The relationship between social norm consensus,perceived similarity,and observer reactions to coworker theft

This research examines observers' reactions to coworker theft in a restaurant chain. This study focuses on the role of social information, such as the social norm consensus regarding the specific type of theft behavior, and on the perceived similarity between the observer and the perpetrator. In general, observers are less likely to label coworkers' behavior as theft when social norm consensus is low and when they perceive the perpetrator as similar to themselves. Also, observers are less likely to report and more likely to imitate the theft behavior of similar coworkers as the amount of consensus regarding the type of theft decreases. Analyses indicate that the relationship between similarity, reporting, and imitation of theft behavior is not mediated by the labeling of an event as theft. Implications for employee theft research and human resource management practice are discussed. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Flexibility at different stages in the life cycle of projects: An empirical illustration of the “freedom to maneuver”

Many textbooks on project management present illustrations concerning the relative size of project attributes during different project phases. The derived models all have attributes in common, such as uncertainty, significance of decisions, and degree of freedom to maneuver, that are typically high in the beginning of the project and low in the end. At the same time, variables such as the accumulated cost and available information begin at low levels and end up at a high level at the end of the project. Based on empirical data from projects, this paper illustrates and quantifies one of these attributes, the freedom to maneuver, in different project phases.     

Banning information in hiring decisions

Journal of Regulatory Economics - Over the past decade, federal, state and local governments have restricted the types and uses of information in hiring and promotion decisions. Examples include...     

Do Rising Top Incomes Spur Economic Growth? Evidence From OECD Countries Based on a Novel Identification Strategy

We investigate the causal relationship between the growth rate of top income shares and economic growth in 12 OECD economies for the period 1950–2010. To analyze patterns of short- and long-run causality, we build upon recent advances in structural-vector autoregressive modeling of non-Gaussian systems. This framework allows us to discriminate between rival transmission channels by means of dependence tests, since independent shocks are unique for a particular causation pattern. We consider the share of income accruing to the top 1 percent (1), to the next 9 percent (9), and to the top decile (10). While structural models display considerable heterogeneity across countries, mean group and pooled results strongly favor a specific transmission pattern. In particular, 1 has a long-run positive impact on economic development. This result, which is also confirmed by identified impulse-response functions, is particularly evident for the post-1980 period.     

Special issue on advanced methods to measure tourism impacts. Editors’ introduction

Portuguese Economic Journal -     

Behavioral economics: implications for regulatory behavior

Behavioral economics (BE) examines the implications for decision-making when actors suffer from biases documented in the psychological literature. This article considers how such biases affect regulatory decisions. The article posits a simple model of a regulator who serves as an agent to a political overseer. The regulator chooses a policy that accounts for the rewards she receives from the political overseer—whose optimal policy is assumed to maximize short-run outputs that garner political support, rather than long-term welfare outcomes—and the weight the regulator puts on the optimal long run policy. Flawed heuristics and myopia are likely to lead regulators to adopt policies closer to the preferences of political overseers than they would otherwise. The incentive structure for regulators is likely to reward those who adopt politically expedient policies, either intentionally (due to a desire to please the political overseer) or accidentally (due to bounded rationality). The article urges that careful thought be given to calls for greater state intervention, especially when those calls seek to correct firm biases. The article proposes measures that focus rewards to regulators on outcomes rather than outputs as a way to help ameliorate regulatory biases.     

Price Volatility and Risk Exposure: On the Interaction of Quota and Product Markets

We consider an industry with firms that produce a final good emitting pollution to different degree as a side effect. Pollution is regulated by a tradable quota system where some quotas may have been allocated at the outset, i.e. before the quota market is opened. We study how volatility in quota price affects firm behaviour, taking into account the impact of quota price on final-good price. The impact on the individual firm differs depending on how polluting it is??whether it is ??clean?? or ??dirty????and whether it has been allocated quotas at the outset. In the absence of long-term or forward contracting, a grandfathering regime??where clean firms are allocated no quotas and dirty firms are allocated quotas for a part of their emissions??minimizes the impact on firm behavior relative to a risk-neutral benchmark.With forward contracts and in the absence of wealth effects initial quota allocation has no effect on firm behaviour. Allowing for abatement does not change the qualitative nature of our results.     

Is there an energy paradox in fuel economy? A note on the role of consumer heterogeneity and sorting bias

From the previous literature, it can be found that consumers tend to undervalue discounted future energy costs in their purchase decisions for energy-using durables. We show that this finding could, in part, result from ignoring consumer heterogeneity in empirical analyses as opposed to true undervaluation.     

Instrumental variables estimation with partially missing instruments

This paper shows that instrumental variables estimators currently in use, require strong but neglected auxiliary assumptions to be consistent in situations with partially missing instruments. We introduce an alternative instrumental variables estimator that does not require auxiliary assumptions.