Bergstrom,Blume, and Varian: Voluntary contributions and neutrality

Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian provided a neutrality result for the private provision of public goods that has inspired a considerable literature. The result has significant implications for income redistribution and broader policy interventions. This paper reviews the basic result and its applications, and discusses extensions to general private provision economies.     

Interest rate volatility,asymmetric interest rate pass through and the monetary transmission mechanism in the Caribbean compared to US and Asia

We analyse asymmetric interest rate pass through, the impact of interest rate volatility on interest rates and the monetary transmission mechanism in the countries of the CSME² using the Asymmetric TAR and MTAR cointegration models by Enders and Siklos (2001) and the EC-EGARCH(1, 1)-M model by Wang and Lee (2009), who examined the same issue for the US and nine Asian countries. The CSME is a unique case of study given that it contains within it a monetary union: the OECS². First, our results show that there is complete pass through in the retail lending rate for Trinidad and Tobago and for St. Lucia and therefore, by extension, in all the countries of the OECS³ but not the other countries of the CSME. In contrast, Wang and Lee (2009) found complete pass through for the US deposit rate but not in the rates of the other nine Asian countries. Second, in Wang and Lee (2009) the results of the TAR and MTAR models show asymmetric cointegrating relationships in the lending rate of three Asian countries and the deposit rate of five Asian countries. Comparatively, our results show asymmetric cointegrating relationship in the lending and deposit rate of only three countries out of six: Jamaica, Guyana and St. Lucia. Third, the results from the conditional mean equation in the EC-EGARCH(1, 1)-M model in Wang and Lee (2009) show that for the countries with asymmetric cointegrating relationships, the lending rate displays downward adjustment rigidity and the deposit rate displays upward adjustment rigidity. In contrast, our results show that both rates for Jamaica display upward adjustment rigidity and both rates for Guyana and St. Lucia display downward adjustment rigidity. Finally, similarly to Wang and Lee (2009), our results from the EC-EGARCH(1, 1)-M models show that the effect of interest rate volatility on interest rates varies among countries. Three out of the Asian countries from Wang and Lee (2009) support the collusive pricing arrangement hypothesis while in our case it happens only in two countries out of six from the CSME: Guyana and St. Lucia. Moreover, the leverage effect exists in the lending rate for two out six countries in the CSME as it happens in Wang and Lee (2009) in two out of their Asian countries. Along the same lines, the leverage effect exists in the deposit rate of three countries in the CSME, contrary to Wang and Lee (2009), who do not find any evidence at all. This shows evidence of an important heterogeneity in the behaviour of the CSME countries and that Trinidad and Tobago and St. Lucia (showing the effect of belonging to a monetary union) are our only analysed countries where, as in the US, there is complete pass through and the central bank can transfer all the cost associated with an increase in its policy rate to the retail rates.     

Volatility spill-overs in commodity spot prices: New empirical results

The classical rational expectations model of commodity markets implies that expected spot price risk is an explanatory variable in spot price regressions; and also that inventory carryover, which is reduced by a larger price variance, creates autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic processes in spot prices. In order to falsify/verify this theory, it has typically been assumed that the square root of the conditional variance of spot prices, a proxy for spot price risk, enters the conditional mean function of spot prices. Based on this simple representation, a typical but counter intuitive outcome has been that spot price risk has an insignificant impact on spot prices, see, e.g., Beck (Beck, S., 1993. A Rational Expectations Model of Time Varying Risk Premia in Commodities Futures Markets: Theory and Evidence. International Economic Review 34, 149–168, Beck, S., 2001. Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Commodity Spot Prices. Journal of Applied Econometrics 16, 115–132). In this paper, we propose an alternative functional relationship (from GARCH(1,1) to GARCH(1,1)-AR(m)) between spot price risk and spot prices that is fully supported by the classical rational expectations model, and based on this new representation we are able to provide stronger empirical support for Muth's rational expectation theory.     

Cooperation or resistance? Representing workers' health and safety in a hazardous industry

This study considers the actions of worker health and safety representatives in coalmines in Queensland, where there is little evidence of the facilitating role of management previous studies have associated with the successful operation of worker representation in occupational health and safety. It examines how worker representatives deliver their pluralist representational role in a context characterised by essentially unitary thinking amongst their employers and the effectiveness of the strategies they use.     

Union games: technological unemployment

Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, C72. Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper.     

IMPACT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE ON THE INCIDENCE OF SECOND JOB HOLDING IN BRITAIN

The advent of any earnings boost, such as provided by the introduction of a minimum wage, might be expected to reduce the supply of low‐paid individuals wanting to hold a second job. This paper uses difference‐in‐differences estimation on a panel of individuals matched across successive Labour Force Surveys around the time of the introduction of the national minimum wage in the United Kingdom in order to estimate the impact of the minimum wage and its subsequent upratings on second job working. There is little evidence to suggest that the extra pay provided by the introduction of the minimum wage was sufficient to affect the incidence of second job holding significantly. However, hours worked in the main job by second job holders may have risen relative to those not covered by the minimum wage; and hours worked in second jobs may have fallen for those whose second job was initially below the minimum.     

Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents

We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim was to describe the equilibrium price formation and analyze how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. To do so, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley–Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (J Math Econ 39:391–400, 2003 ).     

Towards equilibrium offers in unit commitment auctions with nonconvex costs

We compare two types of uniform-price auction formats commonly used in wholesale electricity markets—centrally committed and self-committed markets. Auctions in both markets are conducted by an independent system operator that collects generator bids and determines which generators will operate and how much electricity each will produce. In centrally committed markets, generators submit two-part bids consisting of a startup cost and a variable energy cost. Self-committed markets force generators to incorporate their startup costs into a one-part energy bid. The system operator in a centrally committed system ensures that each generator recovers the startup and energy costs stated in its two-part bid, while no such guarantees are made in self-committed markets. The energy cost ranking and incentive properties of these market designs remains an open question. While the system operator can determine the most efficient dispatch with a centralized market, the auction mechanism used to solicit generator data compels generators to overstate costs. Self commitment might involve less efficient dispatch but have better incentive properties. We derive Nash equilibria for both market designs in a symmetric duopoly setting. We also derive simple conditions under which the two market designs will be expected cost-equivalent.     

Voter decisions on eminent domain and police power reforms

One unresolved issue arising from the use of eminent domain power involves how the perceived benefits and costs of eminent domain power affect people’s positions on the reform of eminent domain and police power law. The paper addresses this issue by estimating a voting model that explains voters’ decisions on eminent domain and police power reform referenda in the US. Estimates indicate that eminent domain referendum outcomes hinged on voters’ fundamental values and ideology, and voters’ immediate self-interest. Voters’ fundamental values and ideology affects referendum outcomes insofar as educational attainment in a county has a statistically significant effect on support for reform. Despite the greater incidence of eminent domain in low income and poorer communities, success of reform referenda in this study was found to be greater in counties with higher incomes and lower unemployment rates. This implies that whatever asymmetry exists in the exercise of eminent domain law across income groups does not affect voter reaction to eminent domain reforms. Moreover, counties with high unemployment rates consider the larger potential benefits from urban renewal projects in vote decision-making providing a link between self-interest and voting behavior.