Job Classification for the Purpose of Making Optimal Decisions Concerning Management Control

The job classification literature has been dominated by a micro‐level orientation reflective of the needs of specialists in human resources. In contrast, we take a multidisciplinary approach involving both micro‐ and macro‐level variables to propose a relatively simple system comprised of four job classes. Our model isintended to inform management as to the type and mix of controls (e.g., centralization, formalization, and various human resources policies) that could be applied to different job types to optimally promote the overall goals of the organization. Fuzzy numbers analysis is employed to illustrate the application of the system using four jobs in a car dealership in Spain. Copyright © 2012 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An overview of Asian equity markets

This study overviews the development of 11 Asian equity markets, namely, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Prior to the onset of the global financial crisis, the Asian stock exchanges were generally bullish, underpinned particularly by China's robust economic performance. Innovations in financial products and services have been growing in importance, as stock exchanges in these countries have been making a concerted effort to introduce new features and best practices, with the objectives of raising market efficiency, enhancing service quality, and generally bringing operations up to par with international standards. But the potential to realize or support market efficiency can only be possible within an adequate legal framework, a sound market infrastructure, and appropriate corporate governance mechanisms. Thus, many challenges are still to be overcome in the region.     

When Do Analysts Adjust for Biases in Management Guidance? Effects of Guidance Track Record and Analysts’ Incentives

Prior research indicates that analysts do not fully adjust for the general downward bias in earnings guidance issued by management. We report the results of two experiments designed to investigate how guidance track record and analysts’ incentives jointly explain the extent to which analysts adjust for guidance bias. Our results suggest that analysts with accuracy incentives adjust for management’s track record of downwardly biased guidance when the bias is relatively small (one cent), but those with relationship incentives do not. Furthermore, the difference in adjustment is larger when the bias track record is inconsistent than when it is consistent. Also, when guidance bias is larger (two cents) relative to smaller (one cent), analysts with relationship incentives partially adjust, as they appear to strike a balance between accuracy and their desire to please management. These findings hold implications for investors, regulators, and the interpretation of prior research.     

Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance

Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators, regulators and courts, presumably to encourage favorable policies and/or outcomes. In dollar terms, corporate lobbying expenditures are typically one or even two orders of magnitude larger than spending by Political Action Committees (PAC), and, unlike PAC donations, lobbying amounts are direct corporate expenditures. We use data made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to examine this more pervasive form of corporate political activity. We find that, on average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial performance. These results are robust across a number of empirical specifications. We also report market performance evidence using a portfolio approach. We find that portfolios of firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks in the three years following portfolio formation.     

More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets

This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1987) model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency, and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium exists uniquely and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others. Sometimes intermediation is essential: the market operates if and only if middlemen are active. If bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient; if not there can be too much or too little economic activity. This is novel, compared to the original Rubinstein–Wolinsky model, where equilibrium is always efficient.