Firms' efficiency and global value chains: An empirical investigation on Italian industry

This paper investigates the effect of participation in global value chains (GVCs) on firms' efficiency and explores heterogeneity in this impact across different firms, according to GVC governance, positioning in the chain and time length of participation. Our analysis takes advantage of survey data providing information on involvement in GVCs for a large set of Italian industrial SMEs between 2008 and 2012. We employ Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to retrieve a measure of firms' technical efficiency (i.e., DEA efficiency scores) and estimate the impact of involvement in GVCs on firms' efficiency through propensity-score matching techniques and truncated regression. Our results show that participation in GVCs induces significant efficiency premia, especially for suppliers, with stronger effects in the case of relational modes of participation.     

CEO investment of deferred compensation plans and firm performance

We study how US chief executive officers (CEOs) invest their deferred compensation plans depending on the firm's profitability. By looking at the correlation between the CEO's return on these plans and the firm's stock return, we show that deferred compensation is to a large extent invested in the company equity in good times and divested from it in bad times. The divestment from company equity in bad times arguably reflects CEOs' incentive to abandon the firm and to invest in alternative instruments to preserve the value of their deferred compensation plans. This result suggests that the incentive alignment effects of deferred compensation crucially depend on the firm's health status.     

On efficient trading mechanisms between one seller and n buyers

Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) prove that if one seller and one buyer have independent private valuations for an indivisible object then no individually rational and incentive compatible trading mechanism can guarantee ex post efficiency when gains from trade are uncertain. Makowski and Mezzetti (1993) show that this is not the case when there are at least two buyers. In the latter context, if the highest possible seller's valuation is not too large, we provide an ex post efficient mechanism in which the mechanism designer and the agents are not required to know the probability distribution for the seller's valuation. Received: February 18, 1998 / Accepted: September 10, 1999     

Profitability of corporate social responsibility in network industries

The present paper shows that, when firms compete in a non-cooperative way on the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in network industries, the conventional result of the prisoner’s dilemma structure of the game in standard industries—i.e. to have social concerns is the Nash equilibrium, but it is harmful for firms’ profits—vanishes and, for sufficiently intense network externalities, the equilibrium in which both firms have social concerns is more profitable than simple profit-seeking. Moreover, we show that—when firms cooperate in choosing the profit-maximising level of social concerns—a profit-maximising CSR level does exist, provided that network effects are sufficiently strong. Therefore, in network industries, firms may obtain higher profits engaging in—cooperatively as well as non-cooperatively—CSR activities, showing that firms’ social concerns may be motivated by the owners’ selfish behaviour. Finally, a counter-intuitive result as regards consumer’s surplus and social welfare is obtained: those are always higher under competitive than cooperative choice of CSR because the level of CSR activities is higher in the former case. However, given that firms gain their largest profits with the cooperative choice of CSR, a Pareto-superior outcome is not reached.     

Managerial firms’ profitability,unions, and environmental taxes

This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit-maximization. It is shown that firm-specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation of environmental quality is sufficiently high. Within this framework, the work also develops the endogenous game played by firms that must choose between sales delegation (SD) and profit-maximization. Results show that the SD contract always emerges as the unique, deadlock sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, thereby solving the (prisoner's) dilemma emerging in the related existing literature assuming a competitive labour market.     

Product market competition with differentiated goods and social welfare in the presence of an industry-wide union

Mainstream locus communis indicates that a more competitive product market leads to higher social welfare levels. Using a Conjectural Variation (CV) model, this research note analyzes the effects on welfare of different degrees of product market competition in a duopoly with differentiated goods. Bargaining between the firms and the industry-wide union occurs under the Efficient Bargaining (EB) model. The work indicates that, with close substitute goods, social welfare is maximized for the intermediate levels of market competition, whereas more independent goods lead to the standard result of a high welfare level under competitive markets.     

JAPAN: THE CASE FOR A TAYLOR RULE? A SIMPLE APPROACH

Abstract.  In this article I propose two different models for analyzing the conduct of monetary policy, facing certain expectations. The first is a autoregressive model, which implicitly accounts for adaptive expectations, while the second accounts for the rational expectations. I used these models to judge whether or not the Taylor rule can be a good benchmark for the conduct of monetary policy in Japan. The conclusion is that a simple AR model fits the data better than the Taylor rule, and that assuming rational expectations in Japan could be highly misleading, at least since the mid-1990s.     

Group heterogeneity and cooperation on the geographical indication regulation: The case of the “Prosciutto di Parma” Consortium

This paper explores the impact of individual group members’ heterogeneous characteristics, resources and strategies on their level of cooperation on defining the future regulation of Geographical Indications (GIs). By following a “grounded theory” approach, this study combines qualitative evidence from an in-depth study on the “Prosciutto di Parma” Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) Consortium with quantitative evidence based on data collected from 94 Consortium members and analysed through path modelling. Results confirm that (1) “Prosciutto di Parma” Consortium members have highly and increasingly heterogeneous characteristics, assets and strategies and that (2) higher heterogeneity negatively affects members’ agreement on the future level of restrictiveness of “Prosciutto di Parma” PDO as GI and therefore the effectiveness of the collective action. Overall, these findings give light to another internal barrier that may threaten producers’ opportunity of profiting from the use of established and highly recognized GIs. Managerial and policy implications for both “Prosciutto di Parma” Consortium members and other groups governing established and highly recognized GIs are drawn.