Selling information to competitive firms

Internal agency conflicts distort firms' choices and reduce social welfare. To limit these distortions, principals dealing with privately informed agents often acquire information from specialized intermediaries, such as auditing and certification companies, that are able to ascertain, and credibly disclose, agents' private information. We study how the structures of both the information provision and the final good markets affect information accuracy. A monopolistic information provider may supply imprecise information to perfectly competitive firms, even if the precision of this information can be increased at no cost. This is due to a price effect of information: although more accurate information reduces agency costs and allows firms to increase production, it also results in a lower price in the final good market, which reduces principals' willingness to pay for information.     

On efficient trading mechanisms between one seller and n buyers

Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) prove that if one seller and one buyer have independent private valuations for an indivisible object then no individually rational and incentive compatible trading mechanism can guarantee ex post efficiency when gains from trade are uncertain. Makowski and Mezzetti (1993) show that this is not the case when there are at least two buyers. In the latter context, if the highest possible seller's valuation is not too large, we provide an ex post efficient mechanism in which the mechanism designer and the agents are not required to know the probability distribution for the seller's valuation. Received: February 18, 1998 / Accepted: September 10, 1999     

Identification issues in the public/private wage gap,with an application to Italy

This paper reviews some of the standard assumptions that are imposed in order to estimate the average public/private wage gap and that are mainly related to the possible selection of the sector. There are two contributions to the existing public/private wage gap literature. One is a better understanding of the identified parameters: standard estimators identify a local effect (LATE), which in general cannot be generalized to the entire population, as instead is almost always done. The other is the partial identification of the population average treatment effect, with an instrumental variable. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper in this literature that employs bounds. The technique is applied to male workers in Italy. For compliers, LATE estimates a wage advantage from working in the public sector greater than 30%. This return is within the narrowest bounds on the population average treatment effect that are consistent even with a much smaller gap (about 15% or more).     

Cumulative and CUB Models for Rating Data: A Comparative Analysis

Ordinal measurements as ratings, preference and evaluation data are very common in applied disciplines, and their analysis requires a proper modelling approach for interpretation, classification and prediction of response patterns. This work proposes a comparative discussion between two statistical frameworks that serve these goals: the established class of cumulative models and a class of mixtures of discrete random variables, denoted as CUB models, whose peculiar feature is the specification of an uncertainty component to deal with indecision and heterogeneity. After surveying their definition and main features, we compare the performances of the selected paradigms by means of simulation experiments and selected case studies. The paper is tailored to enrich the understanding of the two approaches by running an extensive and comparative analysis of results, relative advantages and limitations, also at graphical level. In conclusion, a summarising review of the key issues of the alternative strategies and some final remarks are given, aimed to support a unifying setting.     

Profit sharing as entry deterrence mechanism

In a right-to-manage framework, this paper analyzes the optimal choice of the pay scheme (profit sharing vs. fixed wage) in a unionized duopoly with potential market entry and decentralized bargaining. The paper shows that, depending on the institutional features, both pay systems can arise as equilibria in Nash strategies. Under duopoly with committed bargaining, the fixed wage is the Nash equilibrium; with flexible bargaining, an agreement between the incumbent firm and its union about profit sharing arises as Nash equilibrium, if the union is not too strong. A monopoly with threat of entry reinforces the selection of profit sharing as a deterrent mechanism.     

Profitability of corporate social responsibility in network industries

The present paper shows that, when firms compete in a non-cooperative way on the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in network industries, the conventional result of the prisoner’s dilemma structure of the game in standard industries—i.e. to have social concerns is the Nash equilibrium, but it is harmful for firms’ profits—vanishes and, for sufficiently intense network externalities, the equilibrium in which both firms have social concerns is more profitable than simple profit-seeking. Moreover, we show that—when firms cooperate in choosing the profit-maximising level of social concerns—a profit-maximising CSR level does exist, provided that network effects are sufficiently strong. Therefore, in network industries, firms may obtain higher profits engaging in—cooperatively as well as non-cooperatively—CSR activities, showing that firms’ social concerns may be motivated by the owners’ selfish behaviour. Finally, a counter-intuitive result as regards consumer’s surplus and social welfare is obtained: those are always higher under competitive than cooperative choice of CSR because the level of CSR activities is higher in the former case. However, given that firms gain their largest profits with the cooperative choice of CSR, a Pareto-superior outcome is not reached.     

Managerial firms’ profitability,unions, and environmental taxes

This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit-maximization. It is shown that firm-specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation of environmental quality is sufficiently high. Within this framework, the work also develops the endogenous game played by firms that must choose between sales delegation (SD) and profit-maximization. Results show that the SD contract always emerges as the unique, deadlock sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, thereby solving the (prisoner's) dilemma emerging in the related existing literature assuming a competitive labour market.     

JAPAN: THE CASE FOR A TAYLOR RULE? A SIMPLE APPROACH

Abstract.  In this article I propose two different models for analyzing the conduct of monetary policy, facing certain expectations. The first is a autoregressive model, which implicitly accounts for adaptive expectations, while the second accounts for the rational expectations. I used these models to judge whether or not the Taylor rule can be a good benchmark for the conduct of monetary policy in Japan. The conclusion is that a simple AR model fits the data better than the Taylor rule, and that assuming rational expectations in Japan could be highly misleading, at least since the mid-1990s.     

Adaptive expectations and cobweb phenomena: Does heterogeneity matter?

This paper studies a cobweb-type commodity market characterized by a strictly monotone demand and supply, in which n types of firms operate. Types differ in a key parameter governing price expectations which are supposed to be adaptive. The unique steady state of the resulting economic dynamics is characterized in terms of stability and the impact of the number of firms types is studied: to this end the notions of structural and behavioural degree of instability, which are introduced in the paper, prove to be crucial in determining whether stability or instability prevail. The case of market integration is also considered and conditions to have stability (or instability) in terms of the original markets' parameters are given. The baseline structure is extended in two directions. The first extension assumes the point of view of an authority who is uncertain about the firms types. In this case the structural degree of instability determines how heterogeneity affects the probability of ending up with a stable outcome. The second extension consists in endogenizing the choice of predictors through a discrete choice-based evolutionary mechanism. In both cases the amount of the heterogeneity and its possible variations play a critical role in shaping the range of possible long-run outcomes of the model.     

Interconnection among academic journal websites: multilateral versus bilateral interconnection

Electronic academic journal websites provide text and data mining (and linking) services. Fully realizing the benefit of these services requires interconnection among websites. We perform a comparison between multilateral interconnection through an open platform and bilateral interconnection, and find that publishers are fully interconnected in the former regime whereas they are often partially interconnected in the latter regime for exclusion or differentiation motives. If partial interconnection arises for differentiation motives, exclusion of a small publisher(s) occurs more often in the former than in the latter. In the case of multilateral interconnection, an open platform generates lower welfare than a for‐profit platform.