Strategic investment and international outsourcing in unionised oligopoly

We develop an oligopoly model in which firms facing unionised domestic labour markets choose between producing an intermediate good in-house and outsourcing it to a non-unionised foreign supplier that makes a relationship-specific investment in developing the intermediate. The paper sheds light on the issue of whether international outsourcing offers a means to ‘escape’ the power of domestic unions and on the existence of intra-industry wage dispersion. We show that outsourcing typically increases marginal costs even when it lowers union wages. Despite this, more powerful unions increase the incentive to outsource.     

Robust rules for industrial policy open economies

The theory of strategic trade policy yields ambiguous recommendations for assistance to exporting firms in oligopolistic industries. However, some writers have suggested that investment subsidies are a more robust recommendation than export subsidies. We show that, although ambiguous in principle, the case for investment subsidies is reasonably robust in practice. Except when functional forms exhibit arbitrary nonlinearities, it holds under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, with either costreducing or market-expanding investment, and with or without spillovers. Only if firms have strong asymmetries in their investment behaviour and engage in Bertrand competition is an investment tax clearly justified.     

Preference Learning in Consecutive Experimental Auctions

This paper explores the origins of the strikingly high price premia paid for new food products in lab valuation exercises. Our experimental design distinguishes between two explanations of this phenomenon: novelty of the experimental experience versus the novelty of the good, i.e., preference learning—bids reflect a person's desire to learn how an unfamiliar good fits into their preference set. Subjects bid in four consecutive experimental auctions for three goods that vary in familiarity, candy bars, mangos, and irradiated meat. Our results suggest that preference learning is the main source of the high premia, and that novelty of the experimental experience does not in itself artificially inflate valuations.     

Livestock Revenue Insurance

This study outlines several possible structures for livestock revenue insurance. The policies take the form of an exotic option, an Asian basket option. The actuarially fair premiums for these policies are equal to the prices of the options they represent. Because of the complexity of pricing Asian basket options, we combined two techniques for pricing options to reach the actuarially fair premiums. Projected premiums, producer welfare, and program efficiency are evaluated for the insurance products and existing market tools. Using efficiency ratios and certainty equivalent returns, we compare the insurance policies to strategies involving existing futures and options. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 21:553–580, 2001     

Capital structure and short-term decisions

Share price pressure can lead to managerial myopia as managersface incentives to make short-run decisions. We show how long-rundebt can negate myopic behavior by serving as an incentive tohave high future earnings in order to avoid the risk of bankruptcy.We show how increases in leverage could have been a signal inresponse to growing share price pressure in the 1980s. We obtaina theory of capital structure whose predictions are in linewith recent empirically observed patterns. We demonstrate thebenefits of high bankruptcy penalties in inducing efficientdecision making, and show how debt may, ex post, lead to inefficientdecisions being taken in an effort to pay it off. This ex postconsequence of debt can potentially undermine its ex ante incentivebenefits.     

Insuring Eggs in Baskets: Should the Government Insure Individual Risks?

The vast majority of crop and revenue insurance policies sold in North America are single‐crop policies that insure against low yields or low revenues for each crop grown on a particular farm. This practice of insuring one crop at a time runs counter to the traditional risk management practice of diversifying across several enterprises to avoid putting all of one's eggs in a single basket. This paper examines the construction of a whole‐farm crop revenue insurance program to include livestock price risk. The results show that at coverage levels of 95% or lower, the fair insurance premiums for this product on a well‐diversified Iowa farm are far lower than the fair premiums for the corn crop alone on the same farm. The calculation of premium rates for the whole‐farm insurance product is derived from a method for imposing correlations first proposed by Iman and Conover in 1982. The potential income transfer from crop insurance is also examined. We find that the income transfer due to the subsidization of single‐commodity policies is greater than the total premium for whole‐farm policies. La grande majorité de polices d'assurances de récolte et de revenu agricole vendues en Amérique du nord sont des polices de récolte individuelle qui assurent contre des rendements faibles ou bas revenu pour chaque récolte cultivée par une ferme particulière. Cette pratique de n'assurer une récolte à la fois fonctionne à l'opposé de la pratique traditionnelle de gestion des risques par la diversification à travers plusieurs entreprises pour éviter de mettre tous ses oeufs dans un seul panier. Cet article examine la construction d'un programme d'assurance agricole pour l'ensemble des récoltes produites par une ferme y compris le bétail évalue le risque. Les résultats montrent qu'aux niveaux d'assurance plus petits ou égaux à 95 pourcents, les primes d'assurance justes pour ce type de police pour une ferme bien diversifiée de l'Iowa sont bien inférieures aux primes justes pour une police de simple couvrant le maïs et ce pour la même ferme. Le calcul des taux de prime pour une police couvrant l'ensemble des récoltes est dérivé d'une méthode pour imposer des corrélations originalement proposée par Iman et Conover en 1982. Le transfert potentiel de revenu à partir de l'assurance de récolte agricole est également examiné. Nous trouvons que le transfert de revenu dûà la subvention des polices pour récolte singulière est plus grand que la prime entière pour une police couvrant l'ensemble des récoltes.     

Multilateral subsidy games

This paper examines the rationale for multilateral agreements to limit investment subsidies. The welfare ranking of symmetric multilateral subsidy games is shown to depend on whether or not investment levels are “friendly”, raising rival profits in total, and/or strategic complements, raising rival profits at the margin. In both Cournot and Bertrand competition, when spillovers are low and competition is intense (because goods are close substitutes), national-welfare-maximizing governments over-subsidize investment, and banning subsidies would improve welfare. When spillovers are high, national governments under-subsidize from a global welfare perspective, but the subsidy game is welfare superior to non-intervention. For helpful comments we are grateful to two referees, to Arijit Mukherjee, and to participants in seminars at Prague and UCD, at the EEA Conference in Lausanne and at the GEP Conference on “New Directions in International Trade Theory” at the University of Nottingham, June 2007. Dermot Leahy acknowledges the support of the Science Foundation Ireland Research Frontiers Programme (Grant MAT 017).     

Welfare Impacts of Cross-Country Spillovers in Agricultural Research

The welfare implications of intellectual property protection (IPP) for private sector agricultural research are analyzed, focusing on the realistic cases where countries provide different IPP levels, technology spills over across countries, and the public sector is involved in research. A model is developed to determine who benefits from, and who should pay for, the associated research. The article contains some interesting results on the implications of a harmonization of IPP policies through multilateral agreements or via technology that allows research firms to prevent the copying of plants and animals that express traits that have emerged from their research.