Growth, welfare and optimal trade taxes: a fallacy of composition

Optimal export taxation rules out the possibility of immiserizing growth in a two-country world. Thus, productivity increases in the exporting sector must be welfare improving. This paper shows that in a multicountry world such reasoning commits a fallacy of composition. Simultaneous growth of exporting nations can lead to welfare losses in the presence of unilaterally optimal export taxes. Also, optimal export taxes can decline in response to such growth. This result further strengthens the possibility of perverse welfare movements. Thus, standard policy recommendations of increasing productivity in the exporting sector may lead to unintended and self-defeating outcomes.     

Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule

This paper examines aggregation procedures that map profiles of individual preferences into choice sets. An aggregation procedure is said to be “manipulable by a coalition” if there is a group of individuals, and a preference profile, such that every member of the group prefers the choice set obtained when they are misrepresenting their preferences, to the one obtained when they are honest. We show that the Pareto rule, which is an aggregation procedure that maps profiles of individual preferences into corresponding sets of Pareto optima, is not manipulable by any coalition of individuals under various behavioural assumptions which relate preferences over choice sets to preferences over alternatives. The non-manipulability of the Pareto rule by a single individual follows as a special case under these behavioural assumptions.     

Intraday Price Discovery in the DJIA Index Markets

Abstract:  This paper explores the dynamics of price discovery between the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index and its three derivative products: the DIAMOND exchange-traded fund (ETF), the floor-traded regular futures, and the electronically traded mini futures. Even though the American Stock Exchange is the primary listing exchange for the ETF, the analysis indicates that the electronically traded ETF on the Archipelago (ArcaEx) electronic communications network dominates the price discovery process for DIAMOND shares. The E-mini futures contribute the most to price discovery, followed by the ArcaEx DIAMOND. The DJIA index and regular futures contribute least to price discovery. The analysis is repeated using the derivatives of the S&P 500 index as a robustness check. The results indicate that multi-market trading ensures greater pricing efficiency. Informed traders favor electronic trading because of immediate and anonymous trade execution.     

Customs Union or Free Trade Area? The Role of Political Asymmetries

When trade policy is determined endogenously by lobbying, it matters whether countries are arranged into a customs union or a free trade area. This paper compares the two regimes when the member governments are asymmetric in their susceptibilities to lobbying and in their bargaining power within a customs union. In the model, a customs union never leads to lower tariffs for both countries, whereas it can lead to higher tariffs for both.     

Process and Product Innovation: Complementarity in a Vertically Differentiated Monopoly with Discrete Consumer Types

This paper examines the complementarity between process and product innovation where process innovation reduces the marginal cost of quality. In the context of a vertically differentiated monopolistic market with discrete consumer types, we investigate how the nature of (fixed versus variable) innovation costs and the distribution of consumers over different types affect the complementarity between process and product innovation. We show that under variable innovation costs a process innovation is more likely to occur alone than both innovations together when taste diversity (or consumer heterogeneity) is not significant and/or when there are more low-type than high-type consumers.     

The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules

The paper extends the work of S. Barbera and H. Sonnenschein on probabilistic social welfare functions by permitting quasi-transitive and/or acyclic probabilistic social preferences. Allowing for quasi-transitivity it is shown that the social decision rule is characterized by a subadditive veto power structure. Gibbard's result on oligarchy is shown to be a special case. Similarly, Sen's theorem on Paretian Liberals is shown to be implied by the power structure in the acyclic case.