Testing for Regime Changes in Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis

This paper examines whether the efficiency market hypothesis for the Greek sovereign debt holds. As in Blanco et al. (2005) we test the theoretical equivalence of credit default swap (CDS) and spreads that dictates a CI relationship between the two. The main innovation of the present analysis is the use of a threshold vector error-correction (TVECM) model, thus allowing thresholds within the sample covering the period 1990 to 2010. Moreover, by employing this methodology we are able to evaluate the degree and dynamics of transaction costs resulting from various events due to external market imperfections but also domestic factors. The main hypothesis we test is to what extent spreads and CDS are indeed integrated that may result in an efficient and integrated segniorage capital market. Our findings support the gradual integration hypothesis. We find that spreads and CDS are cointegrated, though threshold effects are also revealed in terms of events that have impacted on markets.     

MODELING THE INCIDENCE OF SELF‐EMPLOYMENT: INDIVIDUAL AND EMPLOYMENT TYPE HETEROGENEITY

Modeling the incidence of self‐employment has traditionally proved problematic. Although the supply‐side characteristics of the self‐employed are well documented, we argue that the literature has neglected demand‐side aspects. We explore the determinants of self‐employment using the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances. We present results from an econometric framework that allows us to model, separately and simultaneously, the influences of individual heterogeneity (i.e., supply‐side factors) and employment type heterogeneity (i.e., demand‐side factors) on the probability of self‐employment. Our findings suggest that while individual characteristics are important determinants of self‐employment, there are factors specific to the type of employment that influence self‐employment. (JEL J23, J33, C25, C10)     

Fiscal Autonomy and Total Government Expenditure: An Austrian Case-study

The ongoing debate on the efficiency of a federal system versus a centralized system has lead to a diverse and unclear empirical picture of the effects of fiscal decentralization on public sector growth. For analyzing these effects it is crucial to consider the sub-national decision power on taxing and spending. In the current paper, we test for the effects of fiscal autonomy on total government expenditure using time series from 1955 to 2007 for Austria. Determinants of government expenditure are economic growth, fiscal illusion of policy makers, and the unemployment rate. We additionally account for different degrees of sub-national fiscal autonomy. Our econometric results suggest that the often-hypothesized dampening effects of fiscal autonomy cannot be corroborated for the Austrian system.     

Under what conditions may social contracts arise? Evidence from the Hanseatic League

Social contractarians commonly take social contracts to be solely hypothetical and refrain from elaborating on the factors that influence the feasibility of the formation of social contracts. In contrast, this paper aims at providing a discussion of the conditions affecting the feasibility of social contracts. I argue that the more aligned the preferences of group members for public goods are, the more the individuals share similar social norms, and the smaller the group is the more feasible a genuine social contract becomes. I provide evidence in support of my contention from the medieval Hanseatic League. At the Hanseatic Kontor in Novgorod, one of the four major trading posts of the Hanseatic League in cities outside of Germany, German merchants agreed to live under the rule of a constitution that gave rise to a political authority for the Kontor society.     

Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators

The economic effects of federalism are unclear: some papers find that federalism has strong positive effects on a number of economically relevant variables, others find negative effects. The results often crucially hinge on the proxies for federalism used. In this paper, we critically survey the existing indicators for both federalism and fiscal decentralization. We argue that federalism is a constitutional institution, whereas decentralization is the outcome of a policy choice, and that the two ought to be systematically distinguished because decentralization can also occur in nonfederally structured states. We further argue that institutional details are very important with regard to federalism and that dummy variables usually capture only very specific aspects of these institutional details. We use factor analysis to test whether the latent variables behind the observed indicators support these assumptions. More than two important factors are derived, implying that a more fine-grained differentiation beyond simply “‘federalism” and “decentralization” might be in order. The correlations of the most important proxies for various aspects of federalism and decentralization with a number of quasi-exogenous variables, as well as with institutional variables, are usually rather modest.     

“Core” and “Periphery” in a Monetary Union: A Macroeconomic Policy Game

We develop a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study strategic interactions between macroeconomic policy makers, namely the central bank and governments. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies, whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a core, with lower initial public debt, and a periphery, with higher initial public debt. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that mildly active cooperative countercyclical policies dominate noncooperative solutions and a scenario of no policy intervention. Optimal policies call for a brief expansionary action to bolster the effects on output and a return to a small fiscal primary surplus as soon as the crisis is over until the targeted level of public debt is reached.     

Market Instability and Revision Error in Risk Premium

This paper provides a theory and evidence that the risk premium puzzle is viewed as a phenomenon pertaining to the unstable foreign exchange market. In an unstable market, revision error uncompensated by an initial risk premium accrues due to consumer expectation revision about the ex ante uncertainty of the exchange rate. The risk premium widely deviates from its initial level, depending on the frequency of the consumer expectation revision and the degree of risk aversion. Subsequent evidence shows the existence of the revision errors for the risk premium during the Asian currency crisis and the recent financial crisis periods.