Product Quality and the Criminal Law

When considering product quality, focus on the civil law as the means of obtaining consumer redress should not blind one to appreciation that the criminal law also has a useful role to play. Even in circumstances in which physical harm to the consumer has not occurred, economic detriment can be sufficient for the quality of a product to be questioned in the context of not only civil but also criminal proceedings. This article uses the example of English law to explore the rationales for regulation of product quality backed by criminal sanctions, and shows how there may be overlaps but also divergences in the scope of coverage of civil and criminal laws.     

Real indeterminacy of equilibria and manipulability

In this paper, we analyze the indeterminacy of equilibria in financial markets and propose a selection mechanism. We suggest that there is one equilibrium that prevails over the others, as a result of the market power of the agents that some states of nature become monopolists of certain commodities. Given a financial assets model, we define a price game and show the existence of mixed strategies equilibria. Then we purify these equilibria by considering a price game with incomplete information.     

Tax Deductions and the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation

Recent work emphasizes the efficiency costs of tax deductions that distort the pattern of household spending. Using evidence on the sensitivity of taxable income to tax rates, this work suggests that the marginal welfare cost (MWC) of income taxes in the United States could be dramatically higher because of tax deductions, and might exceed unity. This paper develops an alternative approach for assessing the MWC using evidence on underlying parameters (e.g., labor supply elasticities, the demand elasticity for tax-favored goods). A MWC of around 0.3 to 0.5 seems more consistent with these parameter values, though this estimate is still significantly higher because of tax deductions.     

Spatial Price Adjustment with and without Trade*

We investigate the possibility that price transmission between spatially distinct markets might vary during periods with and without physical trade flows. We test for differences between trade and non‐trade regimes by using generalized reduced rank regression (GRRR) techniques suggested by Hansen (2003) . We apply these techniques to semi‐weekly price and trade flow data for tomato markets in Zimbabwe and find that intermarket price adjustment occurs in both trade and non‐trade periods. Indeed, the adjustments are generally larger and more rapid in periods without physical trade flows. This finding underscores the importance of information flow for market performance.     

Applying conjoint analysis in economic evaluations: an application to menorrhagia

The increased demand for health care, coupled with limited resources, means that decisions have to be made concerning the allocation of scarce health care resources. This paper considers how conjoint analysis (CA) can be used to aid this decision making process. It is shown how the technique can be used to estimate marginal rates of substitution between attributes, willingness to pay (WTP) if cost is included as an attribute and overall utility scores for different ways of providing a service. The technique is applied to consider women's preferences for two surgical procedures in the treatment of menorrhagia: hysterectomy and conservative surgery. The results suggest conservative surgery is preferred to hysterectomy, as indicated by higher utility scores for the former and a marginal WTP of 7593 to have conservative surgery rather than hysterectomy. The internal validity of CA was also shown. It is concluded that CA is a potentially useful instrument for policy makers. However, numerous methodological issues need addressing before the technique becomes an established instrument within economic evaluations.     

The mediating role of work engagement on the relationship between job involvement and affective commitment

This study examines job involvement and work engagement as predictors of affective commitment. Specifically, we test the proposal of Hallberg and Schaufeli (2006) that work engagement is a mediator of the relationship between job involvement and affective commitment using a survey of 405 Italian working adults. To test the model, mediation effects technique and structural equation modelling were applied to the collected data. Our hypothesis that work engagement fully mediates the relationship between job involvement and affective commitment was supported. This is the first study to demonstrate the importance of job involvement in promoting affective commitment via three dimensions of work engagement. We therefore assert that HR managers should direct their available resources to promoting job involvement and work engagement in their employees.     

Maintaining the Common Pool: Voluntary Water Conservation in Response to Varying Scarcity

Studies of voluntary conservation response to changing information about an environmental problem have traditionally been synonymous with studies of information campaign effectiveness. As such, they have not been able to capture the response to actual changes in the environment. This paper takes a novel approach to identifying voluntary conservation by studying the impact of changing storage levels on urban water usage in the context of a prolonged drought and a highly ’water aware’ community. Our results suggest that voluntary conservation increases substantially when water is scarce and the public value of the savings is greatest. We discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of environmental information campaigns in general, and urban water demand management in particular.     

Information and size of coalitions

We consider a set of asymmetrically informed agents, where the information of each trader is susceptible of being altered when she becomes a member of a coalition. For this, we consider a general rule that depending on the coalition, a signal (or an information partition) is assigned to each member of the coalition. We set examples showing that Grodal’s (Econometrica 40:581–583, 1972), Schmeidler’s (Econometrica 40:579–580, 1972) and Vind’s (Econometrica 40:585–586, 1972) core characterizations of a continuum economy may fail in this general informational setting. However, under mild assumptions on the rule, we extend Schmeidler’s and Vind’s results to economies that allocate information to agents in each coalition according to the rule. We then focus on information mechanisms based on the size of coalitions and provide a general characterization result for the corresponding cores. Moreover, we pay close attention to the rule that assigns the shared information to each member of specific coalitions. We prove that the resulting cores are exactly the same independently of whether arbitrarily small or large coalitions share information.