The aggregate-monotonic core

We introduce the aggregate-monotonic core as the set of allocations of a transferable utility cooperative game attainable by single-valued solutions that satisfy core-selection and aggregate-monotonicity. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core and the aggregate-monotonic core. Finally, we introduce upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity for set-valued solutions, and characterize the aggregate-monotonic core using core-selection and upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity.     

Bankruptcy voting process and corporate reorganization

This study investigates the main legal determinants of corporate reorganization use. Three legal aspects of bankruptcy voting process were examined, such as the voting right of secured creditors (1), bankruptcy voting rule (2), and court's legal right to overrule creditors’ decision (3). Using a sample of 20 countries, our estimations confirm that granting a voting right to secured lenders tends to be associated with more corporate reorganizations. Secured creditors’ voting right may send a signal about firm's capacity to recover from financial distress. Such signal can encourage unsecured creditors to support the reorganization plan.