Nonparametric tests of collectively rational consumption behavior: An integer programming procedure

We present an IP-based nonparametric (revealed preference) testing procedure for rational consumption behavior in terms of a general collective model, which includes consumption externalities and public consumption. An empirical application to data drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) demonstrates the practical usefulness of the procedure. Finally, we present extensions of the testing procedure to evaluate the goodness-of-fit (accounting for optimization error as well as measurement error) of the collective model subject to testing.     

Equilibrium Selection and Consistency

In this paper we show that, for two important classes of strategic games, namely the class of mixed extensions of finite games and the class of games with compact and convex strategy spaces and continuous-concave payoff functions, equilibrium selection is incompatible with One Person Rationality, Consistency and (restricted) Non-Emptiness.     

Inefficiency of equilibria in digital mechanisms with continuous valuations

A digital mechanism is defined as an iterative procedure in which bidders select an action, from a finite set, in each iteration. When bidders have continuous valuations and make strategic reports, we show that any ex post implementation of the Vickrey choice rule via such a mechanism needs infinitely many iterations for almost all realizations of the bidders’ valuations. Thus, when valuations are drawn from a continuous probability distribution, the Vickrey choice rule can only be used at the expense of a running time that is infinite with probability one. This infeasibility result even holds in the case of two bidders and the Vickrey choice rule only being required to be established with probability one. Establishing the efficient allocation when the $n$ bidders’ report truthfully contrasts starkly to the previous setting: a bisection procedure has a finite running time almost always, and an expected number of reports are equal to $2n$. Using a Groves payment scheme rather than Vickrey’s second price payment scheme somewhat mitigates the problem. We provide an example mechanism with a Groves payment scheme, in which the running time of the mechanism in equilibrium is finite with probability $\frac{1}{2}$.     

Transferia: solving local pain or bringing global gain?

ABSTRACT

The sustainability of container transferia, a specific type of intermodal terminals located in the vicinity of ports, is analysed in an external cost evaluation. This concept enables transporting large amounts of containers from a port to a transferium, outside the most congested area, by high-frequency barge or rail transport. From this point onwards, the transport is executed by truck or intermodal. The paper presents a case study of maritime-based container transport in Belgium. A geographic information systems-based model compares transport alternatives, regarding their societal impact. The findings suggest that when trucks perform the hinterland transport to transferia instead of direct truck transport to the port, the production of external costs decreases in the port area, but remains stable in the hinterland. However, when intermodal chains can replace these truck services to the transferia, external costs remain limited in the port area, but also decrease in the hinterland in most cases.