Determinanten des Kundenwerts von Versicherungsnehmern

This paper discusses how the customer equity concept can be transformed to fit to insurance policy holders. The finding is that the equity of a policyholder can not be calculated in line with concepts of other classes of business, because the insurance industry shows special features in its core business. The stochastic characteristics of such a business must be integrated into the concept. These include its service nature and specific supervisory regulations for the capital investments as well as the distribution of profit. In terms of the insurance company, the following equity-determiners of a policyholder are important and should be part of the customer equity model: Firstly the equity of the customer with regard to the past, his future potential and his cross-selling equity as the monetary determiners. Secondly the equity which can be generated through word-of-mouth and customer information. The remaining determiners of the concept used in other branches of business, notably the equity of synergy, cooperation and loyality of a customer are already incorporated in the mentioned components.     

AUCTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION

Abstract. This is a detailed introduction to auction theory. It begins with a simple analysis of standard auctions and then uses a strikingly simple general solution of symmetric private values auctions to prove the payoff equivalence of many auction rules. The basic framework is then modified to admit risk aversion, multi-unit and repeated auctions as well as collusion. Then follows an introduction to optimal auctions, with and without stochastic entry, and to common value auctions and the winner's curse problem. The survey closes with a sample of applications, from the regulation of natural monopolies to price competition in oligopoly and the government securities market.     

Is the EU's labour market threatened by a wave of immigration?

As the accession negotiations continue between the European Union and the Central and Eastern European Countries, Germany in particular fears that granting free movement of labour to these countries might generate a wave of new entrants that could overwhelm its labour market. The following article uses migration determinants and draws on previous experience of integrating countries into the EU in an attempt to reach conclusions about migration patterns that may result from the forthcoming eastward enlargement.     

A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction

This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.     

Reputation and Imperfectly Observable Commitment: The Chain Store Paradox Revisited

This paper reconsiders Selten's famous chain store paradox and its solution by Kreps and Wilson, which is based on entrants' uncertainty concerning the incumbent monopolist's predisposition to fight entry. Following Milgrom and Roberts, we interpret the predisposition to fight entry as the result of a rationally chosen commitment. However, commitment is imperfectly observable. Other assumptions are maintained. We show that a rational monopolist never fights entry, even if he may commit himself to an aggressive course of action. Entry occurs in all markets and is never fought. Hence, Selten's chain store paradox comes back in full force.     

Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (Int. J. Game Theory 20 (1992) 393) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which first-order stochastically dominates the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong, and then test bidders’ preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.     

The Value Relevance of Mandatory Non‐GAAP Earnings

This paper examines the value relevance of earnings components where there is a mandatory requirement to report generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) earnings and non‐GAAP earnings, and where the items to be eliminated from GAAP earnings are defined in detail. The setting is different from non‐GAAP earnings disclosures presented in the United States and elsewhere, where managers have discretion over whether to report a non‐GAAP earnings number, and what to exclude from GAAP earnings. Our mandatory setting enables us to report value relevance results that are not confounded by managers' discretionary choices regarding non‐GAAP earnings exclusions. We use price‐level regressions, based on the Ohlson (1995) model, to test for incremental and relative value relevance. The results show that non‐GAAP earnings reported under a mandatory regime have higher value relevance than GAAP earnings. The disaggregation of these items is useful to investors in a setting where managerial motivations are minimized.     

Negotiating M&As under uncertainty: The influence of managerial flexibility on the first-mover advantage

Using a dynamic real options approach we show that managerial flexibility is strengthening the first-mover advantage in bargaining M&As by undermining the bargaining power of the second mover.