Fresh surface water resource allocation between Bulgaria and Greece

This paper addresses the important issue of transboundary sharing of fresh surface water resources, including quantity and quality dimensions. It carves a simple economic model of the benefits which can be generated by maximizing the joint profits earned, when the resource is shared efficiently between two countries. The appropriate policy instrument towards this end is a bilateral agreement to charge the same water price to all water users in a given sector. Market clearance will then follow to determine the optimal water price. The case of the Nestos river flowing through Bulgaria and Greece, but overexploited by Bulgaria, in the Balkans is used as a case study. The empirical estimation of a fixed proportions production function for corn derives a marginal water value of the Nestos water for Greece. This value, which applies under the current non-cooperative solution, is higher than the optimal water price in the cooperative solution.     

Corporate Political Activities and the SEC's Oversight Role in the IPO Process

We study how a regulator (Securities and Exchanges Commission; SEC) responds to IPOs that have a higher political profile. We find that IPOs with issuers (intermediaries) that actively pursue political strategies receive more (less) SEC comment letters than IPOs without such actors. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that the IPO's political environment moderates the relationship between social pressure for more corporate transparency and SEC scrutiny. Additional tests indicate that the political activities of issuers (intermediaries) contribute to a less (more) efficient IPO process. Overall, our findings suggest that politically active intermediaries have stronger incentives to accurately portray the IPO financial reporting environment than politically active issuers because they have greater reputational and political capital at stake; quite simply, the former have more to lose. We draw out the implications for theory, in terms of agency and reputation.     

The development of industrial clusters and public policy

This paper assesses the relationships between public policy and the development of industrial clusters. A conceptual model of the relationship between public policies and the development of industrial clusters is developed and tested using data from 43 European industrial clusters. The results indicate that most government policies have no significant impact on the growth of industrial clusters or for the development of co-operation within industrial clusters. There is limited evidence that packages of government policies that are specifically geared towards improving the local asset base are effective in overcoming obstacles to growth of industrial clusters. However, when age is used as a control variable the weak relationship between policy packages and growth of industrial clusters disappear. The results indicate that individual and packages of public policies are not strongly connected to either high levels of co-operation, or high growth in industrial clusters. Moreover, no clear evidence was found that high levels of co-operation were associated with growth in industrial districts. In the light of the failure to find clear-cut associations between public policies and the development of industrial clusters the paper outlines a research agenda to help to increase our understanding of these issues.     

Economic Analysis at the European Commission 2012–2013

In 2012–2013 the European Commission has had particularly prominent merger cases, with two prohibitions of transactions and several clearances with far-reaching remedies. In these cases economic analysis has been tightly integrated into the general argument of the Commission and became central to the outcome of the cases. Based on economic theory and supporting data, the Commission has pursued novel economic theories of harm and challenged some economically dubious “common wisdom” in merger assessment. The second area in which economic analysis has had a major impact is in state aid modernization. The new regional aid guidelines of 2013 have moved the rules much closer to economic thinking about effective regional aid and introduced requirements for economic ex-post analysis. Finally, the decisions on the e-books case reflect close cross-Atlantic cooperation with respect to the economic analysis and the design of appropriate remedies. This article reports on a number of examples for the most important cases.     

Online Complaining Behavior in Mainland China Hotels: The Perception of Chinese and Non-Chinese Customers

Examining hotel customer feedback is vital for effective service recovery and improvement. The main objective of this study is to analyze online complaints about hotels in Mainland China and to examine the relationship between culture and other factors that affect the intention to complain online. Content analysis was performed for 822 complaints about hotels in major Chinese cities drawn from TripAdvisor and Ctrip. Complaints made by Chinese and non-Chinese customers were compared and 11 major complaint categories were identified. A two-way contingency table analysis demonstrated that traveler age, hotel price, and travel partner significantly influenced the online complaints made.     

Procyclicality and the new Basel Accord - banks’ choice of loan rating system

Summary. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is proposing to introduce, in 2006, new risk-based requirements for internationally active (and other significant) banks. These will replace the relatively risk-invariant requirements in the current Accord. The new requirements for the largest bank will be based on bank ratings of the probability of default of the borrowers. There is evidence that the choice of loan ratings which are conditional on the point in the economic cycle could lead to sharp increases in capital requirements in recessions. This makes the question of which rating schemes banks will use very important. The paper uses a general equilibrium model of the financial system to explore whether banks would choose to use a countercyclical, procyclical or neutral rating scheme. The results indicate that banks would not choose a stable rating approach, which has important policy implications for the design of the Accord. It makes it important that banks are given incentives to adopt more stable rating schemes. This consideration has been reflected in the Committees latest proposals, in October 2002.Received: 25 October 2003, Revised: 27 April 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D58, E44, G28. Correspondence to: Dimitrios P. TsomocosThe authors are grateful to Pamela Nickell for carrying out some of the calculations and Nicola Anderson, Charles Goodhart, Andy Haldane, Glenn Hoggarth, Nobu Kiyotaki, William Klein, Alistair Milne, William Perraudin, Hyun Shin, Paul Tucker, seminar participants at the Bank of England XI European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, INSEAD, LSE, the University of Oxford and especially H.M. Polemarchakis for helpful comments and remarks. However, all remaining errors are ours. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England, and the Bank of Spain.     

A model to analyse financial fragility

Summary. This paper sets out a tractable model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour, to possible contagious inter-relationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit ‘excessive’ risk-taking. Our model is rich enough to include heterogeneous agents, endogenous default, and multiple commodity, and credit and deposit markets. Yet, it is simple enough to be effectively computable and can therefore be used as a practical framework to analyse financial fragility. Financial fragility in our model emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon. Among other results, a non-trivial quantity theory of money is derived, liquidity and default premia co-determine interest rates, and both regulatory and monetary policies have non-neutral effects. The model also indicates how monetary policy may affect financial fragility, thus highlighting the trade-off between financial stability and economic efficiency.Received: 6 November 2003, Revised: 6 October 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: D52, E4, E5, G11, G21.C.A.E. Goodhart, P. Sunirand, D.P. Tsomocos: We are grateful to T.F. Bewley, S. Bhattacharya, F. Hahn, C. Mayer, H.S. Shin and seminar participants at the Bank of Austria, Bank of England, Bank of Norway, Bank for International Settlements, Brown University, the 7th Annual Macroeconomic Conference, Crete, EcoMod-IIOA International Conference, Brussels, the 2nd Oxford Finance Summer Symposium and Nuffield, Oxford, the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research, Purdue University, the University of Birmingham, the VI SAET Conference, Rhodes, Yale University, and especially an anonymous referee and H.M. Polemarchakis for helpful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England. Correspondence to: D.P. Tsomocos     

Single Versus Multi-market Approach: An Application to the Greek Cotton Market

Estimation of the price-induced welfare effects in vertical and horizontal market settings may prove a tricky task when multiple price changes are taken into account. Whether a multi-market sequential approach or a single-market approach is used the well-established, theoretical result suggests that these two partial equilibrium methods are equivalent in terms of implied welfare changes. This paper develops the methodology to empirically compare these two methods. We estimate the welfare changes to Greek cotton–yarn producers induced by the simultaneous change in the prices of cotton–yarn and the cost of labor. Results substantiate the multi-market approach offers more accurate welfare estimates than the single-market approach, in empirical work.