary conceptual model to measure tourism legacies, and develop propositions on measurement issues. This paper develops a framework of key indicators, propositions and measures to evaluate socio‐economic legacies, which will support event organizers and decision makers to formulate policies for improving event legacies. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Learning never goes on holiday: an exploration of social tourism as a context for experiential learning

This paper applies Experiential Learning Theory to examine learning experiences of UK children during a holiday to assess the potential of holidays as influencing factors in educational achievement and attainment. The paper presents findings from a study undertaken with low-income families who had received financial support to take a holiday through the concept of social tourism. The study concludes that across a range of holiday styles, tourism can provide a context for experiential learning, and that the holiday can help to contextualise classroom learning through relearning. Finally, this form of social tourism, which included cooperation between schools, families, social and education services and social tourism organisations helped to improve relationships between the schools and families, which could be beneficial for children's learning in school. This paper calls for further research on the links between tourism and education.     

INFORMATION ASYMMETRY,MANAGEMENT CONTROL,AND METHOD OF PAYMENT IN ACQUISITIONS

We examine the information asymmetry hypothesis and the management control hypothesis by examining the relation between insider trading and insider holdings to the choice of payment method in acquisitions. Our results indicate that both insider ownership and insider trading are significantly related to payment method. These results provide additional evidence for both the management control theory and the asymmetric information theory in the choice of payment method in acquisitions. Furthermore, we find a significant relation between insider trading activity and the market reaction to the announcement of acquisitions. We conclude that information asymmetry exists in the takeover market and that it influences the payment method decision.     

The kill programme: an ethnographic study of ‘dirty work’ in a slaughterhouse

It has been argued that ‘dirty work’ is characterised by strong occupational and workgroup cultures. This literature has mainly focused on direct workers, but this article largely attends to indirect ‘dirty’ workers, specifically meat inspectors, through ethnographic research conducted in a UK slaughterhouse. Four arguments are developed; the first is that ‘dirty workers’ may not all display group cohesiveness; indeed, individualisation may be more evident depending upon the technology used, internationalisation and employment conditions. Second, there is complexity and diversity within ‘dirty work’ and even single occupations can contain considerable variety, rendering generalisations problematic. Third, we argue that much greater attention needs to be given to the wider contextual issues affecting ‘dirty work’, specifically changing labour markets, itinerant labour, economic conditions and technologies. Finally, we argue that stigmatised work may become more so if it is equated with the low wage economy and/or undercutting conditions of employment through exploiting migrant labour.     

An experimental study of strategic information transmission

Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data.When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.We would like to thank seminar participants at the Economic Science Association meetings, the University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, Northwestern University and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings for their comments. We would like to thank Beth Allen, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Yong-Gwan Kim, Antonio Merlo, Leonard Mirman, In-Uck Park, Charles Plott, Jennifer Reinganum and an anonymous referee for their suggestions. Financial support from the Accounting Research Center at the University of Minnesota is also acknowledge.     

Analyst Following and Market Liquidity*

This paper investigates the relation between analyst characteristics (number of analysts following a firm and their forecast dispersion) and market liquidity characteristics (bid‐ask spreads and depths and the adverse‐selection component of the spread). Prior research has found contradictory results on the relation between analyst following and market liquidity and has offered differing theories on how analysts affect liquidity. While prior research has posited analysts as proxies for privately informed trade or as signals of information asymmetry, I hypothesize that analysts provide public information, implying that analyst following (forecast dispersion) should have a positive (negative) association with liquidity. Cross‐sectional simultaneous estimations provide support for this hypothesis. The results are both statistically significant and economically important. Granger causality tests indicate that analyst characteristics lead market liquidity characteristics. These results clarify the role of analysts in providing information to financial markets and highlight benefits of increased analyst following.