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Using match attendance data collected from a postal survey of Football League clubs, separate demand equations are estimated for standing and seated viewing accommodation. Some significant differences between attendance patterns for the two types of accommodation are identified: current form, the championship significance of the match and a geographical distance variable are found to be important determinants of standing attendance, while the club's historical record is of particular importance for seated attendance. The paper also discusses the implications of the results in view of the current moves towards the conversion of stadia to all-seated accommodation. 相似文献
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In contrast to other research, lower corruption is associated with higher income inequality. This result is consistent with the idea that the corruption–inequality relationship may be different where there is a large informal sector, as in Latin America. 相似文献
34.
Paul W. Dobson 《Bulletin of economic research》1997,49(3):213-229
In the context of price-setting oligopoly, this paper shows that there may be consensus in union–employer bargaining for limiting the scope of bargaining to determining wage levels and allowing the employer to act unilaterally when competing in the product market. A strategic commitment by each union–firm pair to a right-to-manage framework, rather than a participatory approach, may benefit the bargaining parties since this entails higher negotiated wage rates which, by dampening competition in the product market, may allow for an increase in the amount of surplus generated by the parties. 相似文献
35.
This paper investigates the relationship between team performance and managerial change in English football using a data set containing information on all match results and managerial job changes in the English Football League between 1972 and 1993. We find that poor recent form drives many managerial terminations, while managerial turnover is more rapid in the lower divisions.
Significantly, managerial change appears to have a harmful effect on team performance immediately following a managerial termination. 相似文献
Significantly, managerial change appears to have a harmful effect on team performance immediately following a managerial termination. 相似文献
36.
The paper considers 'efficient bargains', with a union that weighs the utilities of its members unequally and negotiates over group employment levels. Such discrimination may lead to socially inefficient overemployment of the dominant group, and underemployment of the group suffering discrimination. 相似文献
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Sellers often provide complimentary “no extra charge” add-ons (e.g., free Internet connection) to consumers who buy their
primary products (e.g., a hotel stay), but recently add-ons that used to be free are offered for a fee. The conventional wisdom
is that unadvertised add-ons for high fees help competitors increase profits that are competed away by advertising low prices
for the basic products. This theory cannot explain why complimentary add-ons are still offered by some sellers. We show that
providing complimentary add-ons can be profitable for sellers with monopoly power under certain demand conditions. If these
demand conditions are not met, it is optimal to charge a supplementary fee for the add-on. We also show how pricing policy
can be designed to selectively target or deter different consumer segments from purchasing the add-on to boost sellers’ profits,
providing a strategic role for selling add-ons at either below-cost or at exorbitantly high prices. Yet such behavior may
have repercussions for economic welfare when it results in socially inefficient giveaways when consumers would be better served
with a lower price on the basic product without the add-on or, with the other extreme, when it results in excessively high
prices for an add-on that restricts sales and leads to its under-provision from a societal perspective. The paper also provides
managerial insights on the design and use of add-ons. 相似文献