塑造新型广东国资监管体制

广东国有资产管理已进入制度创新的深化阶段。在国有资产发生脱胎换骨的变化的同时，广东国资管理仍然面临着巨大的挑战。为了确保广东国有资产的保值增值，防止国有资产流失，创新企业法人治理结构，必须对广东国资监管体制进行创新。而建立“所有者监督为重点，国有资产出资者监督为主体”的政府监督体系和完善企业自我监督体系是塑造新型广东国资监管体制的重点。     

商业银行弱经济周期性分析及启示——以美国富国银行为例

商业银行经营往往具有较强的亲经济周期性,这不仅增大了银行股东的风险,也不利于塑造稳健经营的社会形象.本文选取美国富国银行为案例,通过主成分分析方法评估富国银行多年的经营表现情况,并结合美国经济波动情况,得出结论:富国银行经营具有稳定上升趋势,受到宏观经济的影响较小,具有弱经济周期性.本文最后结合富国银行的经营理念、风险控制、多元化渠道建设以及并购战略等因素,探讨富国银行弱经济周期性背后的原因及其对我周商业银行的启示.     

混合历史模拟法在金融风险度量中的应用

随着银行业务的不断发展和市场竞争的加剧,银行业风险呈现出复杂多变的特征,<新巴塞尔协议>的出台对银行风险管理提出了更高要求.由于中国大多数银行开展风险管理的时间不长,相关数据积累不足.因而选择合适的模型显得尤为重要.本文针对风险计量VaR模型的历史模拟法,运用回溯检验的原理,比较分析了混合历史模拟法与一般历史模拟法在小样本情形下的表现,得到了相对于一般历史模拟法而言,混合历史模拟法能更好地度量风险的结论.     

借融入武汉城市圈东风 强黄冈汽车产业发展之路

为了主动、全面、快速融入武汉城市圈,推进黄冈经济又好又快发展,笔者结合工作实际,通过分析黄冈汽车维修业发展概况及人才需求状况,介绍了黄冈职院汽车检测与维修技术专业基本情况,剖析了黄冈汽车产业发展之路,提出了加强校企合作、服务区域经济的方案。     

交易成本对易货经济的影响——瓦尔拉斯均衡“不成立”的一种情形

本文首先用一种新的解析几何方法在易货经济 (即两种商品的纯交换经济 )条件下的一般均衡框架下揭示了价格与消费者的马歇尔需求之间的函数关系。在此基础上 ,由个人承担的交易成本被直接置入。然后 ,本文证明 :如果交易成本的固定项不为零 ,供、求函数将不连续 ;如果同时有非无穷小比例的人口进行同步化决策 ,那么瓦尔拉斯均衡将会被破坏     

对企业竞争优势的再思考--读波特《竞争优势》有感

企业在发展的过程中必然会面对众多的竞争对手，在日益激烈的竞争压力下。获取竞争优势是企业取得成功的重要保证。就波特有关竞争优势的理论，笔者对什么是竞争优势，竞争优势的特点，以及采取什么样的途径才能获取竞争优势作了一些再思考，希望能给处于竞争中的企业带来一点启发。     

From cultivation to culture: Wheat farming and sex selection in China

Sex selection has been linked to son preference and discrimination against girls in many Asian countries. In this study, we shed light on the shaping role of rice–wheat cropping system to the subsequent gender inequality in China. Using an individual-level dataset compiled from a national scale survey and an archaeology publication, we show regional differences in gender inequality across China: parents show strong gender discrimination against girls in wheat regions. And 15.2 percentage points more parents from wheat regions engage in successful sex selection than those from non-wheat regions. The mechanism analysis reveals that women empowerment matters.     

土地登记制度的经济分析

研究目的:运用法律经济分析的基本理论,阐述土地登记制度的成本与效益,为建设安全、有效率的土地登记制度提供经济分析框架.研究方法:文献资料法和案例分析法.研究结论:在中国土地登记制度建设中要广泛研究如何降低交易成本和提高土地登记效益,避免忽略土地登记制度成本和效益的倾向.     

Incentives to managers or participation of farmers in China's irrigation systems: which matters most for water savings,farmer income,and poverty?

The overall goal of our article is to better understand which matters for water savings, farmer income and poverty in China's irrigation systems: incentives to managers or participation of farmers. To pursue this goal, the article has three objectives. First, we track the evolution of water management reform, examining the practice of providing incentives to managers, and increasing the participation of farmers. Second, we identify the impact of water management reform on crop water use. Specifically, we want to measure whether or not incentives to managers and farmer participation in water management institutions affect the performance of the irrigation system. Because we also are interested in the potential results of water management reform, the article explores how changes in incentives and farmer participation affect farmer income and poverty. Based on a random sample of 51 villages and 189 farmers in four large irrigation districts in Ningxia and Henan provinces, both in China's Yellow River Basin, our results show that the two major forms of water management reform, water users' associations (WUAs) and contracting, have begun to systematically replace traditional forms of collective management. Our analysis demonstrates, however, that it is not the nominal implementation of the reform that matters, but rather it is the creation of new management institutions that offer water managers monetary incentives that lead to water savings. In contrast to the original design of China's reform policies, participation of farmers has not played a role in saving water. Importantly, given China's concerns about national food production and poverty alleviation, the reductions in water, at least in our sample sites, do not lead to reductions in income and do not increase the incidence of poverty.