The Effects of Open Market Operations in a Model of Intermediation and Growth

This article presents a monetary growth model where spatial separation and limited communication create a role for banks. Monetary policy interacts with the financial system's liquidity provision to affect the existence, multiplicity, and dynamical properties of equilibria. Moderate levels of risk aversion and tight monetary policy can lead to multiple steady states. Dynamical equilibria can be indeterminate, with oscillatory paths. Thus financial market frictions are a source of indeterminacies and endogenous volatility. Under plausible conditions, tight monetary policy raises the nominal interest rate and inflation rate and reduces long run output. Thus, a central bank's liquidity provision can promote growth.     

Bartlett adjustments for systems of linear equations with linear restrictions

Simple matrix formulae are derived for calculating a Bartlett adjustment to the likelihood ratio test statistic for testing linear parameter restrictions in a system of linear equations. For the special case of column and/or row restrictions on the matrix of coefficients the adjustment is a simple function of matrix dimensions being invariant to sample observations and the error covariance matrix. An example of testing for homogeneity and symmetry in a demand system is given.     

Volatility Estimation with Price Quanta

Volatility estimators based on high, low, opening and closing prices have been developed, and perform well on simulated data, but on real data they frequently give lower values for volatility than the simple open–close estimator. This may be due to the fact that for real data, the maximum (or minimum) price is often at the beginning or end of the day. While this could not happen if the observed process was log Brownian, it could happen if the observed process were log Brownian, but observed only to the nearest penny. We develop the theory of such approximations to derive the corrected versions of the basic estimators.     

What is (or should be) the difference between competency modeling and traditional job analysis?

We argue that Competency Modeling (CM) has the potential to fill an important void in Traditional Job Analysis (TJA), specifically the infusion of strategic concerns in day-to-day employee behavior. Moreover TJA and CM pursue fundamentally different goals, which those who argue for and against either of these human resource methods at times may overlook. To buttress this point we compare TJA and CM along six dimensions: purpose (describe versus influence behavior), view of the job (an object to be described versus a role to be enacted), focus (job versus organization), time orientation (past versus future), performance level (typical versus maximum), and measurement approach (latent trait versus clinical judgment). We conclude with a series of recommendations regarding ways in which TJA can be joined with CM so that an organization may achieve, among other outcomes, the critical purpose of directing employee behavior toward the accomplishment of its strategic objectives.     

THE EFFECT OF MARKET PROXY REBALANCING POLICIES ON DETECTING ABNORMAL PERFORMANCE

In this paper, effects on the measured abnormal performance of test portfolios are compared against market proxies having the same or different rebalancing policies. Results show that the common practice of comparing buy-and-hold test portfolios with equally weighted market proxies produces lower Jensen [ 7 ] alphas and lower alpha t-values. Comparing buy-and-hold test portfolios with value-weighted market proxies produces higher portfolio betas and alphas, but lower alpha t-values. Finally, comparing buy-and-hold test portfolios with buy-and-hold market proxies produces the most powerful tests of abnormal performance.     

Do Termination Provisions Truncate the Takeover Bidding Process?

We provide new evidence on termination provisions and the takeoverbidding process. Our central contribution is a novel databasefrom Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) documents thataccurately measures the incidence of termination provisionsand the depth of competition in takeover deals. We show thatbiased data in prior research produced incorrect conclusionson the relation between termination provisions and judicialdecisions, bidder toeholds, and deal size. Our comprehensivedata also show that termination provisions are positively relatedto takeover competition. Our evidence is consistent with theinformation/commitment hypothesis in which termination provisionsdo not truncate bidding but instead culminate the takeover process.(JEL G34; K22; D44).