Exchange rates,central bank news and the zero lower bound*

The zero lower bound (ZLB) may restrict the responsiveness of exchange rates to news. A proxy for central bank communication is added as a determinant in a model of exchange rate movements. Two reserve currencies, the British pound and euro, and two currencies of small open economies, the Canadian dollar and Swedish krona, are examined. Reserve currencies are more vulnerable to the ZLB constraint, while the currencies of small open economies become more responsive to foreign central bank announcements. Certain unconventional monetary policy announcements were found to significantly impact exchange rates at the ZLB.     

Short-term inflation projections: A Bayesian vector autoregressive approach

In this paper we construct a large Bayesian Vector Autoregressive model (BVAR) for the Euro area that captures the complex dynamic inter-relationships between the main components of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and their determinants. The model generates accurate conditional and unconditional forecasts in real-time. We find a significant pass-through effect of oil-price shocks on core inflation and a strong Phillips curve during the Great Recession.     

Three decades of money demand studies: differences and similarities

Recent empirical contributions on procyclical productivity have focused on the dynamic implications of persistent aggregate fluctuations on sectoral productivity. Given a permanent innovation in aggregate output, unobserved variations of labour (or capital) utilization may have only a transitory effect on measured productivity, whereas external effects should produce permanent effects. It is found that persistent aggregate fluctuations have a permanent effect on productivity of four-digit US manufacturing industries. While a number of alternative explanations of this evidence are discussed and ruled out, the findings are consistent with a simple model with external or thick market effects.     

Optimal Exit Policy with Uncertain Demand*

In a framework where entrants must make sunk investment decisions with uncertain returns and have private demand information, we show that the relationship between innovation and exit value is non-monotone and features an inverted U-shaped pattern. Consumer surplus is maximised at the lowest exit value that incentivises the investment. These insights are applied to optimal merger policy. An entrant is more willing to innovate to be acquired afterwards, even if it has no bargaining power. This innovation-for-buyout effect implies that an entrant is less likely to leave the market under a lenient than a strict merger policy.     

Managerial firms’ profitability,unions, and environmental taxes

This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit-maximization. It is shown that firm-specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation of environmental quality is sufficiently high. Within this framework, the work also develops the endogenous game played by firms that must choose between sales delegation (SD) and profit-maximization. Results show that the SD contract always emerges as the unique, deadlock sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, thereby solving the (prisoner's) dilemma emerging in the related existing literature assuming a competitive labour market.     

Determining paths of innovation: The role of culture on the adoption on organic farming management

The aim of this paper is to understand whether national culture is linked with operative performance of organic agriculture. The ultimate goal is, indeed, to measure the impact of social change on technical innovation and sustainability issues. We built an econometric model where the impact of some of the six dimensions of national culture by Geert Hofstede is tested on inputs and outputs of organic production, on a country-based scale. We collected data about the evolution of organic agriculture through the last two decades, extracting data about 27 countries of the European Union from 2000 to 2017. We tested the dataset into two passages: we first employed a DEA model to assess efficiency of organic farming, and then we correlated results to Hofstede 6-D model of national culture. We observed the existence of a relationship between culture and innovation, explaining the importance of determined values in people's management within the firm. The operative performance of organic agriculture is linked to determined culturally influenced business values. We used efficiency results as variables for measuring innovation approach based on cultural models. It has been enhanced the relevance to the nexus innovation-culture approaching to one of the most innovation-resistant industrial sectors.     

Upstream conduct and price authority with competing organizations

We characterize the degree of price authority that competing upstream principals award their downstream agents in a setting where these agents own private information about demand and incur nonverifiable distribution costs. Principals cannot internalize these costs through monetary incentives and design “permission sets” from which agents choose prices. The objective is to understand the forces shaping delegation and the constraints imposed on equilibrium prices. When principals behave noncooperatively, agents are biased toward excessively high prices because they pass on distribution costs to consumers. Hence, the permission set only features a price cap that is more likely to bind as products become closer substitutes, in sectors where distribution is sufficiently costly, and when demand is not too volatile. By contrast, when principals behave cooperatively, the optimal delegation scheme is richer and more complex. Because principals want to charge the monopoly price, the optimal permission set features a price floor when the distribution cost is sufficiently low, it features instead full discretion for moderate values of this cost, and only when it is high enough, a price cap is optimal. Surprisingly, while competition (as captured by stronger product substitutability) hinders delegation in the noncooperative regime, the opposite occurs when principals maximize industry profit.     

Corporate social responsibility and market entry

Is the decision of firms to pursue social interest and promote social progress philanthropic or motivated by strategic reasons? Using a simple Spence–Dixit entry model game with homogeneous goods, this paper studies the possible anticompetitive effect of the adoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the form of “consumer friendliness” (i.e., firms’ attention to the welfare of consumers). It is shown that, when the market becomes contestable, the incumbent can select to adopt CSR to hamper to a greater extent the potential entrant, regardless of its choice to engage in CSR activities. In other words, CSR can become a strategic barrier to entry.     

R&D subsidies in a duopoly market with outsourcing to the rival firm

This paper investigates the effects of a public uniform R&D subsidy policy in a downstream duopoly market in which a nonintegrated firm, which faces a lower marginal cost, outsources inputs from its vertically integrated rival. The findings show that, in this market structure, such a policy has relevant effects largely differentiated between downstream competitors, as it can significantly modify the relative market shares and profitability of competing firms. Unlike the standard Cournot setting augmented with R&D, results show that the subsidy policy can have different (counterintuitive) effects on R&D investments, output, and profits of the vertically integrated producer and the vertically separated firm, which hold in both cases of exogenous and endogenous (optimal) subsidy. Our findings offer some testable implications and suggest that a subsidy policy in a market with outsourcing to a rival should also consider the different effects of this approach on competitors.