International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy without Government Commitment

We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export subsidy, R&D subsidy and welfarc are higher when government commitment is credible than in the dynamically consistent equilibrium without commitment. Commitment thus yields welfare gains (though they are small) but so does unanticipated reneging, whereas reneging which is anticipated by firms yields the lowest welfare of all.     

Collective Marketing Arrangements for Geographically Differentiated Agricultural Products: Welfare Impacts and Policy Implications

We examine the incentives of atomistic producers to differentiate and collectively market products. We analyze market and welfare effects of alternative producer organizations, discuss circumstances under which they will evolve, and describe implications for the ongoing debate between the EU and the United States. As fixed costs of development and marketing increase and the anticipated market size falls, it becomes essential to increase the producer organization's ability to control supply to cover the fixed costs associated with the introduction of differentiated products. Counterintuitively, stronger property right protection for producer organizations may enhance welfare even after a differentiated product has been developed.     

Demand System Estimation with Upward-Sloping Supply

There are three important implications of this work. First, demand systems estimates that overlook supply response are as subject to simultaneous equations bias as single ad hoc demand equations. Theil shows theoretically that assuming supply curves are perfectly elastic, when in fact they are not will underestimate price responsiveness in demand equations. An empirical example is presented that demonstrates that the price elasticities generally increase when upward-sloping supplies are assumed.
Second, the iterative testing procedure presented may provide direction for model building when the true structure of the system is unknown. For example, the results of the Wu-Hausman test indicate that assuming chicken supply is perfectly elastic in a model of the Japanese livestock industry is justified. The results also indicate that the supplies of Wagyu beef, dairy beef, pork and fish are upward-sloping and therefore should be modeled as endogenous variables in the demand system.
Third, the results emphasize the sensitivity of projections of Japanese beef imports to the assumptions underlying the demand system. If perfectly elastic meat supplies are assumed for an analysis of reducing Japanese beef import liberalization, the results will likely underestimate the impacts on beef imports.
In summary, the supply curves for agricultural products tend to slope upward within the time periods used for traditional policy analysis and demand system estimation, which in turn implies that prices are determined endogenously within the system. Endogenous price determination is contrary to the assumptions that underlie the theoretical foundations and many empirical applications of demand systems. We present a methodology to test for and adjust demand systems for endogeneity. The importance of this adjustment is demonstrated by using an analysis of the liberalization of the Japanese beef market.     

Welfare Impacts of Intellectual Property Protection in the Seed Industry

We examine the welfare impact of different intellectual property protection (IPP) regimes in private sector seed research and development (R&D). We take into account the period after expiration of legal IPP, and require simultaneous equilibrium in markets for R&D, seeds, and final product. Optimal IPP is remarkably insensitive to alternative parameterizations, except for R&D productivity. Results suggest that optimal IPP is greater than IPP in the U.S. seed corn market, but lower than the IPP that could be attained with genetic use restriction technologies. Optimal IPP is much higher than IPP achieved under open-pollinated crops or where legal IPP is limited.     

Oligopsonistic Cats and Dogs

This paper examines strategic investment behaviour when firms have oligopsony power in the input market. Focusing on the labour market, we study how a firm’s labour supply augmenting investment affects the equilibrium when oligopsonistic firms set wages. Relative to a non-strategic benchmark, optimal investment strategies involve boosting investment that leads rival employers to cut wages, but involves cutting back on investment that causes the latter to increase their wages. Implications of existing labour market policies for strategic investment are also discussed. Finally, the model is generalised to nest wage and employment competition and is extended to include other types of investment.     

Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy Towards Dynamic Oligopolies

We characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's 'animal spirits' taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and also extensions to constrained second-best policies.     

The impact of large-scale employee share ownership plans on labour productivity: the case of Eircom

Large-scale employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) have been a distinctive characteristic of Irish public enterprise reform, with shareholdings of 14.9% being allocated to employees as part of firm restructuring and privatisation programmes. This paper presents a case study analysis of a large-scale ESOP in Eircom, Ireland's former national telecommunications operator. We identify changes in labour productivity (LP) during 8 years before and after the establishment of the company's ESOP and use a framework based on Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan (1991, The Academy of Management Review, 16, 121–144) and Pierce, Kostova and Dirks (2001, Academy of Management Review, 26, 298–310) to explore the role played by the ESOP. The ESOP was found to play a key role in enabling firm-level reform through concession bargaining and changes in employee relations, and thereby indirectly affecting LP. However, despite the substantial shareholding and influence of the ESOP, we find that it has failed to create a sense of psychological ownership among employees, and thereby further impact on productivity.     

Actuarial Fairness of Crop Insurance Rates with Constant Rate Relativities

Increased availability and demand for low-deductible crop insurance policies have increased focus on crop insurance rating methods. Actuarial fairness cannot be achieved if constant multiplicative factors are used to determine how premiums change as coverage levels increase. A comparison of premium rates generated by the factors used by the two most popular crop insurance products with those generated by a standard yield distribution shows that the popular insurance products overcharge for low-deductible policies in most counties. This overpricing may explain why large premium subsidies were required to induce farmers to move from low-deductible to high-deductible policies beginning in 2001.     

Rivalry in uncertain export markets: commitment versus flexibility

This paper examines optimal trade policy in a two-period oligopoly model, with a home and a foreign firm choosing capital and output. Demand uncertainty, resolved in period two, gives rise to a trade-off between strategic commitment and flexibility in the firms’ investment decisions. Firms’ investment timing is endogenous and can be manipulated by the home government, which sets a subsidy before firms decide when to invest. We show that when the government wishes to manipulate investment timing, it will choose its policy to deter investment commitment by the home or the foreign firm.