Energy balance climate models and general equilibrium optimal mitigation policies

In a general equilibrium model of the world economy, we develop a two-dimensional energy balance climate model featuring heat diffusion and anthropogenic forcing driven by global fossil fuel use across the sphere of the Earth. This introduces an endogenous location dependent temperature function, driving spatial characteristics, in terms of location dependent damages resulting from local temperature anomalies into the standard climate-economy framework. We solve the social planner's problem and characterize the competitive equilibrium for two polar cases differentiated by the degree of market integration. We define optimal taxes on fossil fuel use and how they may implement the planning solution. Our results suggest that if the implementation of international transfers across latitudes is not possible then optimal taxes are in general spatially non-homogeneous and may be lower at poorer latitudes. The degree of spatial differentiation of optimal taxes depends on heat transportation. By employing the properties of the spatial model, we show by numerical simulations how the impact of thermal transport across latitudes on welfare can be studied.     

Institutional wage-setting,labour demand and labour supply: Causal estimates from a South African pseudo-panel

Unemployment in South Africa has multiple causes. This article uses a district pseudo-panel to estimate the elasticity of labour demand, labour supply and unemployment with respect to wages. We assess whether hiring decisions are more sensitive to increases in wages of low-paid workers than high-paid workers, and whether wage growth prompts entry into the labour market. These channels combine to result in the positive causal effect of wage growth on unemployment. The research investigates whether these effects are dominated by districts in which unionisation rates are high and employment is concentrated in large firms. Wage growth of middle-paid to highly paid workers – as opposed to low-paid workers – reduces local labour demand and raises local unemployment. Bargaining arrangements correspond closely to the spatial wage distribution; in turn, a large part of the impact that wage growth has on labour market outcomes is determined by these wage-setting institutions.     

Money growth volatility and the demand for money in Germany: Friedman’s volatility hypothesis revisited

Money Growth Volatility and the Demand for Money in Germany: Friedman’s Volatility Hypothesis Revisited. — Recently, the Bundesbank claimed that monetary targeting has become considerably more difficult by the increased volatility of short-term money growth. The present paper investigates the impact of German money growth volatility on income velocity and money demand in view of Friedman’s money growth volatility hypothesis. Granger-causality tests provide some evidence for a velocity/volatility linkage. However, the estimation of volatility-augmented money demand functions reveals that — in contrast to Friedman’s hypothesis — increased money growth volatility lowered the demand for money.     

A Theoretical Perspective on Multilateral Agreements on Investment*

Why do we observe some developing countries objecting to the prospect of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), even though they have been keen to liberalize investment in preferential agreements in recent years? In this paper, we analyze the issue of MAI implementation and assess the welfare consequences of such kind of agreements. In our model, participation to MAI involves a tradeoff between less rent extraction from multinational firms (MNEs) and more abundant FDI inflows. At equilibrium, either all countries enter MAI, or all countries stay out, or only some of them enter. Coordination problems may induce multiple equilibria: the three types of equilibria may coexist. So, the implementation of MAI may depend not only on structural factors but also on the general “political climate.” When all countries join MAI, world welfare is maximized because this minimizes the hold‐up problem faced by MNEs and stimulates investment. However, in an asymmetric world, welfare gains are not guaranteed for all countries.