Modelling non-competitive behavior in commodity markets: A game theoretic approach

In this paper, we provide a coalitional alternative to the perfectly competitive and purely non-cooperative assumptions commonly employed in the modelling of commodity markets. These assumptions of perfect competition or pure non-cooperation are usually imposed exogenously without providing an economic basis for assuming why firms that could stand to gain by cooperating would not in fact do so. Three behavioral rules embodied in three different cooperative games are discussed in this paper and a methodology for predicting the coalition structures that would result from each of these is offered. By applying these games to the US copper industry of the 1970's, we show that the theory of games can be profitably employed in conjunction with the traditional institutional approach of industrial organization to yield useful economic predictions.The author is grateful to two anonymous referees whose comments led to a considerably improved version of the paper.     

Identification and Measurement of Australian Consumer Sentiment

This article was prepared by Dr L. V. Defris and J. S. McDonnell of the Institute research staff. The authors wish to thank Professor R. F. Henderson and Dr P. J. Sheehan for their helpful comments.     

Analysis of Austrian stocks: Testing for stability and randomness

This paper is concerned with subjecting two popular assumptions about the behavior of stock market prices to empirical tests: first, the random walk hypothesis developed by Bachelier (1900), Osborne (1959), and Mandelbrot (1963); second, the stable distributions hypothesis by Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965). For this purpose, ten time series from the Vienna Stock Exchange were used. The first hypothesis was tested using both non-parametric and parametric methods. To obtain evidence with regard to the seond hypothesis, a graphical procedure and statistical estimation on the basis of the empirical characteristic function were applied. On analysis of our data, it turned out that, at least for the time period under consideration (1985–1990), severe doubts are cast on the above assumptions.We gratefully acknowledge the help of Peter Mitter, Institute for Advanced Studies, and Franz Köstl, Österreichische Kontrollbank, who provided us with the necessary data, and the comments of the anonymous referees.     

On the theory of cost sharing

This paper investigates efficiency and equitability issues given a cost sharing method in an economy with a public commodity. We study the concept of a -cost share equilibrium and examine the set of all equilibrium allocations. Finally, we devise a mechanism to implement -cost share equilibria as strong equilibria of an associated non-cooperative game.This paper was written while Shlomo Weber was visiting the University of Bonn. Financial support from theSonderforschungsbereich 303 is gratefully acknowledged. We also would like to thank Dieter Bös for valuable comments.