KfW/ZEW CO2 Panel: Vermeiden oder kaufen – Deutsche Unternehmen im Emissionshandel

The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) is the first large-scale and inter-regional trading scheme for greenhouse gas emissions. It is seen as the central instrument of European climate policy. After a first testing-phase (2005–2007), the second trading period of the EU-ETS had started in 2008, with stronger incentives for investment in low-carbon technologies and carbon dioxide abatement. However, there is hardly any evidence how emissions trading fares in practice. The KfW/ZEW CO₂ Barometer shows that trading of emission permits is actively used by 75 percent of German companies, but the price-signals that stem from the EU-ETS were relatively weak so far—too weak to set strong incentives for carbon dioxide emission reductions on the company-level. Also in the case of the ‘clean development mechanism’ (CDM) which was introduced to promote emission reductions in developing counties, there is need for further development.     

Modelling non-competitive behavior in commodity markets: A game theoretic approach

In this paper, we provide a coalitional alternative to the perfectly competitive and purely non-cooperative assumptions commonly employed in the modelling of commodity markets. These assumptions of perfect competition or pure non-cooperation are usually imposed exogenously without providing an economic basis for assuming why firms that could stand to gain by cooperating would not in fact do so. Three behavioral rules embodied in three different cooperative games are discussed in this paper and a methodology for predicting the coalition structures that would result from each of these is offered. By applying these games to the US copper industry of the 1970's, we show that the theory of games can be profitably employed in conjunction with the traditional institutional approach of industrial organization to yield useful economic predictions.The author is grateful to two anonymous referees whose comments led to a considerably improved version of the paper.     

Transition from part-time entrepreneurship to full-time entrepreneurship: the role of financial and non-financial motives

Part-time entrepreneurship is often a first step towards full-time entrepreneurship. This study analyzes how financial and non-financial motives of part-time entrepreneurs influence the propensity of part-time entrepreneurs to become full-time entrepreneurs. Our results show that the motivation to supplement wage income or the motivation to achieve social recognition is negatively associated with transition behavior, whereas the motivation to achieve independence or self-realization is positively associated with transition behavior. The motivation to follow a role model, financial success, and innovation are not significantly related to transition behavior. The implications of these results with regard to part-time entrepreneurship are discussed.     

Integriertes Innovationscontrolling

Die Kosten für Innovationen nehmen immer bedeutendere Ausma?e an, die immer weniger mit den erst in der Projektdurchführung ansetzenden traditionellen Instrumenten des Innovations- und Projektcontrollings in den Griff zu bekommen sind.