Status, affluence, and inequality: Rank-based comparisons in games of status

We examine the effects of changes in the income distribution in an economy where agents' utility depends both on consumption and on their rank in the distribution of conspicuous consumption. We introduce a new methodology to compare the behavior of agents that occupy the same rank in the two different income distributions but typically have different levels of incomes. Here, an increase in incomes of the least endowed improves their welfare, yet it also increases social competition, making those in the middle to be worse off—even if they have higher incomes as well. As social competition can be lowered by spreading agents apart in income space, we find that an increase in incomes for all, augmented by (weakly) increased income dispersion, constitutes a sufficient condition for Pareto-improvement. We also show that one can have an increase both in income and relative position but still be worse off.     

Governance and control as mediating instruments in an inter-firm relationship: towards collaboration or transactions?

This paper explores the mediation of governance and control structures in an inter-firm relationship between a semiconductor producer and its contractor. As mediating instruments the contract and the control structures are not just pre-given results of distanced managerial decision-making, but are generated in and constitutive of the relationship. They offer the possibility to interpret and to interact and they contribute to more or less unexpected transformations in the relationship. In particular, the study explores how the mediation of the governance and control structures has socialising and/or individualising consequences. The paper particularly offers insights into how the mediation of the governance and control structures is impacted by changes in boundary spanners (i.e. managers who represent their organisations in an inter-firm relationship). The paper draws on Roberts 2001. Trust and control in Anglo-American systems of corporate governance: the individualizing and socializing effects of processes of accountability. Human Relations, 54 (12), 1547–1572. and distinguishes four patterns of governance that may be consequential of mediation by governance and control structures: immobilised governance, individualised governance, socialised governance and complementary governance. The study illustrates that accounting is not so much a force that creates transparency for distanced others, but a constitutive mechanism that produces a collaborative inter-firm relationship with socialised governance. It provides a basis for discussion and debate in the relationship.     

Are cultural values associated with organizational and union commitment and citizenship behavior? A study of Chinese manufacturing workers

This paper examines the association between individual-level cultural values and employees’ commitment to, and citizenship behaviors towards, their employing organization and union. Based on a study of Chinese manufacturing workers, several significant findings emerged, most notably that workers distinguished clearly between the organization and union as foci for commitment and that horizontal, but not vertical, collectivism was positively associated with union commitment and union citizenship behavior. Our results suggest the need to differentiate between horizontal and vertical collectivism when considering the effects of cultural values on attitudes towards unions and collective action.     

New directions in injury surveillance: Development of a model for continuous monitoring of direct medical costs

Information on the costs of injuries is an important additional instrument in setting priorities for injury prevention. The importance of this instrument is increasingly being recognized by health policy makers. The objective of this study was to develop a model which continuously monitors the direct medical costs of injuries in The Netherlands. This model should provide information on the direct medical costs of injuries at any time and for any selection of injury categories. It is an incidence-based model according to the ‘bottom up’ principle. Homogeneous patient groupings with respect to health care use are defined. The groupings are based on existing classifications from the literature and the experience of medical experts, and are defined by means of seven criteria: nature of care provided, body region of the injury, type of injury, severity of injury, age, complications, and sex of the patient. Several cost elements are distinguished (e.g., general practitioner help, hospital care, nursing home care). For each cost element, relevant patient groupings are determined. The new Dutch Injury Surveillance System (LIS) for injuries treated in an A&E department is an important source for incidence data. This article presents the design of the model as adopted by the Working Group on the Costs of Injuries of the European Consumer Safety Association (ECOSA).     

The Stability of Price Dispersion under Seller and Consumer Learning*

In many markets, it is possible to find rival sellers charging different prices for the same good. Earlier research has attempted to explain this phenomenon by demonstrating the existence of dispersed price equilibria when consumers must make use of costly search to discover prices. We ask whether such equilibria can be learned when sellers adjust prices adaptively in response to current market conditions. With consumer behavior fixed, convergence to a dispersed price equilibrium is possible in some cases. However, once consumer learning is introduced, the monopoly outcome first found by Diamond (Journal of Economic Theory3 (1971), 156–68) is the only stable equilibrium.     

Cashing In On Quality? Pay Incentives and the Quality Culture

In this article, the authors explore the relationship between total quality management (TQM) and financial incentives in British manufacturing industry. In particular, they examine the view of some of the most influential quality management ‘gurus’ that there is an incompatibility between incentive pay and TQM. Drawing on survey and case study evidence, they show that TQM is being implemented in the presence of financial incentives. Furthermore, those organisations which had such incentives did not appear to have less success in implementing TQM. On the basis of the evidence presented, the authors conclude that it is not possible to rule out a role for financial incentives in implementing TQM, although incentives are only likely to form one element in a broader implementation strategy.     

Private demands for public capital: evidence from school bond referenda

This paper develops a framework for estimating demand for school infrastructure investment that is financed through local bond referenda. Our framework takes explicit account of the irregular and discrete nature of local capital investment and the objective functions of local school boards. Our empirical model consists of a three-equation system composed of a proposed spending equation, a vote equation, and a selection equation. Estimated income and price elasticities of demand for school infrastructure are similar to those found in studies of current school spending. We also find that school boards act like risk-averse, budget-maximizing agenda-setters.     

Too old or too young? The impact of perceived age discrimination

This article examines the impact on employee attitudes of perceived age discrimination, drawing on a study of a local authority. Survey respondents report that discrimination on the grounds of being ‘too young’ is at least as common as discrimination on the grounds of being ‘too old’. Findings suggest that perceived age discrimination, whether for being too old or too young, has negative consequences for affective commitment to the organisation. Those who feel that they have been discriminated against because they are considered too old have higher levels of continuance commitment. There is partial support for the hypothesis that older workers who feel that they have been discriminated against have a stronger intention to retire early.