Consumers' Attitude Change Across Sequences of Successful and Unsuccessful Product Usage

In two experiments we examine how consumers are affected by a sequence composed of an initial product-failure experience followed by a success experience. Our interest is to assess how consumers' evaluation of the product and of their own performance change after the second experience. A preliminary experiment used hypothetical scenarios describing consumers' experiences with different products. In the main experiment, participants received actual hands-on experience with a Smith-Corona Personal Typewriter/Word Processor. A major result was that product evaluations could be as high following a failure-success sequence of experiences as following success alone. This was especially true with hands-on experiences. However, the main experiment showed that negative affect (frustration) expressed following an actual product failure experience remained even after a subsequent success. Marketing implications of these dual results are discussed.     

An Analysis of Insiders' Use of Prepaid Variable Forward Transactions

This study examines firm performance surrounding insiders' prepaid variable forward (PVF) transactions to infer insiders' information when they enter these off‐market contracts. PVFs allow insiders to hedge downside risk, share performance gains, and obtain immediate large‐sum cash payments for investment or consumption. On average, PVF transactions cover 30% of a sample insider's firm‐specific wealth ($22 million), which is substantially larger than a typical open‐market sale. PVFs systematically follow strong firm performance and precede degraded stock and earnings performance. PVFs also precede periods of negative abnormal returns relative to potential alternative investments. The documented association between PVFs and performance declines does not appear to result from the market's response to transaction disclosure, participant self‐selection, or general price reversals. Thus, evidence suggests that insiders use PVFs to diversify firm‐specific holdings in anticipation of performance declines.     

Promote Internally or Hire Externally? The Role of Gift Exchange and Performance Measurement Precision

Managers often face the choice between promoting an internal employee and hiring an external candidate. Using an interactive experiment, we examine the drivers of managers’ promote/hire decisions and internal employees’ behavior before and after those decisions. Consistent with gift exchange theory, we find that employees exert costly effort to increase the chance of being promoted, and they raise their effort level as the promote/hire decision becomes imminent. Managers respond by promoting those who exert high effort, despite employees’ inferior ability compared to external candidates. Results suggest that managers view employees’ past effort as both a gift to reciprocate and a signal of their future effort. Moreover, we find that managers are more likely to promote internally rather than hire externally under a less precise performance measurement system, and this result is driven by managers who observe low employee output. Finally, we find that total effort is significantly higher when managers promote internally versus hire externally.     

On the Theory of Rational Insurance Purchasing: A Note

The authors consider the optimal amount of insurance purchased by an individual who behaves according to the Hurwicz criterion of choice under uncertainty. Their results are compared with earlier results obtained in alternative frameworks (expected utility maximization and Savage's regret criterion). It is shown that a positive amount deductible is often suboptimal.