Interrelation Among Events of Default*

Abstract. This paper contrasts technical default, debt service default and bankruptcy, and establishes that the valuation effects of their announcements are significant and increasingly severe. We show the events are interrelated. Specifically, we show that technical default is a timely warning of further distress insofar as adverse stock price effects of debt service default are mitigated if preceded by technical default. We find this arises in part because technical default increases the likelihood of further distress. The extent of the mitigation suggests reduced costs of future distress, likely because technical default triggers the early exercise of contractual rights that allow lenders to increase control over the firm. We also evaluate explanations of why debt service default and bankruptcy occur without firms first reporting technical default. Our analysis is based on the small sample of firms for which we can ascertain the terms of debt covenant constraints. Given this limitation, we find that it is not because debt agreements are written with too much covenant slack, nor do we observe material cases of nonreporting of covenant defaults. We conclude that covenants do not always provide warnings of future difficulties. Résumé. Les auteurs établissent la différence entre le manquement technique, le manquement au service de la dette et la faillite et font la preuve que les conséquences de ces indicateurs sur l'évaluation des entreprises sont appréciables et de plus en plus sérieuses. Ils démontrent que ces événements sont reliés entre eux et, plus précisément, que le manquement technique est un avertissement hâtif d'autres difficultés, dans la mesure où les conséquences néfastes du manquement au service de la dette sur le cours des actions sont atténuées si ledit manquement est précédé par un manquement technique. Les auteurs en viennent à la conclusion que cette situation se produit en partie parce que le manquement technique augmente la probabilité d'autres difficultés. L'ampleur de cette atténuation permet de supposer une réduction des coûts associés aux autres difficultés, sans doute parce que le manquement technique déclenche l'exercice anticipé des droits contractuels qui permettent aux bailleurs de fonds de resserrer le contrôle qu'ils exercent sur l'entreprise. Les auteurs évaluent également les facteurs qui expliquent pourquoi une entreprise peut manquer au service de la dette et faire faillite sans faire d'abord état d'un manquement technique. Leur analyse se fonde sur un petit échantillon d'entreprises à l'égard desquelles il est possible de s'assurer des conditions relatives aux contraintes imposées par les clauses restrictives des contrats de prêt. Compte tenu de cette limitation, les auteurs concluent que ce genre de situation n'est pas attribuable au fait que les contrats de prêt comportent des clauses trop permissives et n'observent pas non plus de cas probants de non-divulgation d'information relative au manquement aux clauses restrictives. Ils en déduisent que les clauses restrictives ne préviennent pas toujours les difficultés futures.     

Difference Systems in Financial Futures Markets

Many financial futures markets allow substitutions for the par grade of security at delivery. Substitutes are deliverable at premiums or discounts—“differences” in commodities parlance—to the futures price. The rule that establishes these differences is called a difference system. This paper characterizes financial futures market equilibrium with yield-based difference systems and investigates particular systems in use. The major finding is that currently used difference systems effectively limit deliverable supply in the futures markets and lead to futures prices which understate the cash market price of the par security.     

Cyclical Changes in Firm Volatility

We characterize trends and cycles in the volatility of U.S. firms using a measure that we argue more cleanly captures firm‐specific volatility in sales and earnings growth than standard measures do. While earlier literature has emphasized a trend increase in the volatility of publicly traded firms, we find that a typical publicly traded firm has become more stable. We find that the negative association between firm‐specific volatility and the business cycle is weaker than earlier research based on dispersion measures suggests. We find that during the Great Recession of 2007–2009, firm‐specific volatility increased moderately but never substantially exceeded its sample mean. Our results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that firm‐specific volatility is an important driver of the business cycle, as it theoretically could be through an effect of default risk on credit spreads.     

Consumers' Attitude Change Across Sequences of Successful and Unsuccessful Product Usage

In two experiments we examine how consumers are affected by a sequence composed of an initial product-failure experience followed by a success experience. Our interest is to assess how consumers' evaluation of the product and of their own performance change after the second experience. A preliminary experiment used hypothetical scenarios describing consumers' experiences with different products. In the main experiment, participants received actual hands-on experience with a Smith-Corona Personal Typewriter/Word Processor. A major result was that product evaluations could be as high following a failure-success sequence of experiences as following success alone. This was especially true with hands-on experiences. However, the main experiment showed that negative affect (frustration) expressed following an actual product failure experience remained even after a subsequent success. Marketing implications of these dual results are discussed.     

Promote Internally or Hire Externally? The Role of Gift Exchange and Performance Measurement Precision

Managers often face the choice between promoting an internal employee and hiring an external candidate. Using an interactive experiment, we examine the drivers of managers’ promote/hire decisions and internal employees’ behavior before and after those decisions. Consistent with gift exchange theory, we find that employees exert costly effort to increase the chance of being promoted, and they raise their effort level as the promote/hire decision becomes imminent. Managers respond by promoting those who exert high effort, despite employees’ inferior ability compared to external candidates. Results suggest that managers view employees’ past effort as both a gift to reciprocate and a signal of their future effort. Moreover, we find that managers are more likely to promote internally rather than hire externally under a less precise performance measurement system, and this result is driven by managers who observe low employee output. Finally, we find that total effort is significantly higher when managers promote internally versus hire externally.     

A Dilemma between Liquidity Regulation and Monetary Policy: Some History and Theory

History suggests a conflict between current Basel III liquidity ratios and monetary policy, which we call the liquidity regulation dilemma. Although forgotten, liquidity ratios, named “securities-reserve requirements,” were widely used historically, but for monetary policy (not regulatory) reasons, as central bankers recognized the contractionary effects of these ratios. We build a model rationalizing historical policies: a tighter ratio reduces the quantity of assets that banks can pledge as collateral, thus increasing interest rates. Tighter liquidity regulation paradoxically increases the need for central bank's interventions. Liquidity ratios were also used to keep yields on government bonds low when monetary policy tightened.