On Conformity Testing and the Use of two Stage Procedures

Conformity testing is a systematic examination of the extent to which an entity conforms to specified requirements. Such testing is performed in industry as well as in regulatory agencies in a variety of fields. In this paper we discuss conformity testing under measurement or sampling uncertainty. Although the situation has many analogies to statistical testing of a hypothesis concerning the unknown value of the measurand there are no generally accepted rules for handling measurement uncertainty when testing for conformity. Usually the objective of a test for conformity is to provide assurance of conformity. We therefore suggest that an appropriate statistical test for conformity should be devised such that there is only a small probability of declaring conformity when in fact the entity does not conform. An operational way of formulating this principle is to require that whenever an entity has been declared to be conforming, it should not be possible to alter that declaration, even if the entity was investigated with better (more precise) measuring instruments, or measurement procedures. Some industries and agencies designate specification limits under consideration of the measurement uncertainty. This practice is not invariant under changes of measurement procedure. We therefore suggest that conformity testing should be based upon a comparison of a confidence interval for the value of the measurand with some limiting values that have been designated without regard to the measurement uncertainty. Such a procedure is in line with the recently established practice of reporting measurement uncertainty as “an interval of values that could reasonably be attributed to the measurand”. The price to be paid for a reliable assurance of conformity is a relatively large risk that the procedure will fail to establish conformity for entities that only marginally conform. We suggest a two‐stage procedure that may improve this situation and provide a better discriminatory ability. In an example we illustrate the determination of the power function of such a two‐stage procedure.     

Information Technology As A Factor Of Production: The Role Of Differences Among Firms

Despite evidence that information technology (IT) has recently become a productive investment for a large cross-section of firms, a number of questions remain. Some of these issues can be addressed by extending the basic production function approach that was applied in earlier work. Specifically, in this short paper we: 1) control for individual firm differences in productivity by employing a ‘firm effects’ specification, 2) consider the more flexible translog specification instead of only the Cobb-Douglas specification, and 3) allow all parameters to vary between various subsectors of the economy.

We find that while ‘firm effects’ may account for as much as half of the productivity benefits imputed to IT in earlier studies, the elasticity of IT remains positive and statistically significant. We also find that the estimates of IT elasticity and marginal product are little-changed when the less restrictive translog production function is employed. Finally, we find only limited evidence of differences in IT's marginal product between manufacturing and services and between the ‘measurable’ and ‘unmeasurable’ sectors of the economy. Surprisingly, we find that the marginal product of IT is at least as high in firms that did not grow during 1988–1992 sample period as it is in firms that grew.     

Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies*

Bertrand supergames with non‐binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets. The experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication: zero‐cost, low‐cost and high‐cost. Prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly. Moreover, costly communication decreases the number of messages, but more importantly, it enhances the stability of collusive agreements. McCutcheon (1997) presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices. Although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of McCutcheon's (1997) argument, the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms.     

Improving the business impact of foresight

Achieving an impact on business decision-makers with foresight does not appear to be an easy task. Therefore, the Macro Trends team at Deutsche Bank Research has formulated some criteria to guide foresight projects. They should aim to produce plausibility, provide convenience and inspiration as well as an appropriate time perspective with regard to the content of foresight results. In addition, a structured way of producing and delivering foresight, a seamless inclusion in organisational procedures, a high level of interaction with decision-makers, ideational entrepreneurship, innovation regarding communication with business people, and persistence and synchronisation with the business organisation are the key criteria for achieving a higher impact from foresight projects. To live up to these criteria, the Macro Trends team has developed a 'trend map' which provides a conceptual aggregation of trends - to provide orientation for decision-makers and stakeholders.     

EXPRESS LANE OR TOLLBOOTH IN THE DESERT? THE SEC'S FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY ISSUANCE

U.S. companies that need capital may choose between selling securities in the private and public markets. These venues differ in terms of direct issuance costs, the required information disclosed, the liability incurred, and the mechanics of the capital-raising process itself. During the last two decades, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has deregulated private offerings by broadening their investor base and increasing secondary market liquidity. At the same time, SEC policy has bifurcated the offering process in the public market into two distinct segments based largely on company size and seasoning. Large public issuers have seen a gradual deregulation and acceleration of their capitalraising processes. Important changes for issuers include allowing them to incorporate information into registration statements by reference to Exchange Act reports, to use shelf registration to speed up offers, and to place securities offshore with less regulatory uncertainty. Though small issuers enjoy some of the benefits of these changes, deregulation of their offerings has been somewhat less pronounced. In a Commission report and a subsequent concept release, the SEC indicates it may restructure and unify these three disparate strands of capital raising through an innovative schema of registering companies rather than securities.     

The constant preferences assumption as a specification error in demand analysis

Complete demand systems often are estimated under the assumption that preferences are constant. If preferences do change in reality, this leads to a specification error. This note explores some of the implications of such a specification error.     

House prices, money, credit, and the macroeconomy

This paper assesses the links between money, credit, house prices,and economic activity in industrialized countries over the lastthree decades. The analysis is based on a fixed-effects panelvector autoregression, estimated using quarterly data for 17industrialized countries spanning the period 1970–2006.The main results of the analysis are the following. (i) Thereis evidence of a significant multidirectional link between houseprices, monetary variables, and the macroeconomy. (ii) The linkbetween house prices and monetary variables is found to be strongerover a more recent sub-sample from 1985 to 2006. (iii) The effectsof shocks to money and credit are found to be stronger whenhouse prices are booming.     

The (International) Political Economy of Falling Wage Shares: Situating Working-Class Agency

This paper relates the financial and monetary dimensions of the contemporary economic crisis to working-class agency via a central concern of classical political economy: the distribution of surplus between the chief factors of production. The fall in the wage share of value added is now accepted as a stylised fact in the empirical economic literature. This paper argues that the punctuated pattern of the development validates the regulation theoretical narrative of an epochal shift from Fordism to finance-led accumulation. Furthermore, synthesising econometric studies supports a class-centred explanation. In the last instance, the falling wage share is due to successful transnational class rule in the form of a neoliberal hegemonic paradigm. Crucially, such class rule restructured the environment of trade unions, rendering increasingly ineffective its relational power resources. The paper concludes by considering the contradictory implications for organised labour of the current financial crisis. On the one hand, the financial crisis offers an opportunity to link its particular interests to the general interest of macroeconomic management since low wage share inhibits growth rates. But how might trade unions assert a higher wage share in the face of the structural power of (financial) capital?