Partial‐ and General‐Equilibrium Measures of Trade Restrictiveness

New partial‐equilibrium forms of the Trade Restrictiveness Index and the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index have recently been used by the World Bank and others. In this paper we examine the bias in the partial‐equilibrium forms due to the neglect of general‐equilibrium effects. We propose “semi‐general‐equilibrium” measures that capture those general‐equilibrium effects due to vertical input–output relations without the need for a computable general‐equilibrium model. These measures also incorporate nontariff measures. Australian data are used to compute the semi‐general‐equilibrium measures. These estimates indicate that the partial‐equilibrium forms generally underestimate the true value of the indices, and by a large margin in some cases.     

Increasing returns and the share economy

Under imperfect competition, profit maximization by firms results in the market price exceeding the marginal cost of production; Weitzman terms this “excess supply” Weitzman wishes to replicate in the cost function (in terms of labor) the properties of the revenue function (in terms of output), thus generating “excess demand” for labor. A revenue-sharing scheme will achieve this if and only if there are decreasing returns to scale. Hence increasing returns apparently play no role in Weitzman's analysis.     

TO TAX OR NOT TO TAX? THE CASE OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

Despite the intensifying debate over the taxation of Internet commerce, the relevant issues have not been given a systematic treatment in the context of the literature on optimal taxation. This article presents such an analysis and investigates separately the taxation of business purchases of intermediate goods, the taxation of consumer purchases of final goods and services, and the various issues of administration and compliance costs as they apply to the development of E-commerce. The authors conclude that generally the optimal tax literature cannot be used in support of a blanket tax exemption for Internet purchases. Certain conditions could lead to the optimality of an exemption, but those conditions are not likely to be met in practice.     

Asymptotics for LS,GLS, and feasible GLS statistics in an AR(1) model with conditional heteroskedasticity

We consider a first-order autoregressive model with conditionally heteroskedastic innovations. The asymptotic distributions of least squares (LS), infeasible generalized least squares (GLS), and feasible GLS estimators and $t$ statistics are determined. The GLS procedures allow for misspecification of the form of the conditional heteroskedasticity and, hence, are referred to as quasi-GLS procedures. The asymptotic results are established for drifting sequences of the autoregressive parameter ${\rho }_n$ and the distribution of the time series of innovations. In particular, we consider the full range of cases in which ${\rho }_n$ satisfies $n(1?{\rho }_n)\to \infty$ and $n(1?{\rho }_n)\to h_1\in [0,\infty )$ as $n\to \infty$, where $n$ is the sample size. Results of this type are needed to establish the uniform asymptotic properties of the LS and quasi-GLS statistics.     

Differences in managerial discretion across countries: how nation‐level institutions affect the degree to which ceos matter

The concept of managerial discretion provides a theoretical fulcrum for resolving the debate about whether chief executive officers (CEOs) have much influence over company outcomes. In this paper, we operationalize and further develop the construct of managerial discretion at the national level. In an empirical examination of 15 countries, we find that certain informal and formal national institutions—individualism, tolerance of uncertainty, cultural looseness, dispersed firm ownership, a common‐law legal origin, and employer flexibility—are associated with the degree of managerial discretion available to CEOs of public firms in a country. In turn, we show that country‐level managerial discretion is associated with how much impact CEOs have on the performance of their firms. We also find that discretion mediates the relationship between national institutions and CEO effects on firm performance. Finally, we discuss two inductively derived institutional themes: autonomy orientation and risk orientation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

REPEAL OF PROHIBITION: A BENEFIT‐COST ANALYSIS

In spite of an estimated increase in annual alcohol‐related motor vehicle costs of $2.767 billion (1947 dollars), the net social benefit of repeal of alcohol Prohibition amounts to $432 million per annum in 1934–1937, about 0.33% of gross domestic product. Total benefits of $3.25 billion consist primarily of increased consumer and producer surplus, tax revenues, and reduced criminal violence costs. A Monte Carlo simulation shows the probability of negative net benefits is 16%. The estimated price elasticity of demand for spirits, beer, and wine are –.60, ?.56, and –.51 respectively, which is consistent with the modern literature. (JEL D61, I18, K420, I120)     

Spontaneous visualization and concept evaluation

This paper proposes that customers often respond to brand extension concepts by visualizing the product. We call this process spontaneous visualization and suggest that it precedes concept evaluations. In two studies, we show that spontaneous visualization is enhanced by the fit between the parent brand and the extension category and by the ease with which the product category can be imagined. The appeal of the visualized image in turn determines whether visualization enhances or decreases concept evaluations. In addition, we find a stronger link between product evaluations and delayed choice when evaluations are based on visualization; evaluations based on visualization hence appear to be more “valid” in the sense of predicting subsequent behavior. Implications of these findings and ideas for future research are discussed.

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ross risk vulnerability for introductions and changes in background risk

We present two theorems that provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an expected utility maximizer to become more risk averse in the sense of Ross with respect to bearing a foreground risk after the introduction of any independent fair or unfair additive background risk. We call these decision makers Ross risk vulnerable, and show that Ross decreasing absolute risk aversion and Ross decreasing absolute prudence are jointly sufficient for Ross risk vulnerability. Restrictions on utility necessary and sufficient for Ross risk vulnerability with respect to stochastic dominance deteriorations of an existing background risk are also presented. Our analysis concludes with applications of Ross risk vulnerability.