Governance and control as mediating instruments in an inter-firm relationship: towards collaboration or transactions?

This paper explores the mediation of governance and control structures in an inter-firm relationship between a semiconductor producer and its contractor. As mediating instruments the contract and the control structures are not just pre-given results of distanced managerial decision-making, but are generated in and constitutive of the relationship. They offer the possibility to interpret and to interact and they contribute to more or less unexpected transformations in the relationship. In particular, the study explores how the mediation of the governance and control structures has socialising and/or individualising consequences. The paper particularly offers insights into how the mediation of the governance and control structures is impacted by changes in boundary spanners (i.e. managers who represent their organisations in an inter-firm relationship). The paper draws on Roberts 2001. Trust and control in Anglo-American systems of corporate governance: the individualizing and socializing effects of processes of accountability. Human Relations, 54 (12), 1547–1572. and distinguishes four patterns of governance that may be consequential of mediation by governance and control structures: immobilised governance, individualised governance, socialised governance and complementary governance. The study illustrates that accounting is not so much a force that creates transparency for distanced others, but a constitutive mechanism that produces a collaborative inter-firm relationship with socialised governance. It provides a basis for discussion and debate in the relationship.     

Agency problems,accounting slack,and banks’ response to proposed reporting of loan fair values

We investigate the determinants of bank representatives’ responses to the United States Financial Accounting Standard Board’s 2010 Exposure Draft that proposes fair value measurement for most financial instruments. Over 85% of the 2971 comment letters were received from bank representatives, with most bank-affiliated letters addressing—and opposing—one issue: fair value measurement of loans. The Exposure Draft proposes that companies report both fair value and amortized cost measures for loans; thus, the proposal should result in increased levels of loan-related information and improved financial reporting transparency. We investigate three reasons for bank representatives’ resistance. First, fair value measurement should result in less accounting slack than the current incurred-loss model for loan impairments; therefore, we propose that representatives from banks that historically utilized that slack will resist fair value measurement for loans. Second, we propose that agency problems are an important motivating factor because bank representatives reaping more private benefits from their franchises have less incentive to support increases in financial reporting transparency. Third, we test whether the most common reasons for opposition included in the comment letters are associated with negative letter writing. Our analyses support the first two determinants of bank representatives’ resistance to the Exposure Draft. Specifically, accounting slack and lower demand for accounting transparency are strongly associated with resistance to the standard. However, we find that stated reasons for resistance are not associated with letter writing. Specifically, representatives at firms with difficult to value loans and firms that mostly hold loans to maturity are no more likely to resist the standard than others. The narrow scope of bank representatives’ comments and our empirical findings suggest that bankers’ responses to the Exposure Draft may be more driven by concerns over reduced availability of accounting slack and accompanying de facto regulatory forbearance than by the conceptual arguments they offer. Our results have implications for standard setters, who must navigate special interests as they attempt to promulgate high quality accounting standards, and for users of financial statements who must consider how political forces shape generally accepted accounting principles.     

The influence of tax and expenditure policies on economic growth in The Netherlands: An empirical analysis

Summary This paper explores the influence of government policies in explaining output, emploment and investment in The Netherlands during the period 1966–1989. The paper develops an empirical macroeconomic model estimated with annual data relating to the period 1958–1989. It finds that restrictive fiscal policies in the eighties have had adverse short-term effects on output and employment. Furthermore, the drop in the rate of increase in tax and social security contribution rates in this period has boosted output, employment and investment. However, the shift in public expenditure from investment to consumption has exerted a negative impact on these variables, largely offsetting the positive impact of the tax policies.At the moment of writing, Ed W.M.T. Westerhout was a staff member of the Directorate for Economic Policy, Ministry of Economic Affairs. Currently the is affiliated to the Central Planning Bureau, P.O. Box. 80510, 2508 GM The Hague.We thank Peter van Bergeijk, Lans Bovenberg, Rob Mulder, Pieter Waasdorp and two anonymous referees for uselfut suggestions and comments.     

Outsider Assistance as a Knowledge Resource for New Venture Survival

An emerging theory of outsider assistance as a knowledge resource suggests that new ventures obtain a unique blend of tacit and explicit knowledge through the judicious use of outside assistance. Using data from a longitudinal study of one outsider assistance program at a point in time four to eight years beyond the provision of startup counseling assistance, we present evidence supporting the theory. Results suggest that the ventures studied enjoyed survival rates in excess of those in the general population. More importantly, logistic regression analysis indicates a positive, curvilinear relationship between survival and the time spent in venture preparation under the direction of an outside counselor, a proxy measure of new knowledge acquired. We conclude with a discussion of the directions future research should take to test more fully the relationships implied by the theory.